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Abstract 
In the Introduction I explore the reasons for my enquiry, and outline the inadequacies of 
some of the existing attempts to determine the aims and purposes of mathematics in 
education. In Part 1 I discuss the scope and validity of the justification of mathematics 
on the basis of its supposed usefulness. From there I defend the view that, in principle at 
least, there are different kinds of reasons for learning mathematics. 
In Parts 2 and 3 I attempt to explain whether or not mathematics is fit for two particular 
non-utility purposes claimed by various writers, and if so, how. Thus, in Part 2, I 
examine the rather strong claim that mathematics is afine art, and hence or otherwise 
that it is a source of aesthetic satisfaction. In Part 3, I explore the claim that 
mathematics provides mental training. Here I shall show that 'mental training', is a 
broad notion ranging from the rather moral character training to the more restricted 
notion of training in logic. Between these extremes lies a more modest notion which I 
argue is the most plausible. 
The thesis is thus both a history of ideas and a clarification of the concepts used in 
describing fairly established purposes and rejecting those that seem to me to be 
unattainable or at least scarcely attainable by studying mathematics. The reason for the 
study is twofold. I see it as a particular case of the general enquiry into the aims of 
education. So that my conclusions should inform those who want to justify the place of 
mathematics on the curriculum. Also, however, I want to suggest that the purposes of 
mathematics education are internally related to understanding the subject, so that the 
pupil will gain understanding from a clearer notion of what he or she is doing 
mathematics for. 
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Introduction 
It is thought that every activity, artistic or scientific, in fact every 
deliberate action or pursuit, has for its object the attainment of some 
good. We may therefore assent to the view which has been expressed 
that 'the good' is 'that at which all things aim'. 
(Aristotle, 1953 edn p.25) 
It is a commonplace remark to say that mathematics is a difficult subject to learn. Even 
if there is no kudos attached to failure at mathematics at school, there is scarcely any 
shame in announcing that one was never very good at the subject, that one failed the 
exams once or twice or maybe more. Music, Foreign Languages, and Geography have 
their difficulties too. Indeed it would be quite possible to master mathematics and yet 
still find these latter subjects difficult. To be good at mathematics does not imply that 
any other subject will be learnt without difficulty. Yet mathematics is difficult in 
another way. It is difficult to learn and it seems it must be learnt. This creates panic. But 
one cannot, as it were, leave it on the side of one's plate. Even if there is no shame 
attached to failing at mathematics, to have failed at it is often regarded as a sign that one 
might not be 'academic' after all. It is one of the school subjects which traditionally 
puts one through one's paces intellectually. To make matters worse, many people are 
not clear why they learn it. It takes little to convince anyone that it has played an 
indispensable role in shaping modem civilisation. There seems hardly an area of life in 
which mathematics does not playa part. Moreover, most people will concede that there 
is some mathematics that we all need to know and understand in order to survive. But 
they cannot see the point of much of the mathematics which they struggled to learn. 
This is not simply the case for those for whom one would have to invent hypothetical 
cases when they might need to use, say, simultaneous equations or even finding the 
number of sticks required to make the nth figure in a sequence of growing stick figures. 
Time and time again, in my professional life as a teacher educator, trainee primary 
teachers tell me that my primary curriculum mathematics sessions were those that they 
were most dreading. Almost as often, these trainees are the ones who come to 
understand and even begin to enjoy mathematics. Is this enjoyment the point of it all? 
More recently, with the government requirement that trainees must be audited on their 
own subject knowledge and understanding of mathematics, and that they must make 
good any gaps that appear in a stringent list of post primary level mathematical 
knowledge and understanding, the anxiety sets in again. Trainee teachers realise that 
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they must have a secure knowledge of topics which they will most probably not be 
required to teach. But why should this involve revisiting GSCE topics? Again these 
trainees often fail to understand. The answer implied in the government document is 
that these topics 'underpin' the material in the pupil's curriculum. This seems to silence 
them for a while, but sooner or later the questions arise again. Why all this 
mathematics? 
To the best of my knowledge no one has undertaken an enquiry into the rationale of 
mathematics education in the detailed way in which I have done. Those writing on 
mathematics education do often include a short section on the reasons for teaching or 
learning the subject, but the reasons are usually taken for granted or glossed over. I shall 
be referring to several of these in my account. 1 
Before attempting to seek a rationale for mathematics education, it is worth asking why 
it is worth seeking. I have already made it clear that none of the answers that I have so 
far found are sufficiently detailed and critical. There are at least two reasons why the 
question 'why learn mathematics?' has become my central research question. On the 
one hand, in Great Britain at least, it has been argued that the aims of the National 
Curriculum have not been sufficiently refined, and so an examination of the particular 
contribution which mathematics can bring would seem to throw light on this issue. On 
the other hand, certain theorists have made links between a pupil's understanding of 
mathematics and an awareness ofthe purpose of the subject, which would imply that a 
clear idea of the value of mathematics affects pupils' ability to learn. I shall discuss 
each of these in turn. 
The neglect of educational aims in recent years 
In the first instance, my enquiry may be seen to arise as a particular case of the 
examination of the general aims of education. For one writer, at least, these have been 
in a state of neglect in recent years. So if this has been true of the general aims of 
education, perhaps it is also true of the specific area of mathematics education, in which 
case there is a need to examine the aims of the latter. 
I In the current century the following are among those who have explicitly asked the question 'why teach / 
learn /do mathematics?': Fitch (1902), Yeldham (1936), Skemp (1971), Griffiths & Howson (1974), HMI 
(1979), Cockcroft et al (1982), Cornelius (1984), Leibeck (1984), HMI (1987), 
Wells (1989), Niss (1994) and Davis (1995). 
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At the time when John White wrote his book The Aims of Education Restated he wrote 
in the preface: 'For the past twenty years at least, the key word in writings about the 
content of education has been 'curriculum', not 'aims" (White, 1982). He made this 
observation before the introduction of the National Curriculum in Britain. But in a later 
book (White, 1990) his point was reiterated. He noted that whilst a few 'bland phrases' 
pertaining to aims are included in the documentation, what these denote are perfectly 
compatible with radically differing kinds of society, and so once again, questions of 
suitable aims were left unaddressed. The bland phrases, in question, included the 
promotion of the ' ... spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development of 
pupils at the school and of society' , and the preparation of pupils' ... for the 
opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of adult life' (p.14). But as White points 
out, such phrases might mean' ... virtually anything - or nothing', and that more 
importantly: 'There is no obvious reason ... why a tyrant like Hitler or Stalin should 
object to [thesef as statements of their educational aims' (p.14). So White could 
conclude that the general aims of education, having been restated, still remain 
insufficiently refined by curriculum planners. 
The blandness of the aims set out in the National Curriculum is in a sense 
understandable if not defensible. Whatever the aims of the National Curriculum ought 
to be, one thing is clear: they must not be those which embody or promote one 
particular lifestyle rather than another. Otherwise, they would seem to conflict with 
democratic ideals. But on the other hand, what White calls 'neutrality' is also 
unsatisfactory, within statements of aims, since: ' .. .in refusing preference to some 
ideals of life over others, it overlooks the fact that it is tacitly presupposing the value of 
personal autonomy' 3 (p.22). 
However, White was not daunted by either of these prima facie objections, to setting 
educational aims of substance, on the one hand, or omitting to state any, on the other. 
He argues that the demands implicit in a democratic society, which the National 
Curriculum must serve, do entail certain substantive aims and in his book he proceeds 
2 My use of square brackets is twofold. I shall use them (i) to indicate the insertion of my own word or 
words where that or those of the author are missing or require augmentation or clarification. (ii) I shall 
occasionally use them to bracket off words which I am retaining in the authors' original lines, but which 
may be ignored for my purposes. 
3 Whether of not the extended defmition ofnumeracy, which builds in not only ability but also 
inclination, on behalf of the pupil, is intrusive in this respect is a nice point (see Reynolds, D et ai, 1998 
p.ll) 
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to explain what these should be. So one question for mathematics education is whether 
or not it has suitable aims. Or whether it is the case that its particular aims are in a state 
of neglect? 4 
But even if White is right and suitable aims are scarcely to be found in the National 
Curriculum, the concern that the aims of recent mathematics education in Britain have 
been in 'a state of neglect', in the years leading up to the introduction of the National 
Curriculum, may seem unfounded by glancing at section I of the DES booklet 
Mathematics from 5 to 16 (HMI, 1987). This section is clearly entitled 'the aims of 
mathematics teaching'. The section contains a list of aims, which is set out for all pupils 
in schools. It was not supposed to be an exhaustive list since it allowed for others to be 
added by teachers. Aims that were not left to chance were discussed under the following 
headings: 
(1.2) Mathematics as an essential element of communication 
(1.3) Mathematics as a powerful tool 
(1.4) Appreciation of relationships within mathematics 
(1.5) Awareness of the fascination of mathematics 
(1.6) Imagination, initiative and flexibility of mind in mathematics 
(1.7) Working in a systematic way 
(1.8) Working independently 
(1.9) Working cooperatively 
(1.10) In-depth study in mathematics 
(1.11) Pupils' confidence in their mathematical abilities 
These phrases do not spell out a particularly satisfactory rationale for mathematics since 
they do not always make it explicit why mathematics ought to be taught, what good it is 
4 It is an interesting question whether the aims of mathematics could ever be other than in a state of 
neglect if the general aims were so. But this is not a question that I will go into. 
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supposed to lead to.5 Some of the statements concern what we should be trying to do 
within mathematics. It may of course be the case that the purposes of mathematics do 
include the part it plays in promoting such general dispositions like self-sufficiency as 
in aim (1.8). But any such aim of self-sufficiency is soon neutralised by aim (1.9), that 
of working cooperatively, unless the overall aim is to produce pupils who can work 
both on their own and with others. It must be remarked, however, that such phrases are 
similar to the kind that White has already noted as being of a bland, unhelpful kind. 
Moreover, the aims headed by numbers (1.7) to (1.11) are usually regarded as desirable 
across the curriculum if 'mathematics' and 'mathematical' are replaced by other subject 
names. However, those aims that remain seem to be specific to mathematics. It is these 
that I shall consider first. 
Ifwe look more closely at the content of the first aim (1.2) we can see how it is 
determined. It starts as follows: 'Mathematics can be used to describe, to illustrate, to 
interpret, to predict and to explain. Above all it is used to convey meaning.' From this 
descriptive remark about the function of mathematics the document derives a normative 
claim: 
If they [pupils] can perform successfully a multiplication involving two 
numbers but are unable to say, when challenged, when that operation 
might be used, or to say whether the answer is a reasonable one or not, 
then there is something seriously wrong. (p.2) 
Further support, for what is only an implicit aim, is given by the appeal to the 'main 
reason for teaching mathematics' which is given as 'its importance in the analysis and 
communication of information and ideas' . A similar approach is adopted in the booklet 
to support the next aim which is ' ... to encourage the effective use of mathematics as a 
tool in a wide range of activities within both school and adult life'. This is made to 
follow from the assertion that 'mathematics is a tool' by which it means that it is 
something which 'enables things to be done which it might otherwise be impossible or 
difficult to do, or to do so well'. Notice that a more reflective aim could have been 
derived from the fact that mathematics is a tool, namely, that pupils come to see that the 
subject has had, and can have, a particular kind of role in the advancement of 
civilisation. This is likely to have a completely different kind of practical implication 
for the teacher from that which might follow from the aim given here. 
S This raises the question of whether or not there is a helpful distinction between 'aim' and • purpose'. I 
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To encourage 'effective use of mathematics' would presumably involve pupils in 
the carrying out of certain tasks, the successful completion of which would 
involve the application of mathematics. The more reflective aim, on the other 
hand, might require a more interdisciplinary approach to the teaching of the 
subject, and indeed, might not even necessitate the pupils themselves applying 
any mathematics. This is not to say that such a reflective aim would necessarily 
conflict with the one given here, indeed the latter aim might be a sub aim of the 
former, but these observations do make it clear that the derivation of a normative 
aim from descriptive premises is not without its difficulties. 
Two other aims - that pupils should have 'appreciation of relationships within 
mathematics' and that they should have an 'awareness of the fascination of 
mathematics' - are allowed to follow directly from the nature of mathematics 
once more. This time the fundamental point is that 'Mathematics is not an 
arbitrary collection of disconnected items, but has a coherent structure in which 
the various parts are inter-related. In very simple terms, mathematics is about 
relationships' (p.3). 
The last of the booklet's aims, which is specific to mathematics, is unhelpful. 
Aim (1.6) on the list - 'Imagination, initiative and flexibility of mind' in 
mathematics 6 - can hardly be an aim of mathematics, unless, of course, an 
appreciation of the qualities of mind which have enabled mathematics to develop 
is what is intended here. If so, then we are back with something rather like the 
reflective aim once more. But this seems unlikely. 
So far, the aims of mathematical education are derived largely from the nature and 
function of mathematics. Even if such a procedure is not ruled out from the start as 
committing the naturalistic fallacy, deriving aims in this way does have the usual 
difficulties associated with this fallacy. In particular, there is the difficulty that from any 
descriptive premises a unique practical conclusion is not entailed. The upshot of this is 
that whatever the nature and function of mathematics might be, in principle the way is 
open for deriving aims other than those set out in the booklet. 
Ifa satisfactory account of the nature and function of mathematics cannot uniquely pin 
down the aims of the subject for educational pwposes, perhaps the reasons for teaching 
will discuss this presently 
the subject will do this, particularly if they are of a normative kind. 7 (Recall that the 
first aim from the above list was linked to 'the main reason for teaching mathematics'). 
Yet even when the question 'why teach mathematics?' has been asked it does not 
always make it clear how mathematics can attain the ends given. For example, in a 
section titled 'Why teach mathematics?' in a chapter from a book on the teaching of 
mathematics in a secondary school, Cornelius (1982), suggests that the reasons for 
teaching mathematics are simply a matter of consensus amongst those who teach it. He 
writes: 
Only if some broad measure of agreement can be reached in answer to 
the question 'Why teach mathematics?' can we begin to discuss what 
we teach and how we might plan and organise the teaching (p.38). 
If by this remark Cornelius is claiming that such agreement is a necessary condition for 
making decisions about what to teach, then this is surely true. But whether it is 
sufficient is another matter. 
Cornelius gives the following list of aims derived from a group of secondary teachers: 
(1) to develop the ability to think, communicate and reason clearly and 
logically, 
(2) to provide tools and skills necessary for use in the real world, 
everyday life and other subjects, 
(3) to develop the ability to recognise patterns and relationships and to 
generalise from experience (including the use of symbols) 
(4) to develop creative ability, 
(5) to increase awareness of other cultures and interest in the world. 
(p.38) 
He asserts that these general aims would probably receive 'fairly wide acceptance' 
among secondary school teachers, and the problem he goes on to discuss is the 
inevitable gap between aims and what happens in practice. But suppose that this list 
does constitute a rationale, which has a 'broad measure of agreement', or 'widespread 
acceptance' among secondary school teachers, will this settle the matter? Can we then 
simply turn our attention onto considerations of methods and content? Surely few 
6 My italics 
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secondary teachers would disagree with such reasons. But why should it be supposed 
that the question of aims rests simply on a matter of agreement between teachers of 
mathematics? One difficulty with relying upon such agreement among mathematics 
teachers in setting the aims of mathematics education, is that the agreement could be 
reached by setting aims which were so bland that few would want to disagree with 
them. The above list hardly seems to be unacceptable to most people. Surely only a 
Hitler, a Stalin (or a Milosevic) would have been less than happy to acknowledge that 
one reason for teaching mathematics should be 'to increase awareness of other cultures 
and interest in the world'. 
Another difficulty is that even though some reasons given for learning mathematics may 
not conflict with general educational ideals, it may still be highly questionable whether 
mathematics isjit to realise the ends embodied in such reasons. 'Creative ability' ,8 for 
example, mentioned in the penultimate item of Cornelius' list might well be agreed by 
all to be a laudable educational aim. But it is certainly not obvious that such ability 
really can be developed through the study of mathematics or that it is effectively 
developed in this way. If creative ability can be developed through the study of 
mathematics then it at least needs to be explained how? 
Comparing the way that the HMI Curriculum 5-13 booklet detennines its aims with the 
way Cornelius justifies the teaching of mathematics we seem to have two contrasting 
approaches. To put the matter starkly: Either we value certain aspects which we believe 
are in the nature of mathematics which then become translated into reasons for 
teaching the subject, or we value certain things independently of mathematics and 
assume that in learning mathematics these will be attained. Few writers in recent years 
seem to strike a balance between these two extremes and it is perhaps in this respect 
that the aims of mathematics education are, as White has said of the general aims, in a 
state of neglect. Griffiths and Howson (1974) are exceptional in beginning to make 
connections between the two approaches. After surveying a variety of reasons for 
7 I realise that there is the possibility of course that any normative reason for teaching mathematics might 
already be so closely attached to a particular aim to render the search for an aim futile. 
8 Even 'creative ability' does not fly in the face of the educational ideals of some regimes, my point 
remains. Even if the most austere of regimes welcomes a particular good which it is supposed that 
mathematics can bring, acceptance of the good in no way guarantees that mathematics is fit for the 
purpose. I shall explore some of the issues surrounding creativity and mathematics in Part 2. 
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learning mathematics they make explicit reference to the idea that mathematics can train 
the mind in some way when they write: 
... it is worth drawing attention to the essential difference between the 
'training ground' aim and the others. It alone is not aimed at producing 
behaviour or responses that can be labelled specifically 'mathematical'. 
Rather is mathematics being used as one of the most suitable means for 
the inculcation of ideas and ways of thought considered educationally 
desirable. 
Far too often when considering why we should teach mathematics, we 
forget that education has wider aims than are immediately apparent 
from the school timetable. For example, the supporters of the method 
of teaching children in small groups rather than as a class frequently 
stress the subsequent improvement in mathematicalleaming, but rather 
less often do they argue that it is teaching children to work 
cooperatively in small groups which is probably the more important 
educational aim. (p.23) 
Whether or nor mathematics fulfils this training role is not shown adequately by the 
authors and one of the major tasks of my enquiry is to see whether mathematics is fit for 
such a purpose. Accordingly, I do hope to maintain a balance by focusing upon certain 
educational ends, on the one hand, and trying to see whether the nature of mathematics 
is fit to achieve the goods implicit in such ends, on the other. I shall be considering two 
purposes of mathematics in detail, but as we shall see these are extensive. They centre 
around art and aesthetics, in Part 2, and mental training in Part 3. But in order to 
distinguish these purposes from the perennial belief in the utility of mathematics, this 
and its many varieties will be outlined in Part 1. However, before moving on to the 
other reason for my enquiry, some further clarification is necessary. 
Aims and Purposes 
So far I have been discussing aims in mathematics education and general education as 
though these were equivalent to purposes. However, it seems that there is an important 
distinction between the two concepts of aims and purposes, which Moore (1982) 
believes: 
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... may best be brought out by drawing attention to two different 
questions which may be put to someone who is engaged in a practical 
task. The questions are: what are you doing? and: what are you doing it 
for? To take the second ofthese questions first, to ask: what are you 
doing it for? is to presuppose some end outside the activity itself, 
which the activity is designed and intended to bring about ... the answer 
is given in instrumental tenns ... A rather different approach is 
indicated in the first question: What are you doing? Here someone is 
being asked to specify what his action is, to state its content. (p.27) 
This distinction which Moore has drawn out is indeed one which has been employed in 
the context of mathematics education. In the document Mathematics 5 to 11: A 
Handbook of Suggestions (HMI, 1979), for example, an explicit distinction is made 
between three aspects: 'purposes of teaching mathematics', 'mathematical aims', and 
'objectives'. The authors of the document do appear to be using 'purposes' to refer to 
goods which are in a sense outside mathematics, when they write: 
The need for schools, both primary and secondary, to provide their 
pupils with a good foundation of mathematics has been argued on three 
main grounds. Mathematics is useful, mathematics is part of our 
culture, and mathematics trains the mind. There are many other 
arguments but they nearly always reduce to variations of these three; 
and the three interrelate with one another. (p.4) 
In accordance with what Moore has said, above, the HMI document does regard aims as 
reflecting what it is we ought to be trying to do within mathematics. That is, they are 
'essentially declarations of intent that give direction and shape to a scheme of work or 
teaching prograrnme'(HMI, 1979 pS). 
Finally, 'objectives', in the same document are meant to refer to: 
... detailed descriptions ofperfonnance which teachers can accept as 
evidence oflearning and as 'milestones' along the path of progression 
and development. (p.5) 
Where pressing questions in mathematical education are being asked, too, Moore's 
distinction is implicit. For example Costello (1993) writes: 
There are plenty of people who believe that mathematics education has 
lost its way. Newspaper reports in recent months confinn this feeling; 
but the saddest part of this concern is the suggestion that we need to go 
back - to recover some perceived strengths of a previous age. Of 
course, this is irrational prejudice. But it does oblige those of us 
concerned with teaching mathematics to examine our intentions. We 
need to ask "What is progress?", or even more pretentiously "What is it 
that mathematics education has to contribute to civilisation?" 
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In asking for the contribution which mathematics education can make to civilisation 
Costello is seeking something outside mathematics and hence is making a request for its 
purpose. But to 'examine our intentions' would suggest that clarification of what we are 
trying to do within mathematics education is what is sought and hence he is seeking the 
aims of the subject. 
The area which I am concerned with, falls within the rationale for mathematical 
education, its point, aims, purposes, goals or justification. Notwithstanding Moore's 
distinction, I shall treat all of these as objects of enquiry for the moment. I shall also 
treat as objects of enquiry some of the questions which are used to elicit aims, purposes, 
goals, such as 'why is mathematics necessary?' 'Why learn mathematics?' 'Why teach 
mathematics?' 'Why do we need mathematics?' and so on. Only when these types of 
questions fail to elicit helpful answers that I am seeking will I make a distinction 
between them. 
Understanding and Purpose 
There is, as I have already mentioned, another reason why the aims and purposes for 
learning mathematics need to be clearly spelt out, and this directly concerns the 
individual who is trying to learn the subject. If mathematics is often a difficult subject 
to learn, as I have insisted it is, then one way to make it easier to learn would be to 
know more about how it is best learnt. Whilst there may be a range of answers to this 
question involving, say, the most expedient teaching resources, and the most effective 
structuring of the content, certain writers have recently drawn our attention to an 
important connection between understanding a subject and beliefs about its purpose. 
These writers suggest that understanding mathematics and knowing the purpose of 
learning it are internally linked. In saying this, such writers are not simply saying that 
there is some expedience in ensuring that someone sees the point of learning 
mathematics, that it provides some kind of motivation for learning the subject. What is 
being suggested is that understanding mathematics is partly a function of being aware of 
what it is/or. 
Munn (1997), Sierpinska (1994) and Passmore (1980) all seem to me to be making 
essentially this same point: understanding and purpose are internally linked in the 
learning of a subject. Munn argues, from an empirical standpoint, that the children's 
ability to count is a partly a function of their understanding the purpose of counting as a 
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means of quantification. Sierpinska arguing more conceptually sets her sights more on 
topics in higher mathematics where she wants to separate off an objective criterion of 
understanding from a subjective idea of seeing the point of a particular theory. Finally, 
in a more general way, Passmore connects the case of a pupil's 'not seeing the point' of 
a subject as one way in which such a pupil does not understand it, thereby making a 
conceptual point between cognition and purpose. I shall discuss each of these in tum. 
Munn (1997), setting out to explain a contradiction within the specific area of learning 
to count, writes: 
Currently, researchers are alleging that young children are competent 
with number, yet simple observation shows that children miss the most 
obvious implications of number logic until they are older. (p.l 0) 
She gives three examples of these 'implications' which are missed by young children. 
These are their inability to count objects when they are randomly arranged, their failure 
to understand the conservation of number, and their tendency to judge the relative 
quantities by sight. However, to rely on this evidence, as she complains that researchers 
do, is to focus on what Munn calls 'external' factors. She believes that the apparent 
contradiction can be removed by casting our attention towards the subjective 
considerations of pupils' purposes for counting. She argues that what have been seen as 
errors in understanding, are internally linked with the purposes of counting. Munn, in 
her research, asks the following questions to the children: 'Can you count?' 'Can you 
count these blocks?' 'Could you give me (one, two, three, etc.) blocks?' 'Do you count 
at home?' / 'What do you count at home?' She does this in order to gain some insight 
into children's beliefs about counting. She remarks that: 
The children's responses to the question 'What do you count?' and 
'Why do you count?' showed that it was very rare for them to 
understand the adult purpose of counting before they went to school. 
After school entry, some children seemed to have gained a little 
understanding, but it was uncommon to have a child respond to the 
'Why?' question by saying 'To know how many'. This was true even 
for those children who were quite competent at the counting involved 
in giving nine or ten blocks. They could count in all three senses: 
saying the words, linking the words with the objects, and linking the 
last word in the sequence with the amount. Yet only one of the children 
at the pre-school visits responded to the 'Why' question by replying 
'To know how many'. The rest of the children showed by their 
responses that they were perplexed by the notion of counting as a 
purposeful activity. (p.13) 
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The pupils did have their own reasons for counting, such as enjoyment - what Munn 
calls 'counting to please the self - others were counting simply as part of a social 
activity. The upshot of this, is that development in children's counting is a partly a 
function of their awareness of its purpose. Remarking on the striking difference 
between children's understanding before they start school and afterwards, she adds: 
The progression outlined here demonstrates the influence that social 
beliefs can have on cognitive development. There was a clear 
disjunction between the children's counting behaviour and their beliefs 
about counting.9 (p.16) 
Munn suggests in her implications for teaching, that teachers should 'make the purposes 
of counting explicit for children' and also that they should 'stimulate children to 
develop their own numerical goals'. If she is right in her conclusions about the 
elementary aspect of counting, then there are good reasons to suppose that throughout 
mathematics pupils' beliefs in the purposes of mathematics go hand in hand with their 
understanding of the subject. 
Sierpinska (1994) seems to be making a similar point. Whether or not, like Munn, she is 
making an empirical point, or whether she is trying to establish a conceptual connection 
between understanding and purposes is not altogether clear. She certainly discusses a 
transcript of a conversation in support of her argument in which she makes a distinction 
between the notion of understanding per se and the normative notion of good 
understanding. Some of her assertions, however, certainly seem to be independent of 
empirical confirmation. Like Munn she argues that understanding is often judged by 
external factors when, for example, it is a matter of, determining whether what a student 
knows is consistent with a particular theory which he or she is learning. But she writes: 
9 My italics 
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When it comes to understanding not a particular concept of a theory or 
a particular method but the theory as a whole, when, for example, one 
asks the question 'what is the point of this theory?' then the evaluation 
must be more subjective. Here the problem is not so much with the 
meanings as with the significance, and the criteria of significance are 
not a matter of just the logic. The judgement depends upon one's 
philosophical attitudes towards scientific knowledge, views on the 
raison d'etre of the theorizing thought, on the goals of learning 
mathematics, on one's theory of intellectual development, etc. The 
judgement ofa person's way of understanding will be relative to 
cultural norms, which are not justified by reference to some logical 
system but by an appeal to traditional values. (p.113) 
In contrast to Munn, Sierpinska locates her view in advanced mathematics where the 
understanding of a particular theory is at issue. Nevertheless, like Munn she is insisting 
that the pupil must somehow come to appreciate the value of a particular theory within 
mathematics in order to achieve understanding, just as for Munn the child has to 
appreciate that the particular activity of counting within mathematics has quantification 
as its fundamental purpose. I have emphasised the fact that what both writers are 
drawing out are aspects of mathematics which are linked to purposes. This is an 
important point. It is one thing to admit that there are some aspects within the subject 
that may seem pointless, another to question the value of the subject as a whole. 
However, Sierpinska's mention of 'the goals oflearning mathematics' does suggest that 
the pupil's problem is part of the more general question: 'what is the point of 
mathematics? ' 
There seems to be, then, at least grounds for supposing that an empirical connection 
exists between cognition and purpose within some aspects of mathematics. There is 
also the suggestion that there may even be a general conceptual connection. However, 
the latter possibility is brought out more strongly in another writer, John Passmore, for 
whom being clear about the purpose of mathematics is part of what constitutes 
understanding of the subject. Passmore (1980), states four different ways in which a 
pupil may not understand something, namely: 
... when he misunderstands, fails to understand, half-understands, or 
sees no need to understand. 10 (p.198) 
It is the last of these four ways which is important here. It must be admitted, however, 
that the notion of 'seeing no need to understand' is at first associated, by Passmore, with 
10 My italics 
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the pupil who takes things for granted. So that the corrective action for the teacher 
becomes a matter of puzzling the pupil in order to shake him or her out of a complacent 
state. Yet further on in his account, Passmore interprets this lack of understanding as 
explicitly involving the point of learning a particular subject. In which case some kind 
of justification is required. He writes: 
We no longer ask 'What is the point of rainbows?' or 'What is the 
point of the earth going around the sun?' But in other cases, it is still a 
perfectly proper question ... It is certainly proper in relation to the 
whole apparatus of schooling, the studying of particular subjects, 
examinations and so on. (pp. 203-4) 
Whether puzzling the pupil best brings this about is another matter. In Plato's Meno 
(1956 edn) we could describe the slave as being in a complacent state about his 
knowledge, before Socrates gradually puzzles him and brings him to realise that he did 
not know what he believed he knew. There would of course, then, be some reason for 
teaching him what he did not know. But, ignorance cannot be a sufficient reason for 
learning, otherwise the demand for a justification for learning anything would be 
unnecessary. What the pupil who asks why s/he should study mathematics wants to be 
shown is, as Passmore puts it: 'Either that mathematics has a value in itself or that it is a 
means to some end he accepts as being worthwhile'. This dichotomy - that something 
either has value in itself, or because it is a means to some valuable end - can be traced 
back at least as far as Aristotle's Ethics. It is implicit in the contrast of purposes drawn 
out by Munn, above, where children carry out counting for pleasure perhaps oblivious 
to the fact that for others it is simply a means to quantification. It will reappear in the 
discussion below. But for Passmore there is a conceptual connection at stake. He adds: 
'I don't understand the point of ... ' is indeed a very common form of 
not understanding. And often enough ... the answer is far from being 
obvious. 1J (p.205) 
My second reason for carrying out this enquiry is thus to attempt to throw some light on 
the non-obvious question regarding the point of mathematics which, it appears, prevents 
or limits understanding of the subject on behalf of the pupil. 
11 My italics 
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The structure of the thesis 
I have already remarked that most people would agree that there is some mathematics 
that must be learnt for everyday use. The notion of utility will therefore be my first 
point of departure. Since, it cannot be gainsaid that mathematics has been used for a 
number of purposes in shaping the world in which we live, I shall not be attempting to 
argue that mathematics is scarcely useful. What I shall be more concerned with is 
asking whether there are any other grounds for learning mathematics apart from its 
usefulness. In Part 1 I shall outline what I see as the non-controversial ways in which 
mathematics may be said to be useful to everyone, before extending this discussion 
towards other ways in which mathematics is useful yet not necessarily directly useful 
for everyone. The idea of usefulness being distinguished by its immediacy or directness 
seems to be one way of distinguishing between kinds of reason. Mere practical utility, it 
seems, is distinguishable from other kinds of utility such as the 'use' of mathematics for 
improving or training the mind in some way. But whether or not mathematics can have 
value and purpose without any reference to the notion of usefulness, whether such 
usefulness is immediate, direct, practical or whatever, is something else which I shall 
also explore in Part 1. 
There have certainly been many who have thought that the subject may be learnt for 
intrinsic reasons. But since intrinsic reasons are often described in terms of 'doing 
something for its own sake', this notion will be explored carefully and will reveal that 
the expression can either mean pursuing something primarily for the benefit of the 
individual or primarily for the benefit of the discipline. Only in the first sense can the 
'doing something for its own sake' be free of all taint of usefulness. This is because if a 
subject is pursued for the sake of the discipline then this implies that two other senses 
of usefulness may be introduced namely usefulness of something within a discipline and 
deferred usefulness of the discipline at some indeterminate time. As the intrinsic 
reasons for learning mathematics are somewhat eroded by a broadening of 'usefulness' I 
shall illustrate how some writers have attempted to dispose of any kinds of reasons 
except utility and hence that there are not different kinds of reasons for learning 
mathematics, only different ways in which it is useful. This holistic approach, I shall 
argue, is unsatisfactory as it side-steps and marginalises what have been regarded as 
good reasons for mathematics for centuries. 
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In what I have called the Interlude I set the stage for two particular reasons for learning 
mathematics which will be tackled in depth in Parts 2 and 3. Certain reasons which are 
beyond utility, then, fonn Part 2, Art and Aesthetics in Mathematics Education, and Part 
3 Mathematics as Mental Training. It is because both of these reasons stem ultimately 
from doctrines which can be traced back to Pythagoras that he is introduced and set 
aside in this Interlude before these latter parts begin. Following certain writers, I 
characterise Pythagoras as being responsible for a non-materialistic view of the universe 
and thus a particular view of the goodness of the human being from which the notion of 
'purification' is central. The ancient notion of 'purification' was importantly achieved 
through a particular approach to mathematics - the contemplative approach - and 
therefore becomes the precursor of mathematics as the improvement of the soul. This 
contemplative approach has echoes in both Parts 2 and 3. In Part 2 the connection with 
contemplation is made by those who want to view mathematics as a fine art, and in 
Part 3 by those who believe that reflecting upon special properties of mathematics leads 
to an improvement in the mind, in short that mathematics trains the mind. 
In Part 2 I try and find out what connections could possibly exist between mathematics 
and art and thus whether mathematics could be classified as a fine art in some way or 
other. After showing that the claim that mathematics is fine art cannot be sustained I do 
allow a more modest claim to be sustained: it may still have aesthetic aspects of various 
kinds and thus plausibly be a source of aesthetic experience to those who engage in it. 
To accomplish this it is necessary to show that art and aesthetics are indeed separable 
and even then to narrow down those ways in which mathematics may be viewed from 
an aesthetic point of view. These include the considerations of pattern in mathematics, 
proof and the origination of mathematics from first principles. All of these I argue can 
be seen to have an aesthetic dimension. 
Part 3 looks at the other reason for mathematics which is beyond utility - mental 
training. In this part I show how both the contemplative aspects, stemming from 
Pythagoras, and what have often been introduced as a contrast - discursive aspects - (or 
what I call the procedural aspects stemming from Descartes) are both at work. Neither 
view is completely successful, yet perhaps surprisingly the contemplative view is either 
less challenged or is less resistant to being criticised. Its outcome is, however, difficult 
to clarify. In a similar way to Part 2, I introduce a more modest view of mental training 
which in one fonn or other has had a long history. However, whilst the view is clear and 
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crisp in its outcome it is nevertheless hard to show why mathematics is ultimately the 
best means to it. 
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Part 1 - The Bounds of Utility in Mathematics Education 
Chapter 1 - How Mathematics is useful 
Quantities and indirectness 
Let us begin with the classic dichotomy of value, introduced earlier by John Passmore, 
that something might either have a value 'in itself or as a 'means to some end' which is 
supposed to be of value. I said that we can trace this notion back to antiquity, and this is 
a helpful place to take up the discussion at this point. 12 From ancient times a 
fundamental desire for individuals and societies to survive and flourish, has provided a 
motivation for the development of mathematics. But precisely what counts as 
'flourishing' is not easy to determine. Two broad views of the good life are however 
identifiable. For many philosophers it has centred round a life in pursuit of wisdom 
characterised by contemplation. This may be contrasted with the life of action, which 
included not only the life of ordinary work but also a life spent in pursuit of fame and 
glory in conquest and battle. Both of these ways in which human flourishing was 
believed to consist, relate to the pursuit of mathematics in different ways, and have 
provided reasons for learning it. 
Of course not everyone, then as now, was able to approach mathematics in both these 
ways. The demands of the situation in which one finds oneself, may prevent one from 
having the necessary resources to sustain a life of contemplation. So that only those, for 
example, who were secure, self-sufficient and had leisure time, placed intrinsic value on 
the subject. For others the subject was rather more like a tool which assisted the life of 
action. Flourishing in this latter respect puts a premium on finding quick and efficient 
ways of getting things done. Mathematics was found to be just such a tool for this 
purpose and was therefore actively sought, developed and passed on. According to 
Kline (1980), the origins of mathematics to meet practical demands of this kind were 
particularly associated with the early Egyptian and the Babylonian civilisations. Yet at 
this stage in its development Kline informs us that: 
12 Passmore gives his own view of the utility of certain areas of mathematics when he discusses what he 
calls 'open' and 'closed', 'broad' and 'narrow' capacities. (See Passmore, 1980) 
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... mathematics was hardly a distinct discipline - it had no methodology 
nor was it pursued for other than immediate, practical ends. It was a 
tool, a series of disconnected, simple rules which enabled people to 
answer questions of daily life: calendar-reckoning, agriculture, and 
commerce. These rules were arrived at by trial and error, experience, 
and simple observation, and many were only approximately correct. 
(p.18) 
But as mathematics did become a distinct discipline, its practical value has remained of 
paramount importance in education. Despite the great differences between the 
fundamental philosophical positions of Plato in antiquity and Locke of the 
Enlightenment, they both agree on the educational value of mathematics. Thus the 
Athenian remarks in Plato (1970 edn): 
A man ... will fall a long way short of [such] godlike standards ifhe 
can't recognize one, two and three, or odd and even numbers in 
general, or hasn't the faintest notion how to count, or can't reckon up 
the days and nights, and is ignorant of the revolutions of the sun and 
moon and other heavenly bodies. It's downright stupid to expect that 
anyone who wants to make the slightest progress in the highest 
branches of knowledge can afford to ignore any of these subjects. 
(p.312) 
Locke (1902 edn) writes in a similar way: 
Arithmetick is the easiest, and consequently the first Sort of abstract 
Reasoning, which the Mind commonly bears, or accustoms itself to: 
And is of so general Use in all Parts of Life and Business, that scarce 
any Thing is to be done without it. This is certain, a Man cannot have 
too much of it, nor too perfectly: He should therefore begin to be 
exercis'd in Counting, as soon, and as far, as he is capable of it; and do 
something in it every Day, till he is Master of the Art of Numbers. 
(p.1S7) 
Locke's plea at the end of the seventeenth century is as convincing now as it was then. 
In Britain, at least, the recent National Numeracy Strategy has recommended a daily 
mathematics session throughout primary schools. Yet something that is interesting in 
the remarks of both Plato and Locke is the suggestion that it is counting which is 
fundamental. In recent times the view that number is a property of sets, has given way 
to the idea that a set is at least logically more fundamental than the idea of numbers or 
counting. Nevertheless, despite the influence that this has had on the curriculum there is 
now some evidence that the emphasis should be upon counting. So that counting 
provides once again the bedrock upon which the usefulness of mathematics is based. 
This much we have seen is already implicit in Munn's discussion of purposes in very 
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young children (see page 16). It is worth adding perhaps, that even though we might be 
prepared to insist that mathematics begins with counting, most educationists are 
concerned that pupils do not rely solely on counting methods. So counting can no more 
be the reason for learning mathematics any more than the learning of scales could be the 
reason for learning to playa musical instrument. 13 But it does seem to be the clearest 
way of beginning an argument to show that mathematics is useful. 
If, as Quine (1969) has remarked, 'we are prone to talk and think of objects' (p.l) rather 
than persisting in seeing the world as only stuff, then the need to keep tabs on such 
objects seems to be inescapable. We can keep tabs on objects in ways other than 
counting simply by comparing sets of objects with other sets of objects. Yet counting 
makes the task so much easier. Counting, then, is a convenient tool for finding 
quantities, and this ability to determine quantities provides one of the first 
uncontroversial reasons for learning mathematics. Even quantities of continuous stuff 
may be established by the counting of units, although the use of the real numbers, rather 
than simply whole numbers, is a further useful refinement in measurement. Counting is 
one of the most elementary and general ways in which this can be done, and a 
remarkable one too, which took many years to develop. 
At an even more elementary level than counting it is possible to see the practical value 
of mathematics. Suppose that we wish to acquire some chairs for a meeting. We could 
ensure that we have enough by arranging matters so that every member was asked to 
help him or herself to a chair from a stack, so that each person would be paired with one 
chair. The quantity of chairs required is then equivalent to the number of people. 
'Equivalence' here means that there is a one-to-one correspondence of people to chairs. 
This method is perfectly satisfactory for determining quantities. But it is important to 
note that it uses a method of direct comparison. It requires physically juxtaposing the 
set of people and the set of chairs. 
But the idea of equivalence is the precursor of counting. Counting allows us to make a 
correspondence between one collection and an ordered set of number words. The last 
number in the count provides us with a name, the cardinal number, of the collection in 
13 This comparison is not altogether satisfactory. The value of counting lies in part at least outside 
mathematics, this is not true of scales no application of which seems to be made outside music. 
Nevertheless, scales do seem to have the same kind of fundamental role in music as they do in 
mathematics. 
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question, provided that one word is paired with precisely one of the objects of the 
collection, the quantity of which we are trying to determine. The connection between 
counting and the more primitive method of comparing objects can be shown if we 
recover the set of words used for any count. Thus, if I count my fingers and give the 
number 'five' as the cardinal number, I can easily recover an equivalent set for this 
comparison. It is the set of words {one, two, three, four, five}. The size of this set of 
words is equivalent to the set of my fingers. 
So counting, at the very least, allows us to carry out comparisons indirectly. Continuing 
with the earlier example: we can count the number of people, and without recovering 
the set of names used for this process, note the cardinal number, the last number used. 
Then the chairs can be counted out until the same cardinal number is reached. The 
ordered set of number words are used as a kind of' go-between', but for the cardinal 
number itself to have any meaning and use, rather than as an equivalent set of number 
names which can always in principle be recovered from any count, some sustained 
learning is required. 
Thus we have reasons for learning the number names, the practice of pairing and the 
appreciation that the last name used gives the quantity of the collection involved. One 
must acquire, too, a sense of the size of numbers; to know, for example, that 30 is 
greater than 3 but less than 300, and also that 9999 is considerably larger than 99. In 
this way educators have good reasons for teaching counting and the relative size of 
numbers, at the very least. Children, too, should be able to realise that mathematics can 
be used to obtain quantities. Moreover, we can say that counting, because it can save us 
the trouble of making certain physical comparisons between collections, can be 
regarded as a tool for quantification. On the other hand, if the notion of a tool seems to 
have physical connotations, we may prefer to emphasise the symbolic aspect of 
counting which then may be regarded as constituting a kind of language in which 
quantities are communicated. 
If counting provides one example of how mathematics can be useful by allowing us to 
quantify indirectly, that is, with the minimum amount of manipulating of physical 
objects, there are many other examples. Much more than this can be achieved by 
considering the application of the operations of simple addition, subtraction, 
multiplication and division. With these we can answer hypothetical questions like 'how 
many chairs would be required if, each member brought a partner, say, to the meeting. 
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Or perhaps 'how many chairs would be required if twelve people were unable to 
attend?' In the case of such hypothetical cases we find ourselves relying more on the 
manipulation of numbers than objects even though we could still continue to set up 
physical representations of some kind. It is at this point that questions can arise about 
the nature of numbers. Since they are no longer objects of perception their exact nature 
became a subject of study and hence we have the possibility of focusing our attention 
on the abstract relationships between numbers and their properties. This change of 
focus, as we shall see, provides a reason for pursuing mathematics independently of its 
usefulness. 
A similar account to that of counting can be given of measuring. This can in many cases 
be carried out by direct comparison, but the development of the real numbers allows 
indirect comparison to be carried out. The notion of directness and indirectness runs 
deep in mathematics and so the metaphor of 'tool' is appropriately applied as a 
description of mathematics when, for example, quantities of collections are determined 
with the minimum amount of physical contact. Counting and measuring are simple 
examples of this idea, but a further example is in the use of tables. Mathematical tables 
can be set up to represent extra-mathematical objects by another central idea in 
mathematics, the idea of an isomorphism. Finally, whole mathematical models can be 
constructed to represent certain aspects of extra-mathematical situations. 
Utility in wider contexts 
Beyond the quantification of the objects in routine everyday life, mathematics has had 
practical value when states of emergency have been anticipated. In The Republic Plato 
(1955 edn) emphasises the importance of numbers for the security of the state when he 
remarks that 'soldiers must study them so that they can organise their armies ... ' 
(p.332). In eighteenth century England, too, where, interestingly, the practical value of 
mathematics in education had often been neglected, one of the key landmarks was the 
founding of The Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. Howson documents an 
important event leading to the realisation of the need for such education: 
In 1662 a request was made for a schoolmaster to be supplied to the 
troops quartered in Madras. The schoolmaster was to divide his 
attention between the soldiers and their families. Gradually the idea of 
supplying education to the troops spread and in the mid eighteenth 
century the first army schoolmaster was appointed in England. 
(Howson, 1982 pp. 64-65) 
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However, by this time rather more mathematics than the determining of quantities was 
expected of some individuals: 
For officers ... and, in particular, staff officers ... specialised knowledge 
of mathematics, fortification and drawing was necessary. To meet that 
need the Royal Military Academy (RMA) was established at Woolwich 
in 1741 to train future artillery and engineer officers. (Howson, 1982 
p.65) 
Other changes, too, became dependent upon mathematics education. Howson 
documents the gradual importance that mathematics was to have in navigation for the 
great sea voyages. This was to lead up to another landmark in English mathematical 
education: the assistance of Samuel Pepys in founding the Christ's Hospital School. 
Pepys worked at the Admiralty, where he found himself lacking in arithmetic. Howson 
recounts another important set of events in English mathematics education history that 
arose from this: 
... Pepys gradually came to realise that not only he, but the Navy as a 
whole, was handicapped by a lack of mathematical expertise. The 
restoration of the monarchy in 1660 had been quickly followed by a 
naval war with Holland which seriously depleted the complement of 
naval officers. It was necessary to make good these losses and it was 
increasingly clear that among the replacements should be many officers 
who had a good grasp of navigation and the underlying mathematics. 
(Howson, 1982 p.35) 
But if mathematics has an important use where national security is concerned it has also 
been of value in commerce. Yeldham (1936) describes the effects not so much of 
counting but of the new rules of reckoning or algorisms developed in Hindu-Arabic 
arithmetic. These methods of calculation were acquired and used by the merchants. 
Most of the earliest mathematics textbooks consisted largely of discussions on the 
properties of numbers - the theory of arithmetic - rather than the art of calculating. 
Gradually applications began to appear in newer textbooks particularly by way of 
worked examples and exercises from commerce. So that as Yeldham puts it: 'By 1600, 
sheer usefulness had won the day', implying that mathematics had not always been 
pursued for practical ends.14 But in being selective in the kinds of contexts used in 
textbook exercises there is always the danger that mathematics will appear to favour 
14 It is important, for the discussion which follows, to notice how writers make this implicit cornmon 
sense distinction between 'usefulness' and what for the moment can only be denoted as the 'non 
usefulness' 
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particular groups in society. This seems to have happened as mathematics texts were 
filled with examples set in commercial contexts. Thus Yeldham remarks: 
[This] desire to be of help to men in trade went too far, arithmetic 
becoming so commercialized that in the seventeenth century it was 
being neglected except by those whose way of life demanded it. 
(Yeldham, 1936 p.13) 
When the utility of mathematics is pushed too far in a particular direction, like this, the 
way is open for emphasising a different aspect of the subject. But before pursuing any 
divergence in the utility rationale for mathematical study, we should consider one other 
important and fairly uncontroversial sense in which mathematics is deemed to be useful. 
The use of mathematics 'across the curriculum' 
It has already been suggested in the passage from Locke, above, (see page 24) and is 
undoubtedly accepted by most educationists, that mathematics is of use within other 
subjects of study. Mathematics is useful, say, in enabling statistical information to 
further the study of science. In being able to calculate the half-life of a substance 
mathematics is often useful within history. Perhaps, too, we find measuring techniques 
indispensable in learning geography, or making certain aspects of music intelligible. 
Again, the mathematical theory of perspective geometry, whilst originating in the art of 
drawing and painting three-dimensional representations, may be said to be of use in the 
theory of techniques in art. 
Notice that the application of mathematics in each of these, and many other similar 
cases, is different from its use in the examples discussed earlier of everyday life, states 
of emergency and commerce. To say that mathematics is useful within other subjects 
suggests that the mathematics might not be directly useful. Mathematics may be useful 
in astrology. But suppose astrology is shown to be useless does this now show that 
mathematics is not as useful as was originally supposed? It is certainly true that within 
an area of mathematics, number theory for example, for which scarcely any application 
might be made, a particular result may nonetheless be very useful. So, even if it would 
be difficult to show that any of the traditional subjects which make use of mathematics 
are themselves of dubious practical use, the point remains that the usefulness of 
mathematics in other subjects may be attributed somewhat independently of their worth. 
Yet in general when it is claimed that mathematics is useful in other subjects it is 
supposed that on the whole these other subjects are worth pursuing. But even if the 
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curriculum were of the most liberal kind, the use of mathematics across the curriculum 
in the most 'useless' of subjects could still be upheld. IS 
A divergence within the rationale 
As mathematics became a systematic discipline it was characterised in two ways. Put 
succinctly, there was the theory of numbers and there was the art of calculation. This 
has seemed to allow a branching of the subject's aims. When the practical side has 
seemed to be too specific or in later times even lacking in rigour, the theoretical side 
becomes important and different reasons for pursuing mathematics arise. When 
preoccupation with the theoretical aspects of the subject leads to a lack of success in the 
life of action then the usefulness of mathematics is restated. If we refer back to the two 
quotations from the contrasting major philosophers, (see page 24) we can see that this 
distinction lies just below the surface, as it were. For Plato, there is not only the 
suggestion that one should be able to 'reckon up' or calculate, but also the suggestion 
that we should know certain properties of numbers. This fairly innocuous sounding 
distinction was one of considerable importance in the history of the subject, as the 
Greeks distinguished between logistic and arithmetic - roughly the art of calculation 
and the theory of number. 16 
Locke, too, (see page 24) draws out a further point about mathematics which he 
announces at once, namely, that mathematics is a form of abstract reasoning. It is not 
clear, in the fragment which he gives us, whether this abstract reasoning of mathematics 
simply provides the necessary condition for counting, or whether the reasoning itself 
has special value. Yet many other writers have indeed believed that the abstract 
reasoning involved in mathematics is of value in its own right, and that this provides 
something of a by-product which justifies the learning of the subject in a distinctive 
way. Plato, in The Republic, and other more recent writers, have argued in this way that 
there are special properties of mathematics which provide additional and pressing 
reasons for learning the subject. Thus we shall see that a range of aspects of 
mathematics are supposed to provide different kinds of reason for learning mathematics, 
IS On a related issue of this kind, Wringe has pointed out that 'for something to be good as a means it is 
only necessary that there should be other things which we want to do for their own sake'. (Wringe, 1988 
p.123) He goes on to suggest some things which we may do for their own sake but which we need not 
consider valuable. I shall discuss the notion of doing something for its own sake below. All I want to 
point out here is how something may be a good means, i.e. useful, without its having a valuable end. 
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ones which ebb and flow in priority within the justifications which have been set out for 
the educational value of mathematics. We shall now examine in some detail how these 
different kinds of reasons have been distinguished by some writers whilst others have 
ignored or refused to acknowledge that such distinctions exist. 
16 This (rather confused) distinction is discussed in detail in Klein (1968) 
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Chapter 2. - The basis for different kinds of reasons. 
We have seen that mathematics is useful in various ways. The ways in which it is useful 
do not of course form an exhaustive list. All I have tried to do is to indicate one or two 
of the main uses which are often set out. New practical applications have been found for 
mathematics throughout history, and one may safely assume that this will continue. 
Indeed much mathematics is originated in order be of assistance to those who are 
working at practical tasks. In this section I am no longer concerned to find more and 
more examples of the uses to which mathematics may be put. I want to explore the 
possibility that there are different kinds of reasons, other than utility, which provide us 
with the purposes of mathematics and hence a reason for teaching it. We shall see that 
much depends upon the scope of what counts as 'useful' and this varies amongst 
different writers. 
Unitary reasons 
When reasons are given for learning mathematics these are sometimes in the form of a 
list of reasons, all of which are of a single broad kind. So that if mathematics is deemed 
to be useful, as it has already been argued, the reasons given for learning it may all be 
examples of the use to which mathematics may be put. So that mathematics is typically 
said to be worth learning because it is useful, for example, in everyday life, in 
commerce, states of emergency and in the development of science. These four reasons 
would be all of the same kind. I shall call such reasons unitary, since they can all be 
traced back to one main source. 
On the other hand, different kinds of reasons for learning mathematics may be sought 
and put forward. Some writers have thought that the value of mathematics is not to be 
found solely in its usefulness. Others have even denied that mathematics is of much use 
at all, or perhaps even if it is, it is not primarily this reason which provides a rationale 
for teaching and learning it. 17 So if it is to be justified, by those who have these beliefs 
about the subject, it is necessary to have some means of giving reasons which are 
marked off from what is useful. But the notion of what is useful is elastic, and this has 
allowed some interesting variations in the way writers have responded to the possibility 
of kinds of reasons. 
17 See for example Andrews (1998). 
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Broadly, mathematics is useful to the extent that it is the means to some desired end. 
Typically, as we have seen, these ends include those connected with national security 
when the value of mathematics in military goals has been realised, and those connected 
with prosperity when mathematics has seen to be of value in commerce. Overlapping 
both of these, the use of mathematics in navigation has provided strong grounds for 
teaching and learning it. Additionally, mathematics is seen as being of indispensable 
service to science. The most clear-cut cases of usefulness, then, involve ends that lie 
outside mathematics. However, since some results, techniques, arguments and proofs 
are useful means for achieving or justifying other results, certain parts of mathematics 
become useful within the discipline itself. A theorem might be useful in showing the 
certainty of some mathematical proposition which hitherto was only conjecture, and 
moreover it may be useful for bringing together a range of other results or generating 
further ones. 
Another idea which some have thought to be distinct from all of those mentioned so far, 
is the function that mathematics has in achieving certain ends outside mathematics, but 
'within' the individual. This end is described in various ways, but I shall denote it by 
the expression mental training. A full discussion of this reason for learning 
mathematics is given in Part 3. What I want to explore here is how writers have set out 
their statements about reasons. This is an important preliminary because many 
arguments concerning the justification of mathematics seem to rest simply upon a 
dichotomy between ideas of usefulness and non-usefulness. 
If we allow all the examples that I have discussed so far to be collected under the notion 
of the usefulness of mathematics, then it seems that there is scarcely any other reason 
for learning the subject. Then, not only would applications of mathematics to a range of 
extra-mathematical situations be cases of the usefulness of mathematics. The use made 
of certain parts of mathematics within the whole discipline, and its 'use' as a means of 
training the mind would also fall under the same category. All of these reasons would 
be of one kind. Yet, as I have said, there are those who still want to suggest that there is 
some justification for learning mathematics which does not invoke the notion of 
usefulness. 
One way of asserting that the value of mathematics does not lie in its usefulness, is to 
show that mathematics is not the means to any end, it is an end in itself. Another way of 
putting this has been to say either that mathematics has intrinsic value, or that it is 
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worth learning for its own sake .18 Precisely what this latter expression can mean will be 
considered later. What I want to do firstly is to see how writers have managed or failed 
to manage to present reasons of different kinds. This will then form a preface for a 
further enquiry into particular kinds of reason. 
Is there a plurality in kinds of reason? 
In Plato's The Laws, as we have seen, emphasis is placed on the utility of mathematics. 
The Republic, too, with its remark about the value of mathematics for the soldier 
indicates how mathematics is useful. But The Republic provides an early example of 
how theorists have wanted to mark out different kinds of reasons for learning 
mathematics. Not only must soldiers study mathematics for organising their armies, but 
philosophers, too, must study them for what appears to be a radically different end, 
namely, so that they can 'escape from this transient world to reality'. Now, if the study 
of mathematics does provide the wherewithal for 'escape', whatever this may mean, 
then we might want to say that this is just one more of its uses. But Plato and certain 
other writers who have given what appear to be related or modem versions of this 
purpose, want to suggest that studying mathematics for this end is not just another 
example of the utility of the subject. 
Another interesting case arises from what is said about the value of mathematics by 
Vives, the Spanish tutor to Mary the daughter of Henry VIII, who set out the case for 
mathematics in the first universities. He makes no mention of the clear cases of utility 
which I have been discussing here. Instead, for Vives, the purpose of learning 
mathematics was to, ' ... "display the sharpness of the mind" and to provide discipline 
for "flighty and restless intellects which are inclined to slackness and shrink from or 
will not support the toil of a continued effort" , (See Howson, 1982 p.5). But he still 
believed that there was potential danger when the subject was pursued in such a way 
that it, , ... "leads away from the things of life, and estranges men from the 
perception of what conduces to the common weal" , (p.S). 
This suggests that mathematics can act as a vehicle for performances of some kind and, 
thereby or otherwise, playa part in character building. Yet Vives' remarks came with a 
18 For a discussion on the distinction between intrinsic worth and things done for their own sake, 
see Wringe (1988) Ch.ll 
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warning: engagement in mathematics could be counter productive if one became too 
absorbed in the subject. It is not clear whether this is a warning against the very purpose 
of mathematics, which Plato set out for the philosopher, but the similarity between what 
Vives was warning his readers about, and what Plato seemed to be welcoming in 
mathematics, is striking. Both thought that mathematics had a special power to lift the 
student away from the familiar world. Both articulate this in terms of a 'leading away, 
from 'perception'. Yet Plato and Vives have contrasting, if not diametrically opposed, 
beliefs about the value of such a transformation in the individual. Furthermore, for Plato 
the escape was reserved for the elite few who were picked out not to take a direct part in 
the 'common weal'. Why Plato could value so highly this 'leading away' will be 
discussed later. For the moment, all that I want to show is how utility is not the only 
reason which has been given by some theorists for pursuing mathematics. 
Duality in reasons 
Some important controversies follow from the observations just made. Indeed Howson 
uses Vives' remark not only to signal the possibility of two-fold reasons for learning 
mathematics, and to show how these are endemic in mathematics education, but also to 
show how crucial such an observation is in understanding the development of 
mathematics education in England. He writes: 
The dual aspects of mathematics, the practical and the contemplative, 
were clearly distinguished then by Vives, and he recognised the need 
healthily to reconcile the two. The subsequent history of mathematics 
education in England is largely a chronicle, on the one hand, of how 
this problem was ignored - with the result that a bipartite system of 
mathematics education was effectively created - and, on the other 
hand, of how individual educators have constantly sought to effect a 
reconciliation.1\Howson, 1982 p.5) 
Whether Vives has in fact clearly distinguished the particular dual aspects, to which 
Howson refers, is questionable. The 'practical' and the 'contemplative' seem to fit in 
rather more with what has been said so far about Plato's rationale. Moreover, whilst 
Vives does refer to the 'common weal' he does not imply that mathematics is 
instrumental in achieving this. But clearly for Howson, dualities, perhaps even 
pluralities, in reasons exist, and it will be my task here to identify them and examine 
them. 
19 My italics 
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When writers have wanted to justify mathematics both for its usefulness and for some 
other reason not characterised by utility, then they present what I shall call a dualist 
justification. For example, Griffiths and Howson (1974) make the following statement 
describing a duality in mathematics education: 
From the Egyptians onwards, mathematics has had two aspects. One of 
these is practical, as a help in commerce, farming, building and control 
of the environment; the other is aesthetic, as men have enjoyed the 
contemplation of numbers and geometrical forms, the discipline of 
controlled imaginative thought and the thrill of discovering new 
mathematical relationships. The Egyptian priests combined both 
aspects, the mystical and the practical, and their society honoured them 
highly for both?O (p.7) 
The idea that mathematics is of 'help', here, in achieving other goods is clearly an 
assertion that in this respect mathematics is useful, though the authors prefer to use the 
word 'practical'. Whether or not 'practical' and 'useful' are interchangeable will remain 
to be seen. What Griffiths and Howson must provide, if there is to be a distinction 
between the reasons which arise from the two aspects which they have identified, is 
something that is non-practical. But, they have not been scrupulous in conveying the 
exact meaning of this second aspect. Firstly, they refer to it as 'aesthetic' . Yet under 
their concept of aesthetic they curiously include the idea of 'disciplined thought' of 
some kind, and then in the next sentence 'aesthetic' is equated with 'mystical'. Later on, 
they again seem to identify 'the aesthetic aspect of mathematics' with 'mathematics as a 
mental discipline'. Now, whilst they may not intend to equate 'aesthetic' and 'mental 
discipline' (p.15), they certainly make a very strong connection between these two 
ideas. This is of some considerable importance, because the authors seem to think that 
the practical and the aesthetic are the key concepts underlying the reasons given for 
learning mathematics. As they say: 
Just as the mathematics had its two aspects - the practical and the 
aesthetic - so we shall see that at different times and in different places 
both aspects were used to justify the teaching of the subject. (pp. 8-9) 
So it is of no small importance to clarify this notion of aesthetic, especially since 
amongst some writers what appears to be a further step is made when mathematics is 
20 My italics 
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compared with fine art. The nature and connections between aesthetics, art and 
mathematics will be explored in detail in the next section. At this point, however, it is 
worth noting that since at least the time of Kant, the idea of aesthetic has come to mean 
something non-purposeful, a form of disinterested enjoyment. So any aesthetic aspect of 
mathematics, if it exists, would seem to be a perfectly suitable candidate for a reason of 
a different kind from those which embody, or are examples of, usefulness. 
Unitary justifications - some examples 
Justifications based almost solely on what appear to be broadly aesthetic aspects of 
mathematics are not hard to find. Wells (1989) in providing an answer to his own 
question 'why do mathematics?' asks: 'What is attractive about mathematics? Wherein 
lies its magnetic quality? How does it hook your attention and draw you in?' It must be 
said that his use of 'attractive' and 'hook' do give the impression that he is addressing 
his question to those who are already devotees. His approach is hardly for those who are 
sceptical about the value of the subject and seek a justification for devoting time and 
energy on learning mathematics, rather than on other pursuits. Nevertheless, he does 
offer the basis of what seems to be a unitary justification for learning mathematics, 
referring to several aesthetic qualities: 
Mathematics has been variously described as mysterious, puzzling, 
surprising, weird and curious; elegant and beautiful; simple and 
complicated; displaying generality, unexpected connections, hidden 
depths, unity-in-variety; and last but by no means least, as 
extraordinarily powerful. (p.34) 
I am not suggesting that Wells would deny that mathematics was useful, but his failure 
to stress this shows that a different set of reasons are the operative ones. In a similar 
way, the remarks of Whitcombe (1988), about the value of mathematics, are similarly 
unitary. Complaining that various national publications have in the recent past 
concentrated on 'the utilitarian aspects of mathematics', thereby impoverishing the 
mathematics curriculum, he writes that' ... the wellsprings of mathematics are not utility 
and relevance, but creativity, imagination and an appreciation of the beauty of the 
subject.' It is questionable whether this is entirely true. Much depends upon what is 
meant by 'the wellsprings'. If it simply means the origins of a particular research project 
in mathematics then it is probably far from the truth. Mathematics has surely on 
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occasions arisen from mere curiosity and fascination with a particular homespun 
problem or enquiry, but much of mathematics unquestionably arises from the seeking of 
solutions to pressing practical problems. Nevertheless, the view that mathematics has 
predominantly arisen from non-practical sources has been influential in education. In 
her manual for primary teachers Leibeck (1984) maintains a similar view with respect 
to the reasons for learning the subject. She writes: 
Some people may enjoy mathematics because it is useful. But it is far 
more likely that its appeal for us lies in the intellectual or aesthetic 
satisfaction that we derive from it. This is particularly true of children. 
(p.13) 
So we certainly do appear to have the basis for different kinds of reasons in these 
writers. 
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Chapter 3 - The scope of 'useful' 
Mental training and utility 
Let us return to the two aspects of mathematics discussed by Griffiths and Howson 
from which the authors suggest that reasons of two broad kinds arise. (see above page 
36) We have already noted that these authors identify non-practical reasons arising from 
aspects of mathematics variously referred to as 'aesthetic', 'mystical' and those which 
provide 'mental discipline'. But if mathematics provides mental discipline surely this is 
just another way in which it is practical. One difficulty in responding to this point, is 
that it is not clear precisely what aspect of mathematics is supposed to provide such 
discipline, and thus how it might function as a reason for learning mathematics. 
Sometimes what is meant is that mathematics embodies order of some kind and that in 
learning it one acquires a more ordered mind. So that mathematics, since it is the means 
of reaching such a mental state, is thereby useful. Others, however, have thought that 
this 'use' of mathematics is altogether different from the other uses of mathematics. 
Nevertheless one can easily feel rather tom on the matter. 
Whitehead was one writer who did seem to think that the development of mental 
discipline was part of the utility of mathematics. When he gave a lecture on the 
mathematics curriculum earlier in this century he seemed at first to give the impression 
that mathematics was not in need of any justification. He remarked that it was not his 
task 'to defend mathematics as a subject for profound study', since, as he put it, 'it can 
very well take care of itself. He took it for granted that the subject was of value; what 
he wanted was a modified curriculum. As things were, the curriculum was, he thought, 
'too recondite', and so: 
... the very reasons which make this science a delight to its students are 
reasons which obstruct its use as an educational instrument - namely, 
the boundless wealth of deductions from the interplay of general 
theorems, their complication, their apparent remoteness from the ideas 
from which the argument started, the variety of methods, and their pure 
abstract character which brings, as its gift, eternal truth. 
(Whitehead, 1929 p.118) 
So the mathematics curriculum as it stood was unable to satisfactorily achieve its goal, 
as an 'educational instrument'. Thus despite Whitehead's not intending to provide a 
rational for studying mathematics, we do find one emerging when he remarks that 'this 
liability to reconditeness is the characteristic evil which is apt to destroy the utility oj 
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mathematics in liberal education,?1 (p.117) What is interesting is how he connects, 
here, the seemingly disparate ideas of 'utility' and 'liberal education'. The idea of a 
liberally educated person has usually been opposed to the idea of one who is trained for 
a vocation. Moreover, those who try and suggest that mathematics is not justified by its 
usefulness are often those who wish to uphold a liberal view of education, which they 
believe an emphasis on the utility of mathematics undermines. But it seems that all 
Whitehead is saying here is that mathematics can be the means for which the liberally 
educated person is the end. Consistently with his view of liberal education, he 
elaborates his reasons for teaching mathematics a little further saying that, 
' ... elementary mathematics rightly conceived would give just that philosophical 
discipline of which the ordinary mind is capable' 22 (p.122). His later use of the 'utility 
of mathematics' gains a little more sense when he speaks of mathematics as, ' ... the 
chief instrument for discipline in logical method' 23 (p.127). If Whitehead is suggesting 
that mathematics forms some kind of mental training or discipline, as many have done, 
he is also clearly suggesting that this is one way in which mathematics is useful. But as 
we have seen other writers have wanted to distinguish the usefulness of mathematics 
from its value as a form of mental training, so that usefulness and mental training 
provide different kinds of reasons. What appears to be a dualist justification can, then, 
collapse into a unitary one especially if we broaden the scope of 'usefulness'. 
Sometimes as we have seen in the account of Griffiths and Howson (see page 36) the 
view that mathematics is useful is expressed more narrowly by ascribing 'practical' 
value to the subject. So that even if we agree with Whitehead that mental training is one 
of the uses of mathematics, it is still not clear whether this is quite the same as saying 
that mathematics is thereby of practical value. It depends upon whether there is an 
important distinction between 'useful' and 'practical' or whether they are 
interchangeable. One could argue that the notion of what is practical implies that the 
learner is always aware of the end for which he or she is using mathematics. Whereas, 
the mental training which mathematics is supposed to provide is not something which 
the learner, himself or herself, uses mathematics to achieve, although the educator 
might apply it in this way. Moreover, mental training is more like something, which 
happens to him or her in learning mathematics rather than something which either does 
21 M . 1· Y Ita ICS 
22 M . 1· Y Ita ICS 
23 M . 1· Y Ita ICS 
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with mathematics. Finally, we might want to argue that mental training is not something 
which is so immediate as the purely practical ends of mathematics can be. But writers 
have seldom, if at all, made such a distinction between different kinds of uses of 
mathematics, so the way seems open for different views on the matter. Whether or not 
these conditions can be used to distinguish the useful from the purely practical will 
remain to be seen, after a consideration of the different kinds of opportunities for mental 
training have been discussed in Part 3. But one example can be given of a theorist who 
did distinguish the useful from the practical in order to separate off the mental training 
outcome from others, thus providing different kinds of reasons. 
I suggested earlier that there was indeed a duality in Plato's justification for learning 
mathematics in The Republic. A similar duality, in more modern dress, is set out by Sir 
Joshua Fitch, an inspector of training colleges. In his Lectures on Teaching given in 
1880, Fitch (1902) writes: 
There are two conceivable objects in teaching any subject. (1) Because 
the thing taught is necessary, or useful, and may be turned to practical 
account, or (2) because the incidental effect of teaching it is to bring 
into play and exercise certain powers and capabilities, and so to serve a 
real educational purpose ... of Arithmetic we may safely say at the 
outset, that if rightly taught, it is well calculated to fulfil both purposes. 
(p.286) 
Fitch's account is interesting, because although he does want to invoke the notion of 
'practical', this is made to follow from the usefulness of mathematics. But, then for his 
second 'object' to be different in kind cannot therefore also follow from the usefulness 
of mathematics. This second object is the mental training aspect which, as I have 
remarked before, is still not unquestionably free from being a species of the usefulness 
of mathematics in the hands of other writers. Of course, for those who want to stress the 
usefulness of mathematics, no further refinement is necessary. Indeed, it may seem to 
them to be mere pedantry to pursue the matter. But as doubt has been cast on the 
'usefulness' of mathematics from time to time, it is essential to provide rather more 
analysis of the supposed 'non-useful' reasons?4 
24 At least one writer has recently suggested that the justification for teaching mathematics on the basis of 
its usefulness, in one its senses at least, is a myth. (See Andrews, 1998 and also my response in Huckstep, 
1999). 
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The denial of duality in justifications 
My point in questioning whether or not some reasons for learning mathematics really 
are free from the all taint of usefulness becomes much clearer, I think, when we 
consider a thoroughgoing unitary rationale. John Perry (in Griffiths & Howson 1974) 
wrote at the turn of the twentieth century that: 
'The study of mathematics began because it was useful, continues 
because it is useful, and is valuable to the world because of the 
usefulness of its results, while the mathematicians, who determine what 
the teacher shall do, hold that the subject should be studied for its own 
sake' (p.17) 
In this assertion Perry gives the impression that he is ruling out a particular reason for 
learning mathematics, namely pursuing it/or its own sake. This reason, mentioned 
earlier, seems to be behind what educationists like Wells (see above page 37) give as 
reasons for 'doing' mathematics. However, Perry's denial is only made at the cost of his 
extending the concept of the usefulness beyond reasonable bounds. In the Report, which 
bears Perry's name, it was claimed that mathematics is useful in no less than eight 
ways, many of which sound rather quaint. They are: 
(1) In producing the higher emotions and giving mental pleasure. 
Hitherto neglected in teaching almost all boys. 
(2) (a) In brain development. (b) In producing logical ways of thinking. 
Hitherto neglected in teaching most boys. 
(3) In the aid given to mathematical weapons in the study of physical 
science. Hitherto neglected in teaching almost all boys. 
(4) In passing examinations. The only form that has not been neglected. 
The only form recognised by teachers. 
(5) In giving men mental tools as easy to use as their legs or arms; 
enabling them to go on with their education (developing their souls and 
brains) throughout their lives, utilising for this purpose all their 
experience. This is exactly analogous with the power to educate one's 
self through the fondness of reading. 
(6) Perhaps included in (5): in teaching a man the importance of 
thinking things out for himself and so delivering him from the present 
dreadful yoke of authority and convincing him that, whether he obeys 
or commands, he is one of the highest of beings. This is usually left to 
other than mathematical studies. 
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(7) In making men in any profession of applied science feel that they 
know the principles on which it is founded and according to which it is 
developed. 
(8) In giving to acute philosophical minds a logical counsel of 
perfection altogether charming and satisfying, and so preventing their 
attempting to develop any philosophical subject from the purely 
abstract view, because the absurdity of such an attempt has become 
obvious. 
(Quoted in Griffiths & Howson 1974 pp.17-18) 
The difference between Perry and Fitch is striking. Whereas Fitch wanted to distinguish 
two kinds of reason, Perry wants to draw almost every possible reason he can think of 
under one broad kind. So that in his list we do find something resembling mental 
training appearing under reason (2) thus gathering it under the umbrella of a very broad 
notion of usefulness. Thus his view is in contrast to both Plato and Fitch who both 
implied that usefulness and mental training were two distinct reasons for studying 
mathematics. What is even more remarkable is Perry's reference to the production of 
'the higher emotions and giving mental pleasure' (No.1 in his list). This reference to 
'pleasure' seems to include in one fell swoop most of the value identified by those who 
want to justify mathematics for its own sake. Indeed, it is often supposed that the 
meaning of doing something for its own sake is doing something simply for pleasure 
rather than as a means to some other end.25 But this is precisely what Perry's own 
justification, with its exclusive insistence on usefulness, is supposed to reject. I have 
already shown that enlarging the scope of the usefulness of mathematics to include 
mental training is by no means uncontroversial. I now want to take a closer look at what 
is meant by 'doing something for its own sake' to see what bearing this has on unitary 
justifications of the kind which Perry has set out. 
Doing something for its own sake 
Champlin (1987) in getting clear about the idea of doing something for its own sake 
sets out to attack a view which he calls 'isolationism'. He applies this idea to a range of 
reflexive forms of verbs like 'self-raising' and 'self-correcting'. Firstly, take the case of 
what is called 'self-raising' flour. If such flour undergoes a chemical analysis it will be 
found to contain baking powder. So it is not self-raising after all. Similarly if we look 
25 I make this point notwithstanding Aristotle's remark that pleasure is in a sense instrumental in 
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under the dashboard of a car we find that what were supposed to be 'self-correcting' 
indicators are really corrected by a cam. But to deny that the flour is self-raising and the 
indicators are self-correcting would be, according to Champlin, cases of isolationism. 
This is because we are looking in the wrong place for our answers. The flour is self-
raising because the cook does not have to add further ingredients. The indicators are 
self-correcting because the driver does not need to correct them. The use of 'self in 
these examples acquire their meaning not from within the substance of the flour and 
within the mechanism of the indicators. Their meaning is acquired, Champlin argues, 
from the background in which they are set. If we look in the flour and under the 
dashboard we are looking in the wrong place. We need to consider the context in which 
they are used. 
In philosophy Champlin's main target is Kant, who he says, using his earlier analogy, 
was 'trying to do moral philosophy with, so to speak, his head stuck under the 
psychological dashboard'. (p.37) This is because for Kant, he argues: 
To pursue virtue for virtue's sake, nothing must count with you but 
virtue alone. All else must be excluded - pleasure in the happiness you 
bring to others, contentment, peace of mind, good nature, fellow-
feeling, a sunny disposition. (p.35) 
With this in mind, Champlin gives another example in this Kantian style. Here a person 
has chosen some music for its own sake, yet adds that the music is beautiful and gives 
him (or her) great pleasure. S/he is immediately rounded on by someone who objects 
that the music was supposed to have been chosen for its own sake and it cannot thus be 
for the beauty and the pleasure it gives. 
To this Champlin replies: 
But this, is, surely, quite mad. Somehow, in stripping the music bare, 
as we do when we exclude its power to evoke associated memories and 
to create nostalgia, in our desire to get at the music all by itself, we 
push things too far and end up having excluded something we need to 
keep in order to make sense of what it is to choose a piece of music for 
its own sake. (p.36) 
In the context of learning for its own sake, which is the area which we are particularly 
concerned with, Champlin quotes from Newman's The Idea of a University, and finds 
promoting happiness. (Ethics, 1953 edn pp. 36-7) 
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something much more acceptable. What Newman does there, he argues, is not to strip 
knowledge of any possible ends, but to separate out and contrast particular ends. He 
contrasts, that is, 
... the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake with the pursuit of 
knowledge for utilitarian ends - a liberal education with commercial, 
professional and vocational education. (p.40) 
Comparing Newman's position with Kant's he remarks: 
How different is Newman's account from the one Kant would have 
given, who, ifhe had to depict the university academic pursuing his 
subject for its own sake, might have imagined a scholar on whom his 
subject had gone dead but who chillingly persevered with his 
researches, his reading and his lecturing, although he could take no 
satisfaction or enjoyment from them. To omit the thirst for knowledge, 
the intellectual enthusiasm, in order to guarantee that it is knowledge 
alone that is pursued, is like arguing that if the driver has to use his 
own muscle power to straighten the wheel before the self-cancelling 
indicator works, then it is not a truly self-cancelling device ... (pp. 40-
41) 
He concludes by remarking that: 
The line between what is internal and what is external to that which is 
done for its own sake needs to be drawn in a much more relaxed way: 
sufficiently relaxed to permit the line to be drawn in different places for 
different purposes. (p.46) 
What reply then could Perry, or indeed anyone who is prepared to enlarge the scope of 
'usefulness' in his way, give to the charge that the scope of 'usefulness' now includes 
the very thing which the whole point of the enlargement was supposed to prevent being 
acceptable? He could deny that item (1) on his list did entail doing mathematics for its 
own sake, though it is difficult to see how this reply can be made without adopting an 
isolationist position of the kind which Champlin has convincingly shown to be 
untenable. He might, however, invoke another sense of 'doing mathematics for its own 
sake' where it is the sake of the mathematics which counts rather than simply the 
individual's enjoyment. 
A different sense, of pursuing an activity for its own sake, along these lines, is marked 
out well by what Nagel (1979) calls 'perfectionist ends', those ends which are 
characterised by 'the intrinsic value of certain achievements or creations, apart from 
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their value to individuals who experience or use them ,.26 The list of contexts in which 
such ends are possible is broad and Nagel elaborates upon some helpful examples: 
Examples are provided by the intrinsic value of scientific discovery, of 
artistic creation, of space exploration, perhaps. These pursuits do of 
course serve the interests of the individuals directly involved in them, 
and of certain spectators. But typically the pursuit of such ends is not 
justified solely in terms of those interests. They are thought to have an 
intrinsic value, so that it is important to achieve fundamental advances, 
for example, in mathematics or astronomy even if very few people 
come to understand them and they have no practical effects. The mere 
existence of such understanding, somewhere in the species, is regarded 
by many as worth substantial sacrifices?? (pp. 129-130) 
Nagel's account of perfectionist ends differs from the sense of doing something for its 
own sake, outlined by Champlin. For Champlin, no other explanation beyond an 
individual's pleasure, enjoyment or, what he calls at one point 'a thirst for knowledge', 
is necessary to indicate that something is being pursued for its own sake. The pursuit of 
perfectionist ends, on the other hand, is likely to bring at least some enjoyment, but this 
is not essential. It is the good of the activity, rather than the good of the individual who 
undertakes that activity, which is the decisive factor. 
An interesting point now emerges: in pursuing a discipline for its own good, usefulness, 
in one of its senses described earlier, reappears. This is because certain things now 
become useful in enabling the discipline to flourish. When G.H. Hardy (1967), 
remarked, that' ... very little of mathematics is useful practically, and that ... little is 
comparatively dull', he still supposed that mathematics was useful, but that it was 
useful in the slightly special way in which I mentioned earlier. Certain mathematical 
results are useful, because they are the means of achieving ends within mathematics. So 
that parts of mathematics may have value because they are, as Hardy puts it, 'serious' or 
'significant' : 
The 'seriousness' of a mathematical theorem lies, not in its practical 
consequences, which are usually negligible, but in the Significance of 
the mathematical ideas which it connects. We may say, roughly, that a 
mathematical idea is 'significant' ifit can be connected, in a natural 
and illuminating way, with a large complex of other mathematical 
ideas. (p.89) 
26 My italics 
27 My italics. One of the best examples in recent times is the work of Wiles in solving Fermat's Last 
Theorem. 
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In saying this, Hardy embraces a view that values the pursuit of mathematics for the 
flourishing of the subject itself, independently of any flourishing of the individual. This 
view has its ancestry in writers like Alexander Malcolm, who urged the 'doing of 
mathematics for its own sake' in both of the senses I have discussed here. Although 
utility for posterity is not far from his mind, Malcolm (1730) does, in the following, 
anticipate Nagel's perfectionist ends: 
Though there be many truths discovered in the Theory of Arithmetic of 
which there has been no use or application yet found, there is no reason 
why those things should be neglected or kept out of the system; for 
they are still part of the Science, which we ought to enlarge more and 
more, as far as we can: one age may find the use of the theory which a 
former has invented. 
But he also urges engagement in mathematics for enjoyment on behalf ofthe individual 
as he continues: 
I shall but add this one thing more, viz. That though many things in the 
Science of Numbers were supposed to be of no particular use in human 
affairs, yet as the mind of man is made for knowledge and 
contemplation, and the pleasure arising from the perception of beauty 
and order in other things, is allowed to be worthy of rational natures; 
the contemplation of the surprising connections, the beautiful order and 
harmony of relations and dependencies found among numbers, is not 
less reasonable ... 
If the engagement in mathematics for its own sake, in either of the two senses which I 
have discussed, were largely a matter for professional mathematicians, like Hardy, then 
it might be supposed that its relevance as a justification within educational contexts is 
questionable. But Elliott (1974) has shown that any individual can have these kinds of 
attitude towards a subject like mathematics during the stages in which it is being learnt. 
Elliott gives us some considerable insight into the relationship which an individual can 
have towards various aspects of a subject. One important point which he makes is that 
this relationship is not in a steady state. This he argues by drawing an analogy between 
the love of a subject and the love of a person. In a way reminiscent of Wells, (see above 
page 37), Elliott attributes the initial reasons for wanting to learn a subject to its 
attractiveness. One is, as it were, 'drawn into' a subject and then becomes 'good' at it, 
better at it than other subjects. It begins to consume more and more time and it must be 
realised that there are standards to meet which involve considerable work, sometimes 
bordering on toil. But whilst love for the subject remains, Elliott explains how a change 
of attitude can take place within the individual: 
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Pleasures do not come easily now, but he finds a fulfilment in trying to 
satisfy the demands his subject makes upon him. He has become 
devoted to its discipline, and feels at times that he has been enlisted in 
its service. His relationship to his subject now bears an analogy to 
courtly love, as celebrated by such authors as Chaucer, Gower and 
Chretien de Troyes, a love which makes, extreme, even cruel, demands 
and offers no guarantee of pleasure. (p.136) 
But indefinite lack of pleasure does not typify love of a subject. In time, the individual, 
Elliott adds, ' ... finds himself experiencing the old delight again, as if nothing had ever 
come between him and the objects he is studying' . Yet, this pleasure does not 
necessarily remain. It typically gives way to toil once again. This love is characterised 
by the 'cyclic manner' in which delights are obscured by toil and then delights emerge 
again.28 
The pursuit of a subject in the face of there being no 'guarantees of pleasure', which 
Elliot outlines has what Nagel has called 'perfectionist value' and it thus does not 
always result in what Perry called 'mental pleasure'. So, to return to the question of 
how far theorists like Perry can extend the scope of 'usefulness' to rule out different 
kinds of reasons for learning mathematics, it seems that the only effect that such an 
enlargement of 'useful' can have is of ruling out the pursuit of mathematics for 
perfectionist ends. But whilst these ends might appear to be of little significance in 
education, Elliott's account shows not only that they are involved in the learning of any 
subject which one comes to love, but also how they seem to go hand in hand with the 
pursuit of enjoyment. We must conclude, therefore, that attempts such as that made by 
Perry to reduce all kinds of reasons for learning mathematics to one kind - those which 
may be described in terms of usefulness - cannot be sustained.29 
28 Not only is there a fluctuation between enjoyment and toil, in learning. A similar fluctuation can take 
place between wanting to enlarge the subject for its own sake and because it is from time to time found to 
be of use, even though in this respect, too, there are no guarantees. 
29 Perry's over-zealous attempt to stretch the scope of usefulness beyond helpfulness was not an isolated 
case. Davis and Hersh (1980), perhaps with a touch of irony, also show the same disregard for 
distinctions in kinds of usefulness, when they remark: 
'A pedagogue particularly of the classical variety - might tell us that mathematics is useful in that it 
teaches us how to think and reason with precision. An architect or sculptor - again of the classical sort -
might tell us that mathematics is useful because it leads to the perception and creation of visual beauty. A 
philosopher might tell us that mathematics is useful insofar as it enables him to escape from the realities 
of day-to-day living. A teacher might say that mathematics is useful because it provides him with bread 
and butter. A book publisher knows that mathematics is useful for it enables him to sell many textbooks. 
An astronomer or physicist will say that mathematics is useful to him because mathematics is the 
language of science. A civil engineer will assert that mathematics enables him to build a bridge 
expeditiously. A mathematician will say that within mathematics itself, a body of mathematics is useful 
when it can be applied to another body of mathematics subjects'. (pp. 79-80) 
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The breadth of usefulness explained - Mathematics for communication 
Notwithstanding the extravagant scope which Perry allowed 'useful' to have, for 
Griffiths and Howson the plea for utility culminating in the report, marked a watershed 
in the development of British mathematical education, which had for so long resisted a 
practical mathematical curriculum. But the authors show, too, that the overriding 
demand for utility later became somewhat tempered. For example, they refer to the 
Dainton Committee who in 1968 did provide different kinds of reasons for justifying 
mathematics education. These were: 
1. Mathematics as a means of communicating quantifiable ideas. 
2. Mathematics as a training for discipline of thought and for logical 
reasomng. 
3. Mathematics as a tool in activities arising from the developing 
needs of engineering, technology, science, organisation, economics, 
sociology, etc. 
4. Mathematics as a study in itself, where development of new 
techniques and concepts can have economic consequences akin to 
those flowing from scientific research and development. 
(Quoted in Griffiths and Howson, 1974 pp. 22-23) 
Even here, there is still a sense in which the first three of these purposes might still be 
regarded as species of usefulness. But, as I remarked earlier, and will reconsider in 
Part 3, it is not universally agreed that mental training is yet another example of the 
usefulness of mathematics. Yet, with the inclusion of item 4, slightly ambivalent as it is, 
something approximating to the perfectionist value discussed above has been 
introduced. It is, however, interesting to note that explicit mention of mathematics as a 
source of pleasure, mental or otherwise, is not made. 
More recently, Mathematics counts, from the Cockcroft Committee, acknowledges the 
breadth of scope in the notion of usefulness. Thus it subsumes reasons strikingly similar 
~IBL LONDON UNTV. 
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to those in item (3) of the Dainton list under one similar in description to that given in 
item (1) which it treats as the principal reason for teaching mathematics to children: 
The usefulness of mathematics is perceived in different ways. For 
many it is seen in terms of arithmetic skills which are needed for use at 
home or in the office or workshop; some see mathematics as the basis 
of scientific development and modem technology; some emphasise the 
increasing use of mathematical techniques as a management tool in 
commerce and industry ... we believe that all these perceptions of the 
usefulness of mathematics arise from the fact that mathematics 
provides a means of communication which is powerful, concise and 
unambiguous.30 (Cockcroft et al (1982) p.l) 
All of what is deemed useful in mathematics is drawn out and made to follow from this 
one source - mathematics as a special means of communication - which it treats as the 
principal reason for teaching mathematics to children. However, what the report calls 
'the second important reason' is curiously just a filling out and an extension of some of 
the useful aspects of mathematics already mentioned: 
A second important reason for teaching mathematics must be its 
importance and usefulness [sic] in many other fields. It is fundamental 
to the study of physical science and of engineering of all kinds. It is 
increasingly being used in medicine and the biological sciences, in 
geography and economics, in business and management studies. It is 
essential to the operations of industry and commerce in both office and 
workshop. (p.2) 
So far then the report remains unitary with respect to kinds of reasons given for 
teaching mathematics to children. However, two other kinds of reasons do follow. The 
first of these concerns what I have been referring to as mental training. In the report, 
however, unlike some of the earlier views I have briefly reviewed, this reason is fairly 
muted: 
It is often suggested that mathematics should be studied in order to 
develop powers of logical thinking, accuracy and spatial awareness. 
The study of mathematics can certainly contribute to these ends but the 
extent to which it does so depends on the way in which mathematics is 
taught. Nor is its contribution unique; many other activities and the 
study of a number of other subjects can develop these powers as well. 
We therefore believe that the need to develop these powers does not in 
itself constitute a sufficient reason for studying mathematics rather than 
other things. However, teachers should be aware of the contributions 
which mathematics can make. (p.2) 
30 My italics. Compare this remark with item 1. on the Dainton list. 
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We have already seen how the mental training reason has been subsumed under an 
extended notion of usefulness. Nevertheless, the Cockcroft Report does, at the very 
least, embody a dualist account on the strength of the final reason which it gives for 
teaching mathematics. Here mathematics is seen as having intrinsic worth as a form of 
entertainment: 
The inherent interest of mathematics and the appeal which it can have 
for many children and adults provide yet another reason for teaching 
mathematics in schools. The fact that 'puzzle corners' of various kinds 
appear in so many papers and periodicals testifies to the fact that the 
appeal of relatively elementary problems and puzzles is widespread; 
attempts to solve them can provide both enjoyment and also, in many 
cases, lead to increased mathematical understanding. (p.2) 
We have seen then how a consideration of some categories can help us begin to analyse 
the reasons that have been given for justifying mathematics in the curriculum. In 
particular, there is the category of usefulness, which it seems can either be interpreted in 
a fairly narrow way, often then termed 'practical', in which the ends are direct, and 
immediate and consciously sought after, or 'useful' can be interpreted in a more 
thoroughgoing way. The narrow sense we have seen sometimes allows mental training 
to become a different kind of valuable goal of mathematics. Emphasising the intrinsic 
properties of mathematics, too, allows another category to emerge in justifications 
which writers have set forth. These as we have seen are often expressed in terms of 
aesthetic properties or are more generally regarded as the entertainment value of 
mathematics. Mathematics is then justified as a form of enjoyment of some kind. Those 
who do not want to argue that mathematics is solely justified by its usefulness, as I have 
pointed out, appeal to some of these other sources of mathematical value. 
Summary and Conclusion to Part 1 
Counting, measuring and the numerous examples of mathematical models, allow us at 
the very least, to determine quantities indirectly. In this respect mathematics may be 
regarded as a useful tool. But the concept of 'use' is not always restricted to just those 
ends for which mathematics may be regarded as a tool to determine quantities, both in 
everyday life and within other subjects of the curriculum. Mathematical results can also 
be of use within the whole discipline of mathematics. Moreover, from ancient times it 
has also been supposed that mathematics has a special kind of educational value in 
improving or training the mind in some more indeterminate way. Furthermore it has 
also seemed to be an activity which can bring much enjoyment to its participants - a 
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form of entertainment. Whether or not the provision of some kind of mental training 
and entertainment by mathematics are just two more ways in which mathematics is 
useful has been central to my discussion. The question of whether there are different 
kinds of reasons for learning mathematics depends upon whether the notion of 
usefulness in mathematics can helpfully be extended in scope to encompass these other 
purposes of mathematics. 
A review of the rationales given for mathematics from the time of Plato until the 
beginning of the 1980s shows that what is regarded as useful varies considerably. 
Sometimes what one writer sees as two kinds of reasons another sees as only one. Even 
amongst those who seem to think that there is only one reason for learning mathematics, 
there is disagreement. However, much depends upon notions such as 'useful' and 
'practical' . 
Partly in order to give 'useful' some force in justification, rather than allowing it to be 
mere rhetoric, I have tried to rescue both the mental training and the entertainment end 
from being absorbed into the notion ofusefulness.31 In particular, I have argued that 
'doing mathematics for its own sake', in one of its senses, is meaningless if the pleasure 
for which it is undertaken is regarded as just one more end for the which the activity is a 
means. In another of its senses, 'doing mathematics for its own sake' need not involve 
pleasure but then it is for the flourishing of the discipline that such activity is primarily 
undertaken. Both cases provide reasons for studying mathematics which even the most 
thoroughgoing notion of 'usefulness' could not eliminate. Thus I have argued that there 
are not only different uses of mathematics, which provide one kind of reason, but 
different kinds of reasons for learning the subject. How fit mathematics is for certain of 
these purposes will be the subject of Parts 2 and 3. 
31 In this respect I concur with the Cockcroft Report Mathematics Counts. 
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Interlude 
Beyond Utility - The legacy of Pythagoras. 
We have seen in Part 1, that the learning of mathematics has been continually and 
convincingly justified in terms of its usefulness by many theorists. Indeed some 
theorists seem to think that this is the only way in which it should be justified (Perry in 
Griffiths and Howson 1974, see page 42), whilst others (Davis and Hersh, 1980, see 
page 48) show how every reason may be phrased in terms of usefulness. Nevertheless, 
there have always been theorist for whom reasons for learning mathematics can be 
found which do not rest upon utility. Such reasons I have traced back to Plato, not only 
because his rationale for mathematical education in The Republic is fairly detailed, but 
more importantly because his non-utility reasons are valued above the utility reason. A 
similar emphasis of utility over non-utility is clear in the rationales given by many other 
theorists too, and this is why an analysis of different kinds of reasons is so important in 
my enquiry. In Part 1, one of my tasks was to separate out the varieties of 'usefulness' 
and to try and hold on to the distinction that some theorists seem to have been 
destroying between the useful and the non-useful. This has meant that I have had to 
work with fairly vague expressions like 'mere utility' 'immediate utility' and 
'practical', the meaning of which I have tried to distinguish from the 'usefulness' of 
mathematics when it is being used by the educator rather than by the pupil. 
The distinction between the two interpretations of 'doing something for its own sake' 
was more satisfactory in bringing out a basis for different kinds of reason. Recall that 
one of these interpretations - doing something for the sake of mathematics - leads back 
to the idea of enlarging the subject and hence of partly pursuing that which is useful 
within mathematics. On the other interpretation of the expression 'doing something for 
its own sake', where enjoyment of some kind is essential, I have shown that any attempt 
to allow usefulness to be introduced automatically invalidates the purpose of that 
expression. Through this route in Part 1, I hope to have allowed non-utility reasons to 
have some clear sense. Without this sense the aspects discussed in Parts 2 and 3 are just 
sub-species of utility, and I want to argue that rationales for learning mathematics can 
extend beyond utility. But if the arguments from Part 1 are still not convincing I hope to 
show that broadening the historical perspective will provide more insight into reasons 
which are remote from utility. Moreover, it seems to me that insight into the origins of 
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both of the topics in Parts 2 and 3 can be gained by going back further into history. 
Thus the purpose of the following interlude is to support the main conclusions of Part I 
and to set the scene for the following Parts. 
Pythagoras Mathematics, and the Purification of the soul 
One of the earliest sources of our belief that mathematics is more than simply a useful 
tool derives from Pythagoras. Nothing of what he wrote survives; we have to rely on the 
writings of others, in particular Aristotle. However, the general picture that emerges 
from those who wrote about him, is that like his predecessors and contemporaries, he 
sought an explanation of the nature of the world, in terms of what it was made of. But 
unlike them he did not conclude that it was essentially material. Pythagoras is 
characterised as saying that the world is essentially number. So impressed was he by 
such observations that musical notes are a function of the ratio between the lengths of 
vibrating strings, that he seemed to have felt that the ratios themselves were a more 
fundamental explanation of the musical sounds than the vibrating material strings 
themselves. This point he seems to have generalised, so that numbers are behind 
everything, and thus are bestowed with something of a godlike character. It is therefore 
only a small step to make to suppose that contemplating numbers is an essential way of 
becoming more godlike or pure. 
Pythagoras and his followers founded a religious movement which embodied the idea 
of salvation. Human beings, they believed, have for some reason fallen from grace. 
When they die they are reincarnated, only to die and become reincarnated again in an 
everlasting process unless they are purified. For them purification is achieved not only 
at the lowest level by acknowledging certain taboos, but also at the highest level by 
what Koestler (1959) calls' ... contemplating the essence of all reality, the harmony of 
forms, the dance of numbers'. (p.37) 
This remarkable theory of the connection between mathematics and human well-being 
persisted in some respects in the philosophy of Plato and continued through the Middle 
Ages. Even in recent times, the contemplative aspects of mathematics has continually 
given rise to the view that mathematics can either nourish the soul or somehow train the 
mind. It nourishes and trains as one contemplates the order of things which mathematics 
seems to reveal, or sets the mind reflecting and thus acts as a 'kick-start' for further 
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thought about a number of essential matters. For some, mathematics viewed in this way 
has become a species offine art alongside music, paintings, sculpture and literature.32 
Pythagoras was supposed to have been the originator of what were known as 'the three 
lives' by analogy with those who attended the Olympic Games. In ascending order of 
value these were those who came to trade, those who came to compete and those who 
came to watch. Those who 'watch' rather than 'act' in life were special. Warner (1958) 
tells us that with Pythagoras: 
This idea of the dignity, even the sanctity, of the contemplative or 
philosophical life is a new idea and was to be further developed. It is a 
moral idea and implies the consideration of man's duty with regard to 
his soul and the soul of others. (p.20) 
Pythagoras and his followers were ardent students of mathematics and through their 
discoveries and reflections they came to the conclusion that 'everything is made of 
numbers' .33 This view in one of its interpretations persists to the present day in the 
importance of measurement in science and the pursuit of mathematical laws of the 
universe. But as Warner points out: 
To the Pythagoreans, excited, as was natural enough, by their 
discoveries, there was something sacred in numbers themselves. 
Numbers and their arrangements expressed quality as well as quantity. 
(p.22) 
There are two contrasting aspects to the Greek soul, one which is rash, wild and full of 
fury, the part often characterised in Greek tragedy, and the other which has a calm 
rational aspect. The soul, therefore, by its very nature was in need of some kind of 
remedial treatment and the notion of goodness as 'purification' became an important 
idea. Two sources which emphasise the ideal of purification, in the ancient world, are 
discussed by Passmore (1970). Firstly, he cites the poem 'Purification', written in the 
5th-century Be by Empedocles, about which he writes: 
32 This is not the only reason implicit in the claims of those who try to persuade us that mathematics is a 
member of the fme arts. Many writers stress that it is the creative element in mathematics which warrant 
its being viewed in this way. 
33 As Aristotle succinctly says of the Pythagoreans: ' ... they thought that the principles of mathematical 
entities were the principles of all entities ... ' (Aristotle, 1998 edn). 
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Man, according to Empedocles, is a demi-god, who, at the beginning of 
human history, committed a crime, involving the shedding of blood, for 
which all men since have had to pay the penalty. Banished from their 
proper home among the gods, men must live, as a consequence of their 
guilt, in cycles of reincarnation, life after life defiled by sin until, by the 
exercise of purifying virtues, they finally return to earth, like 
Empedocles himself, as 'prophets, bards, doctors or statesmen'. Then at 
last they escape from the cycle: 'I go about among you all,' Empedocles 
therefore writes, 'an immortal god, mortal no more.' ( pp.36-37) 
Secondly, he shows how purification was central to Orphic-like religions, a set of 
beliefs circulating in 5th century Be Athens. In the most prominent of these religions 
Passmore claims that the human is described as being' ... latently immortal and divine; 
his latent divinity can be made manifest only ifhe purifies himself by ritualistic and 
ascetic practices' (p.37). It is not clear how or whether or not the association between 
Pythagoras and his followers and the necessity of purification is linked to either of these 
two sources, all that can be said is that both were contemporary beliefs expressed at the 
time. 
But there seem to be two sides to the Pythagoreans. One side of them revealed a 
commitment to a rather strange mystery religion which forbade certain strange 
practices. On the other side they were portrayed as accomplished mathematicians and 
astronomers. But the notion of purification remains central in this more rational side of 
their being, not it must be admitted by the strange practices just mentioned, but, 
according to Passmore by a set of ideas namely 'the idea of contemplation, the idea of 
order or harmony, and the idea of purification by wisdom' (p.38). This latter notion of 
wisdom acquires a new meaning with Pythagoras. It no longer means practical ability as 
it did with Homer. It is now firmly attached to the ideas of contemplation. Referring at 
last to the role of mathematics in all this Passmore sums up as follows: 
The contemplation the Pythagoreans thus extolled is contemplation of 
the order of the universe, and especially of its mathematical order. 
With the help of such contemplation, the soul identifying itself with the 
order of the Universe could purit}: and perfect itself and thus emerge 
from the cycle of transmigration. 4 (pp.38-39) 
34 My italics 
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Plato and St.Augustine 
Here, then, is the idea that mathematics is not simply useful but is more precisely' good 
for us'. We have the potential to be godlike but have fallen from grace. To restore our 
true nature we must undergo a programme of contemplation. That which we must 
contemplate is the order of the universe. Since the universe is made of numbers, the 
order which we must contemplate is a mathematical order. So that engagement in 
mathematics is perhaps the first precursor of the idea that mathematics can train the 
mind. This idea is spelt out more clearly in Plato where its moral value, rather than 
simply its Godlike one, is stressed. For Plato, as we shall see, the soul by its very nature 
is in a potential state of conflict the resolution of which was supposed to be achieved by 
the pursuit of reason. Plato believed that mathematics was a route to such reason. 
Although Plato, like Pythagoras, still regarded the pursuit of harmony in the soul as a 
form of purification some modem commentators have preferred to describe this process 
as 'mental training', and thus the purification of the soul begins to acquire a modem 
dress. Not all kinds of mental training, however, may be traced back to the 
contemplative source of Pythagoras, as I shall show when I discuss the varieties of this 
particular rationale for mathematics. However, the Pythagorean contemplative aspect is 
not only one of the earliest origins of what has become mental training, it is also one of 
the most persistent. Even if it is not always present in theories of mental training, it is 
also evident in the other main aspect which I shall be discussing in connection with 
mathematics in Part 2, namely, art and aesthetics. 
The link between contemplation, the purification of the soul, or at least the nourishing 
of the soul, is perhaps easier to make with the pursuit of art and aesthetics.35 Moreover, 
the absence of utility is at its most convincing in this sphere. One again we can, I think, 
trace some of these connections between art and mathematics back to Pythagorean 
doctrines. The link is made partly by Plato, but more specifically by St. Augustine in the 
Middle Ages where we have elaborate statements of how mathematics is the basis of art 
and beauty. It is thus towards a consideration of the connections between mathematics 
and art, and how these might be relevant to a non-utility rationale for the learning of 
mathematics, to which we now turn. 
3S I am deliberately keeping these ideas of art and aesthetics separate for the moment. 
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Part 2 - Art and aesthetics in Mathematics Education 
Chapter 4 - Mathematics and Art - some connections 
Mathematics is a deeply philosophical pursuit and, of all the sciences is closest to the 
arts (Observer 28th September 1997) 
Justification by Association 
It has been customary to distinguish between the two human enterprises of art and 
science. Thus Aristotle claims' ... scientific knowledge is of things that are never other 
than they are ... the business of every art is to bring something into existence ... ' 
(Aristotle, 1953 edn pp. 174-175). Similarly, but much later, Descartes drew his own 
distinction by asserting that the sciences' ... entirely consist in the cognitive exercise of 
the mind ... ' whilst the arts ' ... depend upon an exercise and disposition of the body'. 
(Descartes, 1969 edn pp. 35-36) As it stands these two views do not conflict. Indeed 
they may be combined. The sciences then become the pursuit of knowledge of what is, 
by exercising the mind, whilst art is the use of the body to bring something into 
existence.36 
Suppose then, that we can distinguish between the sciences and the arts, and that 
provisionally the traditional manner in which this distinction is made is roughly correct. 
Suppose, too, that we rightly value the studying of both the sciences and the arts, that is 
to say that we value studying those disciplines which pursue knowledge of what is, by 
exercising the mind, and those in which use of the body brings something into 
existence. Then some of the subjects on the curriculum do not seem to be distinctly art 
or science. Few of the sciences, ifany, seem to reach knowledge, a/what is, purely by 
exercise of the mind since experimentation is necessarily involved in the process of its 
attainment. Also, as far as the arts are concerned the use of the body is not involved, 
except in a contingent way, in bringing literature, for example, into existence since it 
can surely be conceived in the mind. 
36 The notions of art and science have, of course, undergone some changes through the years, and the 
boundaries between them have become somewhat blurred. But I want to try and explore the traditional 
concept first of all. It is worth pointing out that these categories still feature in the curriculum, and most of 
our degrees still bear such names as Bachelor (Master) of Arts or Bachelor (Master) of Science. Many of 
the subjects on the school curriculum, too, are categorised as 'arts' (sometimes humanities) or 'sciences' 
and discussions surrounding pupils' choices of courses often include considerations of whether one 
should take an art or a science, so that these descriptions have acquired some importance. 
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Suppose we relax the condition by which the outcomes of the sciences and the arts are 
attained and simply focus on those outcomes. Then we are left with the situation that 
amongst the subjects on the curriculum are those which are concerned with knowledge 
of what is, and those which are concerned with what is brought into existence. The 
difficulty now is to show how these are always distinguishable. Is it not possible to 
regard some subjects as somehow bringing knowledge into existence? Some answers to 
this question take us into epistemological questions which I shall not discuss here. All I 
want to show is that whilst we mix and match pithy definitions of the sciences and the 
arts, the dividing line between them is sometimes vague. Yet we value both. For most 
purposes perhaps the vagueness is of no importance. But it does become important 
when use is made of science or art to persuade us that a particular subject is worth 
studying. This is especially true of mathematics. 
Mathematics is not straightforwardly either an art or a science. But whilst it would be 
futile to try and show that, say, physics is a science, or that sculpture is an art, it is quite 
common to find writers suggesting, or even vigorously asserting that mathematics is 
either an art or science or even both. It is not only with those cases which categorically 
assert that mathematics is art that I shall be most concerned. I shall also be concerned 
with those views, which simply assert that some kind of connection between 
mathematics and art exists, and that this provides a rationale for learning mathematics. 
For many writers it seems that to justify the study of mathematics, little more is required 
than to state or show a connection between the mathematics and art. In some extreme 
cases mathematics has been identified as art or art as mathematics. But however strong 
the connection, it is as though all that is necessary is to show some affiliation between 
them. I want to call this approach, justification by association. Not only have writers 
made connections of different strengths between mathematics and art, they have also 
made these connections between different senses of 'art'. So that the examples 
discussed will be of strong or weak connections between mathematics and art in a 
general or a specific sense. The first example is of a writer who makes a strong 
connection between mathematics and art in its general sense. 
Justification by association with a general sense of 'art' - Fitch 
We have already seen in Part 1 that Sir Joshua Fitch (1902), a nineteenth century 
inspector of training colleges, in his Lectures on Teaching wanted to distinguish 
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between two different kinds of reasons, or rather 'objects', for learning arithmetic.37 But 
Fitch went further than simply identifying these two objects. He linked them to the 
notions of art and science, and hence introduced his own categorisation of mathematics. 
Arithmetic he claimed is: 
... both an Art and a Science:- an Art because it contemplates the doing 
of actual work, the attainment of definite and useful results; a Science 
because it investigates principles, because he who unearths the truths 
which underlie the rules of Arithmetic, is being exercised,38 not merely 
in the attainment of a particular kind of truth about numbers, but in the 
processes by which truth of many other kinds is to be investigated and 
attained. (p.287) 
This need to categorise mathematics, as I have remarked above, is understandable. Yet 
it is not always helpful, since writers vary in what they mean by 'art'. Fitch's view of 
science, with its emphasis on discovering laws and truths, is not unlike that of both 
Aristotle and Descartes, cited above. His view of art is less straightforward, though his 
reference to work, and what is practical, does suggest the use of the body to get 
something done, perhaps even to bring something into existence. We certainly regard 
fine art 39 as something of considerable value that has been brought into existence. So 
that to make the strong claim that mathematics is fine art would appear to provide us 
with a robust justification. But whatever value the fine arts have, it is not primarily 
usefulness. For Fitch, however, all that arithmetic brings into existence, if anything at 
all, are some 'definite and useful results'. So his use of 'art' is rather different from art in 
the specific sense of fine art. So what is a strong connection between arithmetic and art, 
loses force as a justification because the connection is made with art in a general 
sense.
40 
Indeed, despite the fact that Fitch believed that arithmetic is an art, and that this 
provided the first of his two 'objects' for teaching it, he also believed that arithmetic-as-
an-art was of comparatively minor importance. This is because the aspect of arithmetic, 
37 Although Fitch focuses on arithmetic at this point, as his discussion develops he includes remarks about 
~eometry, so we can safely assume that his remarks apply to mathematics in general. 
8 The use of 'exercise' here is of some interest. I shall discuss a certain ambiguity in the use of this word 
in Part 3. 
39 I shall be examining the notion offine arts later. For the moment I am using it to highlight a difference 
in meaning from the general, descriptive sense in which Fitch uses it, and the more specific, high status 
notion of the arts. 
40 I call this a 'general' sense since to be a (fme) artist one has to learn certain practical arts which will be 
of use in producing works of art. In this respect the art of counting and measuring are analogous to the art 
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which for him characterised the subject as an art, is that which involves the carrying out 
of routines. He admitted that throughout history such routines have enjoyed 
considerable status, but in his time he believed that, unlike the 'arts' of reading and 
writing, they were of little value to the majority who learnt them: 
... Counting - doing sums,- how often in life does this accomplishment 
come into exercise? Beyond the simplest additions and the power to 
check the items of a bill, the arithmetical knowledge required of any 
well-infonned person in private life is very limited. For all practical 
purposes, whatever I may have learned at school of fractions, or 
proportions, or decimals, is unless I happen to be in business, far less 
frequently available to me in life than a knowledge, say, of the history 
of my own country, or of the elementary truths ofphysics.41 (p291) 
Nowadays, of course, more people are in a sense 'in business'. Yet widespread use is 
made of the electronic calculator, and the value of standard written methods for 
calculations has rightly been questioned. So Fitch is surely right to be seeking other 
justifications for mathematics, given his own view of the comparative uselessness of 
many mathematical routines. It is clear, then, that working with his notion of 'art', Fitch 
does not regard the fact that arithmetic is an art as bestowing any special value on 
mathematics. We might say that for him 'art' functions largely as a description. For 
many others, as I have suggested, to say that X is an art is at least to imply that X is of 
special value and that this special value is what justifies our learning it. So in this 
section, I want to look at the way in which the assimilation of mathematics to art, or at 
least the supposed affiliation between the two subjects, is supposed to provide an 
implicit justification for mathematics. Moreover, as we shall see, it is usually taken for 
granted that art is already valued, so that it is supposed that by connecting mathematics 
to art it is automatically justified. 
Justification by association with a specific sense of 'art' - Kline 
More recently, Morris Kline (1972) has viewed mathematics as art, but unlike Fitch, 
Kline views mathematics-as-art very highly: 
of applying paint, drawing in perspective, being able to hannonise a melody, write in sonnet form etc. We 
could call this the 'instrumental' sense of art. 
41 This represents a direct attack on the scope of the utility view of mathematics particularly the view 
which links mathematics with commerce. We saw earlier in Part 1 how the application of mathematics in 
commercial contexts became overstated. 
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For about a hundred years now mathematicians have come to recognise 
what was felt and asserted by the Greeks but had been lost sight of in 
the intervening centuries: mathematics is an art and mathematical work 
must satisfy aesthetic requirements.42 (p.S20) 
With Kline we have our first statement of art which connects it to aesthetics, and 
although this connection is not uncontroversial it was missing from Fitch's account.43 
For Kline mere routines alone are not characterised as art. Something extra is implied. 
With the idea of aesthetics there is the suggestion of concepts such as beauty, elegance 
and others which connect art with the expression of feelings or emotion. Kline thus 
annexes mathematics to a specific sense of 'art'. If we provisionally allow a connection 
between aesthetics and beauty to be made then some support for Kline's reference to the 
Greeks 44 can certainly be found in Aristotle's remark that: 
... the major Forms of the beautiful are order, symmetry and 
delimitation, and these are very much objects of the proofs of the 
mathematical sciences (Aristotle, 1998 edn p.400) 
But all Aristotle is asserting here is that there are strong connections between 
mathematics and beauty. We cannot simply thereby assimilate mathematics into art, if 
only because not all cases of beauty are also cases of art, since beauty is found in the 
natural world. 
What this shows is that if we use the association between art and mathematics as a 
justification we shall firstly need to be clear about the sense of 'art' that we are using. 
We shall have to be aware, too, of the history of the concept of art and the important 
distinctions between 'art' and what I have referred to as 'fine art'. But apart from 
clarifying the meaning of art used in these claims about mathematics, there is another 
task I shall undertake next. For some writers, the connections between mathematics and 
art arise from the dependency of art upon the existence and application of mathematics. 
Sometimes this has been put much more strongly when it has been asserted that art is 
42 My italics 
43 It should be pointed out that Fitch does recognise there are aesthetic qualities in mathematics. In 
particular he mentions beauty and harmony, but these are not mentioned until the very end of his account 
on mathematics, and as such they do not hold a central place in his account. 
44 Fitch, too, invokes the Greeks but only to argue that they did not view mathematics as art, or at least 
not in the sense of art that he insisted on using. (p.288) 
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mathematics. I shall trace this supposed connection between mathematics and art before 
returning to the claim that mathematics is afine art. 
Art as Mathematics - Plato and 'techne' 
In their introduction to Plato's theory of art Hofstadter and Kuhns (1964) identify one 
dominant strand in his thought which associates mathematics with art: 
Art, conceived generally as techne, presupposes a knowing and a 
making: knowing the end to be aimed at and the best means for 
achieving the end. When a maker commands his art he can judge the 
excellence of his product according to his insight into proportion and 
measure. Fundamentally, then, the artist must, ifhe is to work well, 
know the nature of Measure. Basic to anyone art is the art of measure 
without which there can be no art at all. For to know the proper length 
of a speech, the proper proportion of a painting, the proper distribution 
of functions in a society, the proper organisation of language in a 
poem, is to command the art of measurement. Measure for Plato 
embraces the principles of the good and the beautiful, and in our terms 
the principles oftaste as well ... Only the man who understands the 
fundamental principle of measure can judge which imitations are 
worthy, which debased.4s (pp.3-4) 
Here then we have one of the first statements of the connection between mathematics 
and art, where it is claimed that the existence of art, or at the least judgements 
pertaining to art, is dependent upon some mathematics. On this view, since art involves 
balance and proportion, and that these in turn rest on quantity and size, some 
competence in measurement is implicit in art. Thus aspects of art and mathematics are 
brought close together. But before we conclude that since art is of value, then 
mathematics by association must also be valued, we need to examine the nature of art 
referred to here, and the extent to which mathematics is connected to it. 
In ancient philosophy what is translated as art is usually the Greek word techne, and 
was used to identify a much broader set of activities and objects than what we usually 
nowadays call art. In his editorial comments on Plato's The Republic (1955 edn), 
Desmond Lee writes of techne that: 
It may [thus] be said to cover any skilled activity with its rules of 
operation, the knowledge of which is acquired by training. But it is a 
very elusive word to translate, varying between art, craft, professional 
skill, and science according to the emphasis of the context (p.74) 
45 My italics 
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Art in this sense seems to be the way in which Fitch uses it. His view of arithmetic, as 
the art of carrying out routines of number for application, particularly in commerce, 
seems to be an ideal candidate for inclusion amongst techne. We may add that even 
though Fitch seems to have claimed that the Greeks did not view arithmetic as techne 46 , 
there seems to be no reason why they could not have done so. Instead, as Fitch and 
Kline both state in their different ways, the Greeks found a higher status for 
mathematics. 
Clearly then, the amount and kind of mathematics which is essential for art as techne 
will vary. What is required need only involve a minimal amount of measuring skills for, 
say, the cobbler who fashioned shoes, and so we are back with something rather like a 
'utility' justification for mathematics. Much, of course, will depend upon the art in 
question. The main point to note, is that we cannot simply read off an association of 
mathematics with art, from Plato's remarks, which can fonn a rationale for mathematics 
based on non-utility considerations. 
One reason why we may want to resist the idea that art is closely related to mathematics 
is that nowadays art is often regarded as expressing emotion rather than displaying 
rationality. Yet the ancient concept of art was different. Art, for Aristotle (1953 edn), 
was 'nothing more or less than a productive quality exercised in combination with true 
reason' (p.175), which is in stark contrast with the more modern idea that art is often 
characterised by inspiration and emotion. Indeed, Plato, in his dialogue Ion, treated 'art' 
that depended upon inspiration with great suspicion. Thus Socrates says to Ion: 
... this gift you have of speaking well [on Homer] is not an art; it is a 
power divine, impelling you like the power in the stone Euripides 
called the magnet ... the lyric poets are not in their senses when they 
make these lovely lyric poems. (See Hamilton and Huntingdon, 1961 
pp.219-220) 
For Plato, at least, music was scarcely an art for this reason. It only achieved such a 
status when it was realised that those aspects of music, such as harmony, have a 
mathematical and therefore rational basis.47 Moreover, what counted as goodness in art, 
46 Fitch writes: 'Arithmetic, as taught in the schools of Athens or Alexandria; to the contemporaries of 
Socrates and Alcibiades; or later in the Middle Ages it shared with logic, geometry, grammar and rhetoric 
and music the distinction offonning one of the staple subjects ofa liberal education, was taught in its 
principles, as a logical discipline; as something to be understood rather than as a series of devices for 
working out problems' (p.288) 
47 This identification is usually attributed to Pythagoras as it was pointed out in the Interlude. 
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for the ancients, was often that which was functional, so that one criterion for the arts 
was clear: a good artisan produced goods or services for a particular purpose. This is 
not true of the more contemporary concept of art. What we call art is usually non-
functional, something to be enjoyed rather than used.48 So we must be careful not to 
suppose that when the ancients connect art and mathematics, it is the same as the 
modern conception of fine art. 
Art as mathematics - St. Augustine 
A more distinctive account of the association of mathematics does arise, however, in 
the writings of St. Augustine, where the influence of Pythagoras is strong. As it was 
pointed out earlier,49 little is known for certain of the precise doctrines attributed to 
Pythagoras. But one which has been passed down to us through Aristotle is the doctrine 
that 'everything is made of number', or more coherently that the rationale for the 
universe is a numerical one. Behind all appearance therefore lay a more ultimate reality. 
To apprehend this ultimate reality was to achieve wisdom. In the philosophy of 
Augustine the Pythagorean doctrine is connected explicitly to art. Augustine insists that 
the sensuous quality of nature reveals only part of its value: 
Wherever you turn, wisdom speaks to you ... She does this through the 
fonns of external things, leading you to see that all the material things 
which delight and woo you through the senses are characterised by 
number. (See Howie, 1969a p.250) 
At first Augustine connects only the natural world with number: 
Turn your eyes to the heaven, the earth and the sea, to everything which 
shines brightly in or above them, which creeps, flies or swims. They all 
have fonns, and this is because they have numbers; take numbers away 
from them, and there is nothing left. so (pp 250-1) 
But then, in speaking about artefacts he echoes what was said about Plato's view above: 
Indeed, men who construct all physical shapes have numbers as the 
basis of their craft, and they make their products confonn to them. 
(p.251) 
48 I say 'usually' because, for example, music might be composed for processional purposes or for 
dancing. In this respect we might want to say that a good composition was one which was especially well 
suited for these purposes. 
49 See my Interlude, above. 
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But now we can say of Augustine, what might have been true for Plato but for which we 
had insufficient grounds for saying of the earlier writer, that the numbers which are 
basic to the craftsman, are not subservient to his or her art, but in a sense constitute it. 
In particular, Augustine wants to add that the pleasure which we receive from art, is at 
root, mathematical: 
... if you ask what moves the limbs of the craftsman, the answer is 
"number," for even these move rhythmically. If the hands have no task 
to perform and the mind has no intention of making anything and if the 
movement of the limbs is solely for pleasure, then we call the activity 
dancing. If you inquire what gives pleasure in dancing, number will 
reply. "Look, it is I" Examine the beauty of a well-formed body; 
numbers are expressed there in spatial form. Study the beauty of 
physical movement; there you find number expressed in temporal 
form. 51 (p.25 I ) 
We have then in Augustine a clear statement that beauty, and thus aesthetic pleasure, is 
a function of mathematics. Indeed one contemporary critic has taken Augustine's 
remarks to be showing not simply that mathematics is a necessary condition of art, but 
that some reduction of art to mathematics has been implied. Thus Howie (1969b) 
comments: 
... the standard of reference, by which Augustine judges beauty, is a 
numerical standard. Aesthetic pleasure derives from a perception of 
proportion and harmony, reflecting in natural things the thoughts of the 
Creator and in works of art the artist's grasp of these principles. Both 
the creation and the enjoyment of works of art reduces itself, therefore, 
to a knowledge of number .. that is to an appreciation of the relationships 
of parts to wholes ... 52 (p.l18) 
But, Howie does, however, quickly point out the inadequacy of Augustine'S position: 
... So far as it goes, Augustine's theory of aesthetics is satisfactory. But 
in emphasising the intellectual element in aesthetic pleasure, he 
explains only one aspect of an experience, which is more complex than 
he realised. The notion of number lying at the foundation of artistic 
creation needs to be supplemented by other considerations, of which 
Augustine does not take account. (p.118) 
We may suppose that the 'other considerations', which Howie alludes to here, almost 
certainly include the feeling side of art which characterises many, if not all, more 
contemporary views of art. But despite the modern critic's view that Augustine'S theory 
SI My italics 
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is inadequate, it is still important to point out that his was a view once held, and that it 
does seem to have had some influence on those who connect art and mathematics. 53 
Indeed, at least one writer, Morris Kline, insists that emotion is not central to the 
concept of art, and he seeks other properties of mathematics which resemble those of 
art. But before we consider in detail what he has to say, we shall consider the views of 
other writers who, within the last hundred or so years, explicitly connect mathematics 
with the fine arts. 
52 My italics 
53 We shall also see that what appears to be Augustine's influence is present in one important theory of 
aesthetics in mathematics. (see my later discussion of Charlton's work) 
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Chapter 5 - Mathematics as a Fine Art 
I noted, in Part 1, when I was discussing the work by Griffiths and Howson (see page 
36), that in maintaining a distinction between the practical and aesthetic aspects of 
mathematics, they allowed the notion of the aesthetic to have a large scope. 
Nevertheless, whatever else these writers subsumed under the concept of the aesthetic, 
in connection with mathematics, the fine arts was not one of them. 
Yet several other writers have explicitly claimed that mathematics, at the very least, 
resembles the established forms in which fine art is most typically cast. Some writers go 
even further and claim that mathematics is a fine art. In speaking offine art, such 
writers are clearly not simply referring to the 'art' of mathematical routines mentioned 
earlier. Nor are these writers, simply admitting that mathematics is an ingredient in art, 
or even that artists require competence in various aspects of mathematics. They make a 
strong connection between the high status fine arts and mathematics, so that 'added 
value' is attached to the latter by association. Thus conceived, mathematics is not simply 
a tool, but a highly valued end in itself. Clearly, if such claims could be shown to hold, 
then equating mathematics and fine art would provide an important rationale for 
mathematics. 
Three characteristics are often given of fine art, namely, representation, expression and 
form. The most plausible of these in relation to mathematics is form, and that is the one 
which will ultimately be argued for here. 54 It is not clear how mathematics could 
express emotion. However it may be worth suggesting, in passing, a possibility of 
making a connection between the idea of representational art and mathematics. The 
applied mathematician makes a mathematical model of reality which represents the 
world in some way. The mathematics does not, however, have sensuous properties 
which resemble the world, rather the mathematics mirrors certain formal relationships 
of quantities. It is just possible that we could argue that mathematics was a work of art 
in this respect, though I know of no one who has attempted to make such a connection. 
Moreover, it would be difficult to see how this would provide a justification for 
learning mathematics which did not invoke the idea of a tool and hence 'usefulness'. In 
54 This will not be revealed, however, untill develop my account away from the fine arts to the 
distinguishable area of aesthetics. 
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what follows it should be clear that it is the formal properties which are most prominent 
in the discussion. 
The Moritz anthology 
Robert Edouard Moritz has collected an anthology of extracts, by mathematicians and 
writers on mathematics. Thirty or so of these form a chapter entitled 'Mathematics as a 
Fine Art' (Moritz 1914). Moritz gives no commentary on the chapter, many of the 
contributions to which were written in the nineteenth century, and hence the reason for 
the inclusion of any particular piece is not made clear. Whether one author or another, 
of a particular fragment, is successful in showing that a strong connection between 
mathematics and the fine arts exists, or whether indeed mathematics ought to be 
considered as fine art, is not endorsed by the editor. Yet the chapter, left uncriticised as 
it is, does give the impression that the contributors have justified the study of 
mathematics by association with the fine arts. So it is worth examining carefully the 
selections from the chapter, in order to see, for example, whether there are important 
and useful common features amongst them, and whether such features provide the basis 
of a convincing account. 
At the outset, it is interesting to note that Moritz, or indeed any other writer, should 
explicitly connect mathematics with thejine arts. The expression 'fine arts' was 
introduced by Charles Batteux in the middle of the eighteenth century in order to refine 
the more general term 'art', the meaning of which is very broad as we have seen. 
According to Hanfling (1992) the ancients did not distinguish between art in general 
and a specific class of fine art. As he points out: 
It is usually held that the decisive and most influential statement of the 
'modem system' was that of Charles Batteux, who, in his treatise Les 
beaux arts reduits a un meme principe ('the fine arts reduced to a single 
principle') of 1746, separated the 'fine arts' from the 'mechanical arts', 
and listed the former as consisting of music, poetry, painting, sculpture 
and the dance. Batteux tried to show that the principle common to the 
fine arts was the 'imitation of beautiful nature'. But his main influence 
lay, not in the particular principle that he put forward, but in his clear 
separation of the fine arts - the arts, as we might say - from other 
activities, according to some principle or definition. What 
distinguished the 'modem system' was not that it replaced some 
previously existing system, but the very idea of treating the arts in a 
systematic way. (p.7) 
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According to this original definition, then, mathematics as it stands is certainly not a 
fine art. So either the term 'fine art' must be extended to include things which were not 
originally included, or it must be shown in some special way that mathematics is, after 
all, one of the objects on the original list of fine arts, or at least that it closely resembles 
one or other of such objects. If the concept 'fine art' needs to be modified in order to 
include mathematics, we would need to ask whether such a modification is justified or 
whether it destroys the purpose of setting out such a small exclusive list.55 We should 
bear in mind, however, that what constitutes the fine arts can change from time to time 
whilst still preserving the spirit of Batteux's list. In more recent times it might include, 
for example, cinema and photography. 56 However, the writers in Moritz's anthology try 
to persuade us that mathematics shares common features with painting, sculpture, 
literature (in particular poetry) or music, thereby suggesting that mathematics is 
associated with items on Batteux's original list. 
Personal characteristics: Fine artists and mathematicians 
Several of the contributors to the anthology focus on mathematicians rather than 
mathematics. So that in drawing a resemblance between the mathematician and the 
artist, they imply that mathematics should be viewed as a fine art. Thus Moebius, giving 
us very little of substance, writes: 
It is with mathematics not otherwise than it is with music, painting or 
poetry. Anyone can become a lawyer, doctor or chemist, and as such 
may succeed well, provided he is clever and industrious, but not every 
one can become a painter, or a musician, or a mathematician: general 
cleverness and industry alone count here for nothing. (Moritz, 1914 
p.184) 
But all that follows from this observation is that both the mathematician and the artist 
are set apart from others by dint of their special qualities. We are given no further 
information about the nature of such qualities. Bocher, on the other hand, is more 
explicit about the kinds of common qualities that are shared by fine artists and 
mathematicians: 
55 It should become clear later, that I do not believe that the concept of fine arts can be extended to 
include mathematics without the risk of losing something of special value in the arts. 
56 For a cautionary remark on photographs and fme art from a writer who energetically argues for a strong 
connection between mathematics and the fme arts, see Kline (1972) p521 
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I like to look at mathematics almost more as an art than as a science· , 
for the activity of the mathematician, constantly creating as he is, 
guided though not controlled by the external world of the senses, bears 
a resemblance, not fanciful I believe but real, to the activity of an artist, 
of a painter let us say. 57 (Moritz, 1914 p.182) 
For Bocher, as for many mathematicians, mathematics is not simply discovered as is 
sometimes ordinarily supposed. It is, to some extent at least, created, and it is thus 
creativity which is used here to connect artist and mathematician. Others writers in 
Moritz's anthology are only slightly more forthcoming in saying precisely what it is that 
is being created by the mathematician. For example, Lampe writes: 
In the projection of new theories the mathematician needs as bold and 
creative a phantasy as the productive artist, and in the execution of the 
details of a composition the artist too must calculate dispassionately the 
means which are necessary for the successful consummation of the 
parts. Common to both is the creation, the generation, of forms out of 
the mind.58 (Moritz, 1914 p.185) 
But even if we can make sense of the mathematician creating theories and forms 'out of 
the mind' ,59 the idea of a creative mathematician, does seem to have what Elliott (1971) 
has called 'ironic undertones'. It is an ambiguous notion. This is because there are, 
according to Elliott, two quite distinct versions of the concept of creativity. One of these 
versions, the so-called 'traditional concept' essentially involves the making of 
something, and hence it is particularly appropriate to the artist, but is misapplied if used 
in certain other contexts.60 He writes: 
If we call someone a 'creative' historian it is virtually impossible, no 
matter how we load the context, to avoid the suggestion that he makes 
up his stories instead of deriving them from the historical 
evidence ... 'Creative biologist' suggests a breeder of new germs; 
'creative anatomist' a Dr. Frankenstein; 'creative chemist' an alchemist. 
(Elliott, 1971 p.l40) 
The same kind of irony or ambiguity, we might add, can be attached to the idea of the 
'creative mathematician', rather as it is to the idea of a 'creative accountant'. It suggests 
the idea that the truth has somehow been displaced. Yet one writer in the anthology, 
57 My italics 
58 My italics 
59 The underlying idea here of constructing 'fonns out of the mind' is clearly related to my earlier point 
that the traditional defmitions of art and science can in principle be merged. 
60 See for example the defmition of art in Aristotle (1953 edn) p175. 
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Thomas Hill, seems to be so detennined to connect art and mathematics that he is 
prepared to accept this: 
The Mathematics are usually considered as being the very antipodes of 
Poesy. Yet Mathesis and Poesy are of the closest kindred, for they are 
both works of the imagination. Poesy is a creation, a making, a fiction; 
and the Mathematics have been called, by an admirer of them, the 
sublimest61 and most stupendous ofjictions 62 ... (Moritz, 1914 p.189) 
However, Elliott does point out that not all applications to science, of the traditional 
concept of creative, are ambiguous. There is it at least one class of notable exceptions: 
Although nowadays most educated people do not think of the 
practitioners of nonnal science as creative, they do regard 
revolutionary scientists - men like Newton, Darwin, Einstein and Freud 
- as creative, and, what is more, believe them to have been creative to 
an exceptionally high degree. (Elliott, 1971 p.144) 
This is so, according to Elliott, because great artists do not simply make things. We 
regard them more as having made a world. This accomplishment he believes can be 
attributed to great scientists too, those who: 
... have quite radically re-structured our world, which is the world as 
we conceive - and even perceive - it. (Elliott, 1971 p.144) 
Alongside the revolutionary scientists whom Elliott cites, it would seem reasonable to 
include certain mathematicians, who in the same way we could intelligibly regard as 
being creative. Amongst these we could include, for example, those mathematicians 
who have shown us that new and different geometries are possible, and that Euclidean 
geometry does not finally and conclusively describe the space of the world in which we 
live, as was once unshakeably believed. This way of viewing the matter begins to 
remove some of the possible ambiguity in what has been said so far, when it has been 
suggested that mathematicians, like artists, are characterised by their creativity. Thus 
Pringsheim, in his contribution to the anthology, is more explicit in what the 
mathematician creates when he writes: 
61 The notion of the sublime in aesthetics is discussed briefly below with the concept of beauty. 
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The true mathematician is always a good deal of an artist, an architect, 
yes, of a poet. Beyond the real world, though perceptibly connected 
with it, mathematicians have intellectually created an ideal world, 
which they attempt to develop into the most perfect of all worlds, and 
which is being explored in every direction. None has the faintest 
conception of this world, except he who knows it. 63 (Moritz, 1914 
p.184) 
In addition to creativity, Bocher, also cites imagination as a quality shared by fine artist 
and mathematician: 
Just as no one can become a good painter without a certain amount of 
skill, so no one can become a mathematician without the power to 
reason accurately up to a certain point. Yet these qualities, fundamental 
though they are, do not make a painter or mathematician worthy of the 
name, nor indeed are they the most important factors in the case. Other 
qualities of a far more subtle sort, chief among which in both cases is 
imagination, go to the making of a good artist or good 
mathematician.64 (Moritz, 1914 p.l82) 
Hill, also stresses the importance of imagination: 
Mathesis and Poetry are ... the utterance of the same power of 
imagination", only that in the one case it is addressed to the head, and in 
the other, to the heart.65 (Moritz, 1914 p.l89) 
But to invoke the imagination is perfectly apt in mathematical contexts. Indeed, the 
concept of imagination is closely linked with what Elliott refers to as the 'new' concept 
of creative, one which does not entail the making of something. This new concept of 
creative has two main versions: 
According to the first of these, a problematic situation is defined as one 
for which no adequate response is available in terms of existing 
knowledge, methods and techniques, and creativity is taken to be the 
capacity to resolve situations of this kind. The second version identifies 
creativity with getting novel ideas and making something of them. By 
'making something of an idea is meant either solving some existing 
problem by means of it, or putting it to some other acceptable purpose, 
or just making it available to others who actually do or might well find 
some such employment for it. (Elliott, 1971 p.146) 
Elliott adds: 
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... under the new concept to proceed imaginatively is ipso facto to be 
creative. All creativity is creative (i.e. imaginative) thinking. (Elliott, 
1971 p.l47) 
So that now we may apply the new concept quite readily to science: 
Hitherto we might have said of a scientist or scholar that he had 
performed original work in which he had used imagination to solve his 
problems, but we would not have called him creative. Under the new 
concept he qualifies for this latter title. (Elliott, 1971 p.147) 
On the other hand this new concept does not sit well with art. He writes: 
... the acceptability of the new concept to the artist and lover of art 
depends on whether artistic activity can be adequately conceived in 
terms of problem-solving or getting novel ideas, i.e. in terms derived 
from the analysis of scientific enquiry. The danger is that by 
assimilating art to science we shall misconstrue the nature of art . .. 66 If 
what counts as a problem has no reference to what the artist 
experienced as a problem, any and every element in the work can be 
regarded as a solution of a problem ... though it has analogies with 
scientific enquiry, artistic creation also proceeds differently, within a 
different encompassing form of life. The new concept may not be so 
well-suited to art as the traditional concept was. 67 Ifwe assume or 
presuppose that it is well-suited to art, this may lead us to analyse 
artistic creation in a manner which distorts our understanding of it. 
(Elliott, 1971 p.148) 
The notion of innovation has certainly become important in art. Hanfling (1992) cites 
Dubuffet the painter who wrote: 'The essence of art is novelty. Likewise should views 
on art be novel. The only system favourable to art is permanent revolution'. (p.4) So 
with this in mind perhaps we cannot rule out mathematics as a fine art if it involves the 
development of novel ideas, as it surely does in some of its aspects. Yet Elliot 
continues: 
The view that artistic creativity is a matter of getting and making use of 
novel ideas is open to a rather different objection. This view identifies 
artistic creativity with inventing novel techniques or new methods of 
composition or exploiting the medium in new ways - in a word with 
changing the language of the relevant art. (Elliott, 1971 p.149) 
Referring to an evaluation of the work ofT.S. Eliot and that of Yeats he remarks that: 
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Eliot has contributed more than Yeats to the language of twentieth 
century poetry, yet many critics would want to say that Yeats is the 
greater and more creative poet. Such cases, where criteria of 
creativeness conflict, are incomprehensible if we think in terms of the 
new concept alone. (Elliott, 1971 p.l49) 
From this discussion it does seem that an artist can be creative in both senses, for 
presumably T. S. Eliot did 'make' poetry as well as finding new form. The 
mathematician, too, can be creative in both senses according to another contributor to 
the anthology: 
Who has studied the works of such men as Euler, Lagrange, Cauchy, 
Riemann, Sophus Lie, and Weierstrass, can doubt that a great 
mathematician is a great artist? The faculties possessed by such men, 
varying greatly in kind and degree with the individual, are analogous 
with those requisite for constructive art. Not every mathematician 
possesses in a specially high degree that critical faculty which finds its 
employment in the perfection of form, in conformity with the ideal of 
logical completeness; but every great mathematician possesses the rarer 
faculty of constructive imagination. (Moritz, 1914 p.184) 
Elliott's two concepts of creative are echoed here in Hobson's remarks. Clearly, he 
likens only the leading mathematicians to the great artists and those have a distinctive 
kind of imaginative faculty. Others writers who have drawn attention to the importance 
of the imagination, like Sylvester, have a more simple idea in mind: 
Surely the claim of mathematics to take a place among the liberal arts 
must now be admitted as fully made good. Whether we look at the 
advances made in modern geometry, in modem integral calculus, or in 
modem algebra, in each of these three a free handling of the material 
employed is now possible, and an almost unlimited scope is left to the 
regulated play ofjancy.68 (Moritz, 1914 p.183) 
The upshot of this is that the concept of creativity only provides a link between the 
mathematician and artist if we understand creativity in certain special ways. The version 
of the concept as usually applied to artists, applies to a certain few outstanding 
mathematicians. In its transformed version it applies to all mathematicians but not to all 
artists. Moreover, the two versions of the concept accentuate, rather than remove, the 
difference between the mathematician and artist. But why should the mathematician 
want to be regarded as creative? Why should he or she want to be allied to the artist 
anyway? I have assumed from the start that to assimilate mathematics into the fine arts 
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would add value to mathematics. Contrary to this Elliott, now adopting a rather ironic 
tone himself, writes: 
But the scientific discoverer and the savant have never been regarded 
as having a status inferior to that of the artist. They have not been 
called 'creative', but their understanding of nature, of the scriptures and 
of the classical past have usually been valued much more highly than 
the artist's creativeness. It has never been forgotten that the worlds 
created by the artists are unreal, and there has been a persistent 
tendency to place the creation and enjoyment of such objects outside 
the really serious business oflife. (Elliott, 1971 p.144) 
Although Elliott is comparing scientist and artist, and we are comparing mathematician 
and artist, his point may be extended to include mathematics. The mathematician may 
not claim to have precisely the same kind of understanding that Elliott attributes to the 
scientist or scholar. But he or she can quite rightly claim to have a profound 
understanding of other analogous objects, such as number properties and the 
relationships between them. 
So far we have seen that the indirect way of connecting mathematics to the fine arts by 
comparing artist with mathematicians, as some of the contributors to Moritz's 
anthology have done, is not without its difficulties. Suppose that we compare particular 
kinds of fine art and mathematics, rather than their practitioners, perhaps this will 
provide a clearer more convincing association between the two enterprises. Painting and 
music have both either been directly referred to, or have at least been alluded to in some 
of our examples so far. In several other extracts from the anthology attempts are also 
made to reveal a strong connection between mathematics and music. Let us see whether 
or not these are convincing. 
Certainly nothing is forthcoming in the assertion by Novalis who simply writes the 
following: 'Music has much resemblance to algebra' (Moritz, 1914 p.190). Helmholtz's 
remarks, though more extended, are also not illuminating: 
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Mathematics and music~ the most sharply contrasted fields of scientific 
~ctivity which can be found, and yet related, supporting each other, as 
If to show forth the secret connection which ties together all activities 
of our mind, and which leads us to surmise that the manifestations of 
the artist's genius are but the unconscious expressions of a mysteriously 
acting rationality. 69 
(Moritz, 1914 p.191) 
The same goes for Sylvester, who gives us no clear idea of the link, either. Indeed he 
gives us quite a strong reason for showing that art remains the domain of the senses, and 
mathematics the domain of reason: 
May not Music be described as the Mathematic of sense, Mathematic 
as Music of the reason? the soul of each the same! Thus the musician 
feels Mathematic, the mathematician thinks Music, - Music the dream, 
mathematics the working life - each to receive its consummation from 
the other when the human intelligence, elevated to its perfect type, shall 
shine forth glorified in some future Mozart-Dirichlet or Beethoven-
Gauss - a union already not indistinctly foreshadowed in the genius and 
labours ofa Helmholtz! (Moritz, 1914 p.191) 
It rests with Cajori to give us anything substantial by way of a comparison. His point is 
the Pythagorean one that number relationships underlie music. Yet the most that this 
point can show is that mathematics is really a part of music, as we have seen in 
Augustine'S theory. It can hardly show that mathematics itselfis fine art: 
... he [Pythagoras] endeavoured to discover some principle of 
homogeneity in the universe ... he observed that musical strings of equal 
lengths stretched by weights having the proportion of 112,2/3,3/4, 
produced intervals which were an octave, a fifth and a fourth. 
Harmony, therefore, depends on musical proportion; it is nothing but a 
mysterious numerical relation. Where harmony is, there are numbers. 
Hence the order and beauty of the universe have their origin in 
numbers. 1130 (Moritz, 1914 p.l90) 
For Poincare, too, it seems that mathematics has' ... delights analogous to those that 
painting and music give,70 (Moritz, 1914 p.l81). Yet we are given no more detail of the 
nature of the analogy between mathematics and music. But whatever the 'delights' 
were, he was clear that they were only to be enjoyed by the elite few, or what he called 
'the adepts'. This restricted accessibility to certain features of mathematics, which is 
especially associated with Poincare, is something which I shall take up again later. But 
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we should note here that others in the same anthology seem to hold a different opinion 
from Poincare, provided that we suppose that the 'delights' of mathematics, which 
Poincare had in mind, include what Young refers to as its 'beauties': 
The beauties of mathematics - of simplicity, of symmetry, of 
completeness - can and should be exemplified even to young 
children.71 (Moritz, 1914 pp. 184-185) 
Not all of the writers in the anthology are in agreement on which of the fine arts 
mathematics most resembles. Several writers, as we have seen, have linked painting and 
music with mathematics. But these particular links are rejected by Bertrand Russell in 
favour of his own: 
Mathematics, rightly viewed, possesses not only truth, but supreme 
beauty - a beauty cold and austere, like that of sculpture, without 
appeal to any part of our weaker nature, without the gorgeous trappings 
of painting or music, yet sublimely pure, and capable of a stem 
perfection such as only the greatest art can show.72 (Moritz, 1914 
p.l82) 
In trying to annexe mathematics to the fine arts, difficulties emerge in certain of the 
ways in which writers try and draw out the supposed connection between the two 
enterprises. The linking of mathematics and art by the apparent similarities in the 
capacities of its practitioners, we have seen is by no means convincing. The 
predominant capacity invoked is that of creativity and there is not a satisfactory match 
between the versions of this concept most appropriate to artist and mathematician 
except in the rarest of cases. Nor have any clear analogies been made between 
mathematics and particular fine art forms. Moreover, even if mathematics were 
considered to be fine art, it is not altogether clear whether or not it is sufficiently 
accessible enough for such a consideration to be embodied in a rationale for learning 
the subject. 
Aesthetic Properties: Beauty and the Sublime 
It was necessary to distinguish, earlier, between the very general concept of an art, 
which included the mastering of certain routines, and a more recent view which invoked 
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what Morris Kline called 'aesthetic requirements'. Typical amongst such requirements 
is beauty, which has often been seen as an essential property of art. Indeed, we have just 
seen that Bertrand Russell wanted to make a strong link with sculpture by drawing our 
attention to what he believed was the 'supreme', 'cold and austere' beauty of 
mathematics. There are, however, difficulties in trying to suggest that mathematics is a 
fine art by appealing to certain of its aesthetic properties. To reiterate a point made 
earlier, beauty cannot be a sufficient condition of fine art since there exist objects of 
natural beauty, like flowers and sunsets, so the presence of beauty alone in an object 
does not guarantee its inclusion amongst the fine arts. Not all of the writers in Moritz's 
anthology make a connection between beauty in mathematics and the fine artS. 73 Indeed 
Kummer, in the following remarks distinguishes mathematics from art: 
A peculiar beauty reigns in the realm of mathematics, a beauty which 
resembles not so much the beauty of art as the beauty of nature and 
which affects the reflective mind, which has acquired an appreciation 
of it, very much like the latt!:!r.74 (Moritz, 1914 p.185) 
Sylvester, too, in applauding the beauty of mathematics does not go as far as connecting 
the subject to fine art: 
... !he contemplation of divine beauty and order which it induces, the 
harmonious connexion of its parts, the infinite hierarchy and absolute 
evidence of the truths with which it is concerned, these, and such like, 
are the surest grounds of the title of mathematics to human regard ... 75 
(Moritz, 1914 p.l81) 
But other references to beauty in mathematics are less cautious. Although Russell, in 
likening mathematics to sculpture, makes one of the strongest links between 
mathematics and the fine arts, in Moritz's anthology, Young, with his use of 'works' 
suggests a similar kind of link: 
73 It is important to note that one reason I am carrying out this analysis of Moritz's extracts is to see 
whether there are grounds for including mathematics amongst the fme arts. But not all of his extracts 
insist that that mathematics should be categorised thus. 
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Mathematics has beauties of its own - a symmetry and proportion in its 
results, a lack of superfluity, an exact adaptation of means to ends, 
which is exceedingly remarkable and to be found elsewhere only in the 
works of the greatest beauty. 76 (Moritz, 1914 p.184) 
But beauty does not even appear to be a necessary condition of fine art. Some fine art 
displays features which writers have contrasted with beauty, namely, those features 
which are sublime. For certain Eighteenth century writers such as Edmund Burke it was 
the vastness of sublime objects which distinguished them from beautiful objects which 
were generally regarded as being essentially more confined. Whether or not this is a 
satisfactory distinguishing feature to make, it has, nonetheless, been of some historical 
importance because, as Hanfling (1992) remarks: 
The assumption that beauty is a necessary condition of art - or rather, 
of good, successful art - could now be challenged, and various other 
qualities put forward by which to judge and appreciate a work of art. 
(p.44) 
Kant, too, gave some consideration to the notion of the sublime and even linked some 
experiences of the sublime to aspects of mathematics. In distinguishing one of the two 
kinds of sublimity which were identified by Kant, Warnock (1976) writes: 
There is one sublimity, the feeling of which arises from the 
contemplation of vast numbers .. .Infinitely large numbers give us a 
sense of the sublime because in contemplating them the imagination 
calls to our mind the powers of reason, in contrast with its own 
feebleness. By reason we are not incapable of calculating with large 
numbers, but we can never make these calculations concrete by 
actually envisaging the numbers ... 77 (p.58) 
So, mathematics may be a source of both beauty and the sublime. Indeed, in Moritz's 
anthology both of these features are acknowledged, in what Boltzmann has to say, 
although his concept of the sublime is fairly muted: 
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Beauty, I hear you ask, do not Graces flee where integrals stretch forth 
their necks? Can anything be beautiful, where the author has no time 
for the slightest external embellishment? .. Yet it is this very 
simplicity, the indispensableness of each word, each letter, each little 
dash, that among all artists raises the mathematician nearest to the 
World-creator; it establishes a sublimity which is equalled in no other 
art, - something like it exists at most in symphonic music.78 (Moritz, 
1914 p.186) 
There is of course no contradiction in saying that mathematics is both beautiful and 
sublime. Nature, too, has beauty and, in its dramatic landscapes, for example, it also has 
sublime aspects. What is important, however, is the significance of any such duality in 
the aesthetic properties of mathematics for its justification. The fine arts we have 
supposed are objects of pleasure, this is at least one reason why they are valued.79 But it 
is not clear whether or not sublime properties are best regarded as objects of pleasure. 
As Warnock (1976) points out: 
Kant argues that it is more proper to describe the sense of the sublime 
as producing not pleasure so much as awe or respect. For what we 
respect is the idea of reason itself. What we stand in awe of is the fact 
that we are such as to be able to frame such ideas. (p.58) 
There is another difficulty attached to the identification of beauty. We have been 
exploring this property in order to see whether it can lead us to an important non-
utilitarian justification for learning mathematics. But in Young's extract, quoted above, 
one of the ways in which mathematics has beauty is in its 'exact adaptation of means to 
ends'. Curiously, this suggests that beauty might be connected with utility, something 
that we might suppose is diametrically opposed to the fine arts.80 This is not a new idea. 
Plato in his dialogue, Greater Hippias, allows Socrates to equate usefulness and beauty: 
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... we say that the whole body is beautifully made, sometimes for 
running, sometimes for wrestling, and we speak in the same way of all 
animals. A beautiful horse, or cock, or quail, and all utensils, and 
means oftransport both on land and on sea, merchant vessels and ships 
of war, and all instruments of music and of the arts generally, and, if 
you like, practices and laws - we apply the word 'beautiful' to 
practically all these in the same manner. In each case we take as our 
criterion the natural constitution or the workmanship or the form of 
enactment, and whatever is useful we call beautiful, and beautiful in 
that respect in which it is useful and for the purpose for which and at 
the time at which it is useful, and we call ugly that which is useless in 
all these respects. 
(See Hamilton and Huntingdon, 1961 pp. 1548-1549) 
The view that 'whatever is useful we call beautiful' has even been applied to 
mathematics recently. Davis and Hersh (1980) in order to illustrate what they call 
'Mathematical Maoism', quote an extract from a dialogue on the beauty of mathematics 
from a discussion at the Shanghai Hua-Tung University, between an American 
professor of mathematics, J.1. Kohn, and a delegate during a conference of the People's 
Republic of China: 
Kahn: Should you not present the beauty of mathematics? Couldn't it 
inspire students? Is there room for the beauty of science? 
Answer: The first demand is production. 
Kahn: That is no answer. 
Answer: Geometry was developed for practice. The evolution of 
geometry could not satisfy science and technology; in the seventeenth 
century, Descartes discovered analytical geometry. He analysed pistons 
and lathes and also the principles of analytical geometry. Newton's 
work came out of the development of industry. Newton said, "The 
basis of any theory is social practice." There is no theory of beauty that 
people agree on. Some people think one thing is beautiful, some 
another. Socialist construction is a beautiful thing and stimulates 
people here. Before the Cultural Revolution some of us believed in the 
beauty of mathematics but failed to solve practical problems; now we 
deal with water and gas pipes, cables, and rolling mills. We do it for 
the country and the workers appreciate it. It is a beautiful feeling. 
(p.88) 
Here the notion of beautiful has been extended, until it is simply a term of 
commendation. So that geometry may be seen as beautiful because it was originated for 
practical purposes. Yet objects of fine art are typically, if not exclusively, objects of 
contemplation, rather than things which serve a practical purpose. Moreover a 'beautiful 
feeling' is of course a different thing from a feeling of beauty. The former can amongst 
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other things simply mean a feeling of relief. It is an example of the use of beautiful in 
its most general sense in which almost anything can be beautiful. 
Despite these difficulties in the use of 'beauty' in mathematics, many writers persisted 
in claiming that mathematical beauty exists. All I want to suggest at this point is that 
even if we admit that mathematics has beauty, and that such beauty is not consequent 
upon its utility, this would not be sufficient to show that mathematics is therefore a fine 
art. It might however be tantamount to accepting that mathematics has certain aesthetic 
aspects. But in order to show that the presence of aesthetic properties does not imply the 
presence of fine art, it is necessary to show that such properties are not coexistent with 
art. This I shall do after I have finally detennined whether or not mathematics may be 
regarded as fine art. 
A more recent account 
As I have already pointed out, the extracts from Moritz's anthology, were not written 
recently. However, attempts to connect mathematics and fine art still persist. Moreover, 
as we shall see, the compelling features which persuaded mathematicians of the last 
century that mathematics was a fine art are those which recent writers have invoked. 
Thus Morris Kline (1972), leans heavily on the capacities and personal qualities of 
mathematicians in his account. But since Kline's account is much more elaborate than 
any ofthe fragments in Moritz's anthology it is worth examining. Not only does he 
supplement the creative aspect of mathematics with certain other properties to bring 
mathematics closer to art, he also makes a bold attempt to change our view of some of 
the fine arts in order to bring them closer to mathematics. 
Kline begins by asserting that all branches of mathematics are characterised by a 
particular method, one which uses a set of axioms as its starting point and upon which 
all the results are built, using logical steps. For centuries the axioms of geometry arose 
from our experiences of the world and were believed to be validated in the same way. In 
particular, geometry was thought to assert truths about the space which surrounds us. 
Central to Kline's argument is the fact that this axiomatic method took on a special 
significance when mathematicians developed consistent systems the axioms of which 
did not derive their truth from the physical world. So that mathematics, then, was no 
longer seen as the discovery of a system of truths. It became a logical system which had, 
as it were, broken away from its roots. One important consequence of this, according to 
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Kline, is that mathematics ought to be regarded more as a fine art than as a descriptive 
SCIence. 
Kline (1972) points out, however, that the logical method of mathematics, alone, does 
not sufficiently account for the way in which its results are originated and developed. In 
particular logic cannot determine what theorems to prove, nor can it determine how to 
prove such theorems. For the most part psychological processes of imagination, insight, 
creativity and inspiration must enter into the picture. As he remarks: 
Most people could look at a quadrilateral indefinitely without 
becoming aware that if the midpoints of the four sides are joined, the 
figure formed is a parallelogram. Such knowledge is not the product of 
logic but of a sudden flash of insight. (p.5ll) 
It is partly this dependence upon inspiration that leads Kline to believe that the 
mathematician is indistinguishable from the composer.8l ' ... essentially both 
mathematician and composer', he writes, 'are moved by a divine afflatus that enables 
them to 'see' and 'know' the final edifice before one stone is laid.' But the breaking 
away of the axioms from their roots in experience, and the invention of others which do 
not necessarily arise from such experience, has intensified this belief that the 
mathematician is like an artist, a creator rather than a discover. As Kline explains: 
The creation of non-Euclidean geometry ... released the mathematician 
from the bondage of producing truths and set him free to adopt axioms 
and to investigate ideas that may have no apparent usefulness in 
mastering or understanding the physical world. And so the 
mathematician is compelled to ask himself what guides his choice of 
subject matter and what motivated his activity. (p.520) 
Kline, as I have said, believed that mathematicians of modem times are motivated in a 
similar way to that of the Greeks, namely, by what he has called the satisfying of 
'aesthetic requirements'. But as we saw earlier, art was of a rational nature for the 
Greeks. To reiterate, it was for Aristotle (1955 p 175) 'nothing more or less than a 
productive quality exercised in combination with true reason' and hence in apparent 
contrast with the ideals of the fine arts which has been developed over the last two 
centuries. To suggest, therefore, that Greek ideals underpin the mathematicians' 
construction of axiomatic systems may have little or no bearing on the question of 
81 This reference to divine inspiration, recall, is in stark contrast to the way that Plato regarded the source 
of art. (See Ion pp 219-220 in Hamilton and Huntingdon, 1961) 
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whether mathematics is afine art. So if Kline does want to insist that mathematics is art 
in the modem sense of fine art, then it is not clear how he can avoid addressing the 
feeling element, which is so important to much if not all of art. It is important to note 
that Kline does acknowledge this point and does not suppose that 'aesthetics properties' 
and 'art' are synonymous. He realises that the usual assumption that art has an 
emotional element which is missing in mathematics is a potential stumbling block in 
trying to bring mathematics and art together. Kline attempts to overcome this difficulty 
by identifying an emotional element in mathematics, on the one hand, and by 
diminishing the importance of emotion in the fine arts, on the other. With regard to the 
emotion in mathematics he writes: 
No doubt many people feel that the inclusion of mathematics among 
the arts is unwarranted. The strongest objection is that mathematics has 
no emotional import. Of course this argument discounts the feeling of 
dislike and revulsion which mathematics induces in some people. This 
argument also undervalues the delight experienced by creators of 
mathematics when they succeed in formulating their ideas and in 
erecting ingenious and masterful proofs. Even the student of 
elementary mathematics is pleased by his success in proving 
stereotyped exercises and by his ability to see light, meaning, and order 
where formerly there was obscurity and confusion.82 (p.521) 
It must be said that this is a very weak attempt at showing that mathematics has an 
emotional element. The negative feelings which Kline refers to are not intrinsic to 
mathematics. The positive feelings, on the other hand, which are experienced in the 
production of mathematics, do have something in common with those experienced by 
artists. But whereas the artist can additionally, intentionally, express emotion in his or 
her work, this is not true of the mathematician. Moreover, to say that the student is 
'pleased' with their efforts may have very little to do with the mathematics; the same 
pleasure could arise from any demanding activity. 
, 
So Kline's case has not yet been made, and this much he concedes. Perhaps his attempt 
to remove the kinship of emotion and art will fare better. His first move in this direction 
is to admit that 'a person is logically able to insist that the primary function of art is to 
arouse emotions and stir feelings'. But he points out that this function cannot be 
sufficient to pick out works of art since 'a dramatic photograph' might move us more 
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than certain great works of art. 83 It appears to Kline that the arousal of emotions 
is not necessary to the arts either. He presses this point by giving precise 
examples of works of fine art which he believes do not satisfy this requirement: 
The still-life paintings of Picasso, impressionistic studies, such 
as Monet's, of atmospheric and light effects, the work of Seurat 
and Cezanne, and the 'arrangements' of the Cubists would also 
fail to satisfy the requirement. In fact, the pure art of modem 
times puts emphasis on the theoretical and formal side of 
painting, on the use of line and form, and on technical problems. 
Such work appeals much more to the intellect than to the 
emotions. (p.521) 
But whilst it might be true that these works do appeal to the intellect to some 
extent, to say that they appeal more to the intellect than the emotions seems to be 
loading the die too much in favour of Kline's own position on mathematics. For 
Kline, moreover, the emotional aspect of art is largely attributable to the work of 
the Renaissance. This is clearly an exaggeration. Even if it were true of paintings, 
it is false of music. No one would surely deny that intense emotion was present 
in much of nineteenth century music. One only needs to think of the works of 
Chopin, Brahms or Tchaikovsky. It is true that much of contemporary music has 
been called 'cerebral', but our concept of music has not changed dramatically. 
There is still an overriding demand for works of emotional content in our concert 
programmes, and as we try to come to grips with a new music concept - even that 
which consist solely of silence - there are insufficient grounds for concluding that 
emotion is minimal in the arts even if it is missing in some of them. 
However, Kline does more than stress the negative point that since emotion 
and art are only contingently connected, mathematics cannot be ruled out as 
a fine art in this respect. He sets out a positive reason why mathematics is art, 
namely, that it is 'an outlet for the creative instinct of man. But as we have 
seen, the concept of creative has different versions and these versions tend to 
highlight the difference between artist and mathematician rather than draw them 
together. Kline adds no more to the concept of creative to convince 
us otherwise. Indeed he makes the important point that creativity 
83 I remarked earlier that the fine arts may be extended to include such media as photography. It 
is interesting to see that Kline seems to find it less plausible to regard a 'dramatic photograph' as 
art than mathematics. 
alone is not sufficient, and that the mathematician must produce work with 'design, 
harmony and beauty' .84 
So far then we have not found convincing grounds for annexing mathematics and the 
fine arts. But even if we could, we still only have what I have called 'justification by 
association'. We would still, that is, not be justifYing the learning of mathematics unless 
it were also shown how the arts themselves were justified. However, if we understood 
the value of the arts in education it might suggest the essential criterion which 
mathematics must have to gain parity with those arts. So, we will pause to consider a 
fairly elaborate rationale for art which has been put forward, to see what it is about art 
which justifies its place on the curriculum. Accordingly, the rationale I shall be 
discussing will provide the opportunity to usher in one final attempt to show that 
mathematics is a fine art by dint of its special properties. 
84 Some of these aesthetic aspects have already arisen in my discussion of earlier writings from Moritz's 
anthology. They will be revisited when I fmally detach aesthetics from fine arts. 
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Chapter 6 - The fine arts, education and mathematics 
In the previous chapter we saw that writers, both ancient and modern, have tried to 
make connections between mathematics and art. Although the meaning of art has 
undergone some change since the eighteenth century we can suppose that at least some 
of these writers have suggested that mathematics resembles, or even provides an 
instance of, fine art alongside paintings, poetry, music and the like. There have been 
several reasons why writers and mathematicians have come to this conclusion and these 
reasons seem to appear again and again. Prominent amongst them is the view that the 
mathematician creates rather than discovers mathematics. Also writers are often struck 
by the fact that mathematics has certain aesthetic properties particularly, but not 
exclusively, that of beauty of some kind or other. But these considerations by 
themselves still seem to ignore the fact that fine art has an emotional component which 
is absent in mathematics. However, at least one writer, Kline, has even thrown doubt on 
this objection. So far I have insisted that these writers are unconvincing. 
But suppose that such arguments had been convincing, it is not clear what would be 
gained from re-categorising mathematics as a fine art. If mathematics were, after all, a 
fine art would this give us a strong reason for learning it? Unless we want to provide 
more than what I have called 'justification by association' we would still need to find a 
purpose for learning mathematics via the value of the fine arts themselves. I cannot of 
course review the many and various rationales which set out the educational value of 
the arts. What I shall do is to rely largely upon the work of a leading contemporary 
philosopher of education, John White, whose reputation has been gained largely on the 
strength of his pioneering and continued work in the aims of education. After 
considering his work, I shall examine the argument of one final writer who believed that 
mathematics is a fine art because it has some of the same kind of educational value that 
White ascribes to art. 
The educational value of fine art 
Several justifications for studying art are given by White (1990). By 'art' White 
indicates that he means paintings, poetry, music and literature, and hence not 
mathematics. Indeed, at one point when he does refer to mathematics it is to make 
something of a contrast with art. I shall firstly examine why White thinks that art is of 
special value in a person's education, before considering whether or not mathematics 
could be valued in the same way. 
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Clearly, if art were a form of knowledge then this alone might secure art a place in the 
curriculum, given that education is closely connected with knowledge. But White 
acknowledges that there is a problem with supposing that art can be a form of 
knowledge, even though he maintains that art can enlarge one's knowledge. What art 
does do, according to White, is to enlarge the range of options to be pursued for their 
own sake and 'for opening doors to further options including vocational ones'. He 
realises that many other activities, including the study of mathematics, can similarly 
extend our options. But he singles out art for special consideration because of 'the 
enormous delight which art can give us - so immediately and often with so little 
struggle - as compared with so many other intellectual or practical activities' (p.155). 
The delights of Mathematics, on the other hand, are not so easy to achieve. Even those 
who have wanted to establish a strong connection between mathematics and art have 
highlighted the difficulty facing anyone who is to enjoy this aspect of mathematics. In 
particular, Huntley (1970) in his study of 'mathematical beauty', admits that whilst' a 
limited sense of aesthetic appreciation is given; the rest must be acquired', reminding us 
once again that many of the enjoyable aspects of mathematics are not easily accessible. 
He continues: 
... the mathematically uneducated can appreciate the dual symmetry of 
the ellipse; that is given. But the unlimited store of beauty of the conic 
sections is reserved for the mathematically trained: it is acquired. This 
indicates that the path to real aesthetic pleasure is through toil, a 
principle that holds far beyond the realm of mathematics. Spadework is 
essentiaL .. (p.2) 
So one thing that we shall need to take up later is the extent to which the accessibility of 
aesthetic pleasure in mathematics is worth the effort it takes for its acquisition. We shall 
need to ask whether or not aesthetic pleasure can be achieved much more easily in other 
areas of the curriculum, and hence that these areas should be the sole or main source of 
such enjoyment of the kind attached to art, or, on the other hand, whether aesthetic 
pleasure should be sought wherever it exists. We need to know whether or not it is the 
specificity which counts, whether or not we can argue by analogy with protein, which 
vegetarians learn must be taken from foods of different kinds to achieve balance and 
variety. 
So far, then, White argues that art can enlarge knowledge, and does enlarge options for 
a certain kind of enjoyment much of which is relatively accessible. But there is more to 
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come. 'Art unlocks emotion in one' he writes, it ' ... breaks through the crust of our 
conventional way of thinking and behaving, and through our ordinary practical 
involvement in our affairs'. So that art 'liberates': 
We take pleasure in exercising our powers in a spontaneous, unfettered, 
way. In satisfying these desires so deeply implanted in us, art 
contributes directly to our well-being (p.155). 
Something on these lines has been claimed for mathematics, as we have seen, when the 
creativity of mathematics is stressed, and if such a view could be sustained then 
mathematics at least has some properties that resemble art. But to make the strong claim 
that mathematics is art would need much more argument, particularly since creativity if 
it is possible in mathematics is largely achieved by the initiated. 
If we continue with White's account of the importance of art in education we can see 
again where it diverges from mathematics. The next level of justification of the arts 
arises, as it were, from the other end. We delight in extending our emotional life, by 
giving our emotions full leash, but we also experience conflicts amongst our desires and 
seek some order. When all that is required is some prioritising amongst desires of 
different value, some ordering is possible through developing strength of will. But 
sometimes we experience what White calls 'irresolvable tensions between our most 
important desires themselves'. For example, he remarks that: 
It may be impossible for me to be both an artist and a man of affairs; to 
be fully responsive both to the loyalties which claim me and to my 
personal projects; to see the world as objectively as possible on the one 
hand and from my own SUbjective perspective on the other ... (p.156) 
Such a predicament provides a strong role for art. Referring to such conflicts of this 
kind, White believes that' Art enables us to come to grips with them'. More 
specifically, he says of art that: 
... it can do this by working on our imagination: we experience the 
tensions in what we see as the artist's soul, or in those of the characters 
he or she creates. In this way we approach our own conflicts by 
contemplating their counterparts in others; and here we do not merely 
contemplate them, but experience them within the framework of the 
work itself. The work contains them and enables them to co-exist 
within a unity, a formal structure. This helps us to reconcile ourselves 
to the ineluctability - we see our tensions as something we have to live 
with, something we can hold together within the framework of our life. 
A work of art comes to stand proxy for our own life. (p.156) 
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This awareness that art brings 85 is characteristic of the autonomous rather than the 
heteronomous individual and hence we may say that, in this way at least, the study of art 
contributes towards the development of autonomy. 
As White reiterates: 
We want life, spontaneity, and wealth of sensory and emotional 
experience; and we want boundedness, order and framework ... a work 
of art by embodying this tension within itself, can help us to hold these 
two opposites together. It shows us how it can be done. 
( p.l57) 
Others have made essentially the same point. Q'Hear (1988) writes: 
In works of art and literature ... we come to a particular, inward type of 
understanding of human life and experience. This inwardness derives 
from the way in which in a work of art there is a sympathetic enactment 
of the experience depicted or evoked, and in which, on the part of the 
author and audience, feeling and receptivity are at their peak (p.90). 
White also outlines what he calls a more 'conservative' role for art. It seems that art 
allows us to reflect upon our common values, for many of which no rational argument 
can be found to justify. One of art's roles is to reaffirm these values. In this way it 
contributes towards our self-knowledge. So White writes: 
It is because of this affinity between art and our nature that experience 
of the former has a role in education which goes far beyond its value as 
an optional activity for those who prefer it to other things. Art is 
necessary for everyone, because self-knowledge - in its practical aspect 
- is necessary for everyone. (pp158-159) 
and, again, reiterating what he had said earlier in the book about autonomy, he says: 
85 Russell comes quite close to making a similar claim about mathematics. Firstly he outlines the place 
that mathematics should have in one's life: 
'What is best in mathematics deserves not merely to be learned as a task, but to be assimilated as a part of 
daily thought, and brought again and again before the mind with ever-renewed encouragement' (Moritz, 
1914 p.l82). 
Then he goes on to give reasons why. The world of mathematics, Russell believed, can compensate us for 
the shortcomings of the everyday world: 
'Real life is, to most men, a long second-best, a perpetual compromise between the real and the possible; 
but the world of pure reason knows no compromise, no practical limitations, no barrier to the creative 
activity embodying in splendid edifices the passionate aspiration after the perfect from which all great 
work springs. Remote from human passions, remote from the pitiful facts of nature, the generations have 
gradually created an ordered cosmos, where pure thought can dwell as in its natural home, and where one, 
at least, of our nobler impulses can escape from the dreary exile of the natural world'(Moritz pp.182-3). 
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... the autonomous people we have in mind need, for the sake of their 
own well-being, to be closely in touch with their own structures of 
desire, including their feelings; and not to be confused or mistaken 
about their priorities, or in other ways self-deceive. In its power to 
reveal ourselves to ourselves, and thereby to confirm us in what we 
take ourselves most deeply to be, and also in our sense that our values 
are not idiosyncratically our own, but shared with countless others 
across space and time, art is an unparalleled vehicle of self-
understanding, and so of education. (p 159) 
White's last line on the role of the arts is especially pertinent: 
Their intimate connection with self-knowledge and personal well-being 
give them a curricular importance which mathematics, say, or science 
could not hope to rival (p.160) 
White's argument is most convincing when the art in question is literature, painting or 
sculpture. But it becomes difficult to see how absolute music could help us come to 
grips with conflicting desires in quite the way in which he outlines it. But suppose it 
could be argued that mathematics could contribute to self-knowledge. Then even if it 
could not rival the fine arts it may at least equal them. This is precisely the claim made 
by John William Navin Sullivan. 
Mathematics and self-knowledge 
Sullivan, in his 'Mathematics as an Art' (In Newman, 1956), makes the bold claims that 
, Art which is worthy of the name reveals to us some aspect of reality' . A similar 
revelation, he believes, arises in mathematics: 
Mathematics, as much as music or any other art, is one of the means by 
which we rise to a complete self-consciousness. The significance of 
mathematics resides precisely in the fact that it is an art; by informing 
us of the nature of our own minds it informs us of much that depends 
on our minds86 (p.2021) 
Here then is a clear statement that mathematics is a fine art since it provides us with a 
particular kind of self-knowledge. As we have just seen, White also singled out the 
special value, peculiar to the arts, of self-knowledge 87. However, we should note from 
86 M . I· y Ita ICS 
87 This aspect of self-consciousness is an important one and is not usually included by those who simply 
want to assert that mathematics has an aesthetic aspect. It strengthens my resolve to distinguish between 
those things which are aesthetic, and those things which are art either in addition to being in the aesthetic 
realm or art without being aesthetic. 
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the start that not only is self-knowledge only one of several values of art which White 
discusses, but also that Sullivan's notion of self-knowledge is much more restricted. For 
White, self-knowledge includes knowledge of common desires and feelings, whereas 
for Sullivan it appears to be solely knowledge of the relationship between mind and the 
external world. 
Much of Sullivan's main argument is similar to Kline's, (see above page 83). He begins 
from the historical fact that although mathematics was once regarded as providing 
absolute knowledge of the external world, through the rarely questioned truths of space 
given by Euclidean geometry, it gradually became evident that alternative, consistent 
geometries could be created. So he notes that 'the mathematician is entirely free, within 
the limits of his imagination, to construct what world he pleases'. However, the 
connections between this created mathematics and what we might call the external 
world, but which Sullivan simply refers to as 'experience', presents him with a 
problem. He rightly says: 
Ifhe [the mathematician] can find, in experience, sets of entities which 
obey the same logical scheme as his mathematical entities, then he has 
applied his mathematics to the external world; he has created a branch 
of science (p.2020) 
However, he is clearly not satisfied with the idea that the mathematician has hereby 
simply created 'science', rather than art. So he invokes the creativity aspect once again 
saying: 'Since ... mathematics is an entirely free activity, unconditioned by the external 
world, it is more just to call it an art than a science'. But there is a price to pay for this 
realignment: mathematics-as-an-art cannot, it seems, give us the kind of knowledge that 
Euclidean geometry once did. The moment we use created 'mathematical models' for 
understanding the external world, we are engaging in science. Many would agree that 
this is indeed the state of affairs with respect to pure mathematics and science. But 
perhaps because the creative nature of mathematics does not seem sufficient for 
classifying mathematics as an art, Sullivan goes much further and boldly asserts that: 
Art which is worthy of the name reveals to us some aspect of reality. 
This is possible because our consciousness and the external world are 
not two independent entities. (p. 2021) 
He has therefore assimilated mathematics into art only by taking on something rather 
like an idealist position, in order to side-step the dualism implicit in mathematics as it is 
applied in science. From then on he reiterates his earlier point: 
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Mathematics, as much as music or any other art, is one of the means by 
which we rise to a complete self-consciousness ... the real function of 
art is to increase our self-consciousness; to make us more aware of 
what we are, and therefore of what the universe in which we live really 
is. (p.2021) 
But to say that mathematics provides essential self-knowledge, and to say that art does 
this too, is not sufficient to show that mathematics is art. This would be to commit the 
fallacy that If A is S and Mis S, then M is A. Nevertheless, in his concluding lines this 
is precisely what Sullivan does: 
... it is certain that the real function of art is to increase our self-
consciousness; to make us more aware of what we are, and therefore of 
what the universe in which we live really is. And since mathematics, in 
its own way, also performs this function, it is not only aesthetically 
charming but profoundly significant. It is an art, and a great art. It is on 
this, besides its usefulness in practical life, that its claim to esteem 
must be based. (p.2021) 
There is therefore somethingformally wrong with Sullivan's argument. But even if we 
could accept that a certain kind of self-knowledge was a necessary and sufficient 
condition of the arts, it is not clear that this would clinch the matter. As I have already 
mentioned, the particular kind of self-knowledge, which Sullivan believes that 
mathematics can provide, is much narrower in scope than that which is obtained from 
the arts. To see how this might rule out Sullivan's way of including mathematics 
amongst the fine arts, it is worth considering how certain philosophers have 
distinguished art from other enterprises. In a manner analogous to Sullivan, 
Schopenhauer (1819) suggests that art is similar in one respect to philosophy since both 
are concerned with the question 'what is life?' But he does not thereby assimilate art 
into philosophy. Indeed, he goes on to distinguish them, by remarking that: 
[But] all the arts speak only the naive and childish language of 
perception, not the abstract and serious language of reflection; their 
answer is therefore a fleeting image: not permanent and general 
knowledge ... their answer, however, correct it may be, will yet always 
afford merely a temporary, not a complete and final, satisfaction. For 
they always give merely a fragment, an example instead of the rule, not 
the whole, which can only be given in the universality of the 
conception. (See Hofstadter and Kuhns, 1964 p.452) 
Mathematics of course does not provide answers to questions such as 'what is life?' but 
like philosophy it deals almost exclusively with propositions of a general or universal 
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nature and hereby lies its power, its capability for widespread application. Indeed 
Sullivan highlights this point when he says: 
Mathematics is of profound significance ... because it exhibits 
principles that we impose. It shows us the laws of our own being and 
the necessary conditions of experience (p.2021) 
But in saying this he draws a particular kind of wedge between mathematics and art. 
More recently Anthony O'Hear, (1988) in The Element of Fire: Science, Art and the 
Human World, has like White explained the value of the arts in terms of a particular 
kind of self-knowledge, claiming that 'in works of art and literature ... we come to a 
particular inward type of understanding of human life and experience'. He, too, makes a 
similar point to Schopenhauer that such understanding is brought about 'in a concrete 
way, through particular experience by reference to the concrete particularity of things' . 
So once again we find that any self-knowledge that mathematics brings is in strong 
contrast to that which is provided by the arts. 
There are difficulties, then, with Sullivan's arguments. Even if it is true that 
mathematics has a creative element, we have seen earlier (see page 71) that this is not 
sufficient to show that mathematics is an art, or at least an art in the full-blown sense 
that Sullivan has in mind. Mathematics may indeed give us self-knowledge but this is 
only of a restricted kind and is only achieved at the expense of adopting an undefended 
idealism. The self-knowledge of the kind that White has claimed art can provide, is one 
which helps to brings us to terms with conflicts of desires and values, on the one hand, 
and confirms our deep-seated common values, on the other. It is doubtful, to say the 
least, whether the awareness of our freedom to construct models of reality similarly 
resolves certain conflicts of desire. We must also acknowledge that Sullivan's argument 
contains a formal difficulty in the last extract above. Even if the ability to increase self-
consciousness is a necessary condition of art, it need not be a sufficient one. So that 
even if mathematics has this property it does not imply that mathematics is thereby art. 
In coming to see that we can construct systems, that these are not simply given, we 
surely can learn something about ourselves. But to admit this, is not to go as far as to 
say, with Sullivan, that mathematics is therefore art. 
Once again we have found that a strong claim that mathematics ought to be regarded as 
fine art cannot stand up to analysis. It is time now to ask whether it is not possible to 
show that every argument is doomed to fail, not simply on a formal point but 
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conceptually. We have just seen how one philosopher of education has found a 
fundamental criterion which distinguishes art from philosophy. Ifwe delve further into 
O'Hear's arguments, and adapt them slightly, we find that an additional, powerful 
distinction can be made between mathematics and the fine arts which shows us 
conclusively that mathematics cannot be regarded as fine art. 
Art and Mathematics - a possible dividing line. 
In The Element of Fire: Science, Art and the Human World 0' Hear (1988) sets out a 
strong contrast between art and science, particularly physics, in order to emphasise the 
importance of art. If such a contrast as 0' Hear makes could be shown to be applicable 
to mathematics and art, and the connection between physics and mathematics is in many 
places a very close one, then this will give us good reasons for supposing that no 
attempt to classify mathematics as art can be sustained. 
Much of 0' Hear's contrast rests on the notion of human perception. A significant part 
of his argument goes as follows: human perception is central to the arts, and is treated 
there as an end in itself, whereas, for science, the way things seem to be is never 
sufficient. Indeed an important aspect of science is its claim that common sense 
perception of the world is illusory. The object that concerns science is the world-in-
itself rather than the world as-it-is-perceived. So that even if science begins from human 
perception, it necessarily transcends this in order to attain some kind of independent 
view, unbiased by the way humans contingently are, and aims at asserting information 
about how things are in themselves. 
Our seeing something as coloured is, according to a long tradition of science, just the 
effect of which some ultimate colourless material is the cause. So that our perception of 
colour cannot be the basis of our understanding of the nature or properties of such 
material. For such an understanding we must somehow transcend the standpoint of the 
perception. Tactile perception has been questioned by scientists too; the famous remark 
by Edison that the common sense view of a table, as something which is solid, is not the 
physicist's notion. More recently, in quantum mechanics we learn that even the position 
of particles is not at all as simple as one would imagine. So as science develops there 
seems to be no end to the measures it will go to, to diminish the importance of human 
perception. 
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Without giving further details of 0' Hear's argument at this stage, I should like to look 
at one aspect of mathematics in a similar way to that in which he looks at physics and 
consider the status that mathematics has under the demarcation that arises from his 
argument. It will be crucial to know whether mathematics falls on the physics side, as it 
were, or on the arts side. But we shall have to tread carefully. Although there seem to be 
close connections between mathematics and, say, physics, there is at least one essential 
difference between the two of them, namely, that science sets out to discover causes. 
So in one important aspect mathematics cannot be grouped with science in the way that 
O'Hear has in mind. Yet, his insistent complaint that science too readily believes it can 
ignore human perception does still have echoes in mathematics. We learn, for example, 
that a point has no size, only position, and that a line is a series of points, so that neither 
can be perceived. The same is true of numbers. Notwithstanding a thoroughgoing 
empiricist view of the nature of mathematical objects, numbers are not the properties of 
objects and hence cannot be perceived. 
If perception is not the usual source of mathematical insight, widespread use is made of 
so-called 'intuition', and it seems to me that intuition does play an analogous part in 
mathematics to the part that human perception plays in the sciences. That is to say, just 
as science might be said to begin from perception, mathematics may begin from 
intuition.88 We have seen that for science human perception is problematic; the question 
to ask now is whether intuition in mathematics has similar difficulties. 
It should be pointed out that the concept of intuition is a broad one. Davis and Hersh 
(1980) offer six different, though related interpretations of the concept of intuition. 
Intuition they suggest can either mean' the opposite of rigorous'; 'visual'; 'plausible; 
incomplete; or convincing in the absence of proof; 'relying on a physical model, or on 
some leading examples'; or finally 'holistic or integrative as opposed to detailed or 
analytic' (pp. 391-2). The sense in which intuition leads to propositions which are 
'plausible or convincing in the absence of proof is a particularly important one to 
consider. Thus described we can enquire whether intuition must at some point part 
company from mathematics in a similar way to which human perception departs from 
physics, but not from the arts. If intuition is at some point dispensable, then we have a 
powerful way of removing the pretension that mathematics may be classified as art. 
88 For some mathematicians intuition provides the foundation of mathematics. 
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We do not have to look far before we find examples of the inadequacy of intuition as a 
means of reaching mathematical truth. Several examples of what he calls the 'failure of 
intuition' are discussed by Hans Hahn in his 'The Crisis in Intuition' (In Newman, 
1956). He shows quite conclusively that there are many occasions where what seems to 
be intuitively true turns out to be false through the application of mathematics. As he 
writes: 
It was believed that a curve must possess an exact slope, or tangent, if 
not at every point, at least at an overwhelming majority of them. 
(p.1962) 
But Hahn goes on to discuss the famous blancmange curve, by applying rigorous 
mathematical techniques to which it can be shown to have no tangent anywhere. The 
similarity of his example to 0' Hear's example of the 'vault of heaven' is striking: 
One stands, let us say, on a clear night beneath a moonless sky in the 
Mediterranean, and the sense that there is a vault above one filled with 
stars is overwhelming. One knows that there is no such thing, that the 
sky and heaven's vault are illusions ... (pp.8-9) 
In both cases what seems to be true from a human point of view turns out to be false 
within disciplines that somehow go beyond such a human perspective. 
Another example from mathematics lies in the theory of transfinite numbers. Intuitively, 
we might say, there are fewer even numbers than there are whole numbers. Yet Cantor 
has shown that if we apply the same criterion to infinite sets, as we do for comparing 
finite sets, then the set of evens and the set of whole numbers are the same size. The 
proof is simple. Create a mapping from the set of whole numbers to the set of evens in 
the following way: map 1 to 2, 2 to 4,3 to 6 and in general n to 2n. The mapping is a 
one-to-one correspondence and hence we can conclude that these sets are the same size! 
Once again intuition leads us one way but mathematics leads us away from such 
intuition. As I take it, O'Hear believes that art never overrides human perception in the 
way in which mathematics overrides intuition in such examples as I have given. To the 
extent that this point is criterial, mathematics can never aspire to art. 
So, by using O'Hear's argument, and drawing at least one parallel between mathematics 
and science, an important distinction between art and mathematics can be made which 
suggests that they are radically different in an important respect. O'Hear writes: 
98 
What modern science aims to do is, in the name of a wider objectivity 
of view, to displace the human being and his modes of perceiving the 
world from the centre of the picture, and to present the human being 
and his modes of perceiving the world as incidental parts of the picture. 
From this point of view, the human being is seen as part of a wider and 
more inclusive causal process, and, from the point of that view, of no 
more significance than any other incident in the development of the 
cosmos. (p.lS) 
What I am suggesting is that mathematics can be seen as having a similar aim to 
science, even though this aim is perhaps not so far-reaching, since there is not so much 
of a common sense view of intuition in mathematics to override. All the same, once we 
turn our intuition onto mathematical objects, a similar kind of correction must 
sometimes be made to such intuition as it is to sense perception in science. This is in 
strong contrast to the way matters are in art and gives us an important reason for 
seriously questioning whether mathematics could ever be art in any thoroughgoing way. 
Of course, if mathematics is not a fine art, nor could ever become one on the strength of 
these considerations, there is nothing to stop artists and mathematicians from denoting 
it as such. Nor is there any reason to suppose that mathematics may not be a source of 
aesthetic satisfaction, unless of course' art' and 'aesthetic' are synonymous. It is these 
alternatives that I want to discuss in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7 - Mathematics and Aesthetics 
Art and the aesthetic are not necessarily co-existent 
Mathematics, we have seen, is essentially different from the arts because it must always 
at some point eschew the human point of view. But even if mathematics can thus never 
be considered to be fine art, it may still have those aesthetic properties, which so many 
writers have insisted upon, unless, of course, we equate 'aesthetic' and 'art'. Both 
Sullivan and Kline in their attempts to show that mathematics is fine art have implied a 
distinction between the fine arts and aesthetics. Kline found it necessary not only to 
invoke aesthetic requirements in the origination of mathematics but also went on to 
discuss the extent of the feeling side of the arts and how that could be squared with 
mathematics. Sullivan is even more explicit in the way he shows that the existence of 
aesthetic properties is not a sufficient condition of the fine arts. Before setting out his 
account that mathematics is a fine art, which we have already seen is inadequate, he 
wrote: 
The literature of mathematics is full of aesthetic terms, and the 
mathematician who said he was less interested in results than in the 
beauty of the methods by which he found the results was not 
expressing an unusual sentiment ... But to say that mathematics is an 
art is not to say that it is a mere amusement. Art is not something 
which exists merely to satisfy an "aesthetic emotion". 
(In Newman, 1956 pp. 2020-2021) 
Art for Sullivan, then, is something more than mere aesthetic delight, nevertheless he 
does acknowledge and distinguish the presence of something which at least provides 
'mere enjoyment'. To refute Sullivan's claim that mathematics is a fine art, as I have 
done, is, therefore, not to deny that it may still be a source of 'aesthetic emotion'. 
Moreover, if mathematics is a source of aesthetic satisfaction this might provide some 
justification for studying the subject. Both Kline and Sullivan are suggesting that art 
and aesthetic are not co-existent. If they were co-existent, then to cast doubt over the 
connection between art and mathematics, as I have done, would at the same time be 
casting doubt on the possibility of the aesthetics of mathematics. Other writers, too, 
have been explicit in saying that whilst art and the aesthetic are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive they are independent of each other. If this is the case, then the question of 
whether mathematics has an aesthetic aspect, and whether this in any way can provide a 
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justification for learning it, still remains unanswered by inadequate arguments to show 
that mathematics is fine art. 
Without the coexistence of art and aesthetics, any object may, in principle, fall into one 
of four categories, according to whether it is deemed: 
1. to be fine art but without aesthetic properties. 
2. to have aesthetic properties (or be a source of aesthetic experience) but not be fine 
art. 
3. to have aesthetic properties (or be a source of aesthetic experience) and be fine art. 
4. to have neither aesthetic properties (nor be a source of aesthetic experience) nor to 
be fine art. 
As far as mathematics is concerned my argument so far rules out the possibility of 
mathematics falling under category 1 and 3, but it still leaves open the possibility of its 
falling under category 2 (or even category 4). 
It must be admitted that there is a sense in which aesthetics has come to mean the 
Philosophy of Art, in the same way as ethics has become the Philosophy of Morality. So 
that the connection between aesthetics and fine art may be regarded as a necessary one. 
Yet the examples from natural objects do show conclusively that not all that is aesthetic 
is art, ifby art we primarily mean artefacts. So it is at least conceptually possible to 
claim that mathematics is aesthetic without thereby entailing that it is art. 
It is often pointed out that the word 'aesthetic' was introduced in the eighteenth century 
by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten who adopted the Greek word for perception to 
denote the study of perception in contrast to the study of what is known. He collected 
the study of art under the notion of aesthetics and the two were seen as identical. 
Strictly, speaking then, aesthetics is an enquiry about a special kind of experience, 
typically, but not exclusively of art. It is particularly attached to beauty and modem 
writers are still concerned to elucidate this kind of experience. 
Aesthetics, then, is not a sufficient condition of art. But Binkley (1977) makes it clear 
that aesthetics need not be a necessary condition of art either, so that all four of the 
categories in the above list are indeed possible. He writes: 
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An artwork is a piece. The concept "work of art" does not isolate a 
class of peculiar aesthetic personages. The concept marks an indexical 
function in the artworld. To be a piece of art, an item need only be 
indexed as an artwork by an artist. Simply recategorizing an 
unsuspecting entity will suffice (pp37-38) ... There are many kinds of 
"pieces", different according to the practices they are indexed within. A 
"piece" could be a piece of mathematics, or economics or art; and some 
pieces may be addressed to several disciplines. An artwork is just a 
~iece (of art), an entity specified by conventions of the practice of art. 
9 (p.39) 
His notion that art is simply that which is indexed as art by an artist is a helpful one for 
explaining much of contemporary work found in exhibitions. He discusses in detail one 
such example: a representation of the Mona Lisa who is given a moustache. His main 
point is that perceiving this work is unimportant since there is nothing special about the 
way the moustache is drawn. One could come to know the work just as well by a 
description. Sense perception is no longer essential in coming to grips with this work 
since it is not the look of the work that matters.90 The same could be said presumably 
about Cage's 'silent' piano piece. 
Binkley concludes from this that: 
... "Is it art?" is a question of little interest. The question is "So what if 
it is?" Art is an epiphenomenon over the class of its works. (p.38) 
What it is very important to note, however, is that Binkley's account rests upon a 
nominal account of art. To index something as art is more or less to say that it is art. Of 
course not anyone can say this, but even so it does leave the question of what can be 
deemed art as a very open one; no determinate properties of a work are necessary for it 
to be indexed as art. Binkley, himself, admits that a 'piece' of mathematics could be 
deemed as art in this way. In particular, mathematics may be indexed as art without 
implying that it has any aesthetic properties. Binkley clearly thinks that the question of 
whether mathematics is art would be oflittle interest. For us, however, it is crucial, 
because, as I am suggesting, by association with art mathematics is supposed to have 
special educational value. So if mathematics is indexed as art the value of mathematics-
as-art will be of crucial interest in deciding whether or not this way of regarding 
mathematics has any justifyingforce. Binkley does not provide us with any concomitant 
value with the indexing of objects as art. If art has no special educational value after all, 
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then on this view of the matter it is pointless to try and decide whether the connection 
between mathematics and the fine arts is a close one. 
Leaving aside the question of whether we should simply index mathematics as fine art, I 
now want to explore the other option which has arisen from this discussion. Given that 
aesthetics and the fine arts are not co-existent, I want to examine the various ways, if 
any, that mathematics could be included under category 2 in the above list. That is to 
say I want to detennine how it might be deemed to have aesthetic properties (or be a 
source of aesthetic experience) even though it is not fine art. 
Mathematics as a source of aesthetic experience 
The possibility that mathematics can be a source of aesthetic experience has been put 
strongly very recently by Morgens Niss (1994) who has claimed that mathematics is a 
field oj aesthetics. He follows a range of writers in the present century who have argued 
that mathematics has special properties which are a source of special enjoyment. But 
this rather general claim needs to be examined. 
One way of understanding the notion of 'aesthetic' is to regard it as involving a 
particular kind of experience. Since at least the time of Kant, the notion of disinterest 
has become a central defining characteristic of such experience. Disinterest, in the 
aesthetic context, as elsewhere, is not contrasted with uninterest but rather with certain 
kinds of partiality associated with non-aesthetic experience which will be outlined 
presently. But even if theorists are right in describing aesthetic experience in this way 
the task remains of establishing whether opportunities for such experience exist in 
mathematics. 
It must be pointed out that few aestheticians seem to admit readily that mathematics is a 
source of aesthetic experience. But many point out that the range of objects about which 
aesthetic judgements can be made is indefinite, even though works of art and features of 
the natural world are amongst the most typical. The following passage by Charlton 
(1970), illustrates this point well: 
90 In this respect, of course, Binkley's view is in contrast to that ofO'Hear. 
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You are thinking of taking a flat: you look it over, and note, among 
other things, that the windows are well or ill proportioned. You are 
driving somewhere on business, and see that the countryside has 
changed in character, become more sombre and severe. You are trying 
on clothes, and consider how they look on you and how they make you 
look. You are listening to a talk, and contrast the banality of what the 
speaker is saying with the pleasant tones and well chosen words in 
which he says it ... You are bedding out some plants and try to get the 
spacing even or the colours well grouped ... it strikes you that the 
postman has a funny face ... aesthetic judgement is exercised most 
formally, perhaps in art galleries, concert halls and the like, but our 
lives would be very dull if it was in perpetual abeyance outside these 
temples dedicated to the muses. 91 (pp. 9-10) 
Stolnitz (1960) gives a clear, though not uncontested, account of aesthetic experience, 
which he prefers to call the aesthetic attitude but which is nevertheless characterised by 
disinterest. Moreover as we shall see he does make explicit and helpful reference to 
mathematics as an appropriate object to which one can adopt the aesthetic attitude. 
Stolnitz remarks that most of our perception is of a practical kind whereby we notice 
only the features of things which serve our own purposes. It should be clear that the 
attention we pay to mathematics is usually of this kind especially when it is presented as 
a tool, a set of techniques, which can be used to solve practical problems. Yet we do not 
always perceive things in this way. There are occasions when as Stolnitz puts it ' ... we 
pay attention to a thing simply for the sake of enjoying the way it looks sounds or feels'. 
On these occasions we have adopted what he calls the 'aesthetic attitude' of perception, 
which he defines as 'disinterested and sympathetic attention to and contemplation of 
any object of awareness whatever, for its own sake alone'(p.19). 
It should be pointed out that the kind of account that Stolnitz gives is one where 
aesthetic experience is defined negatively; it is experience which does not have certain 
features. Thus Stolnitz gives a few examples of cases which are not characterised by 
disinterest. They are the cases where one wants primarily to own, gain knowledge 
about, or pass judgement on, the object of one's attention. So if we are to adopt this 
special aesthetic attitude towards mathematics it must be possible to avoid attending to 
certain of its objects in at least these ways. In particular we must not be attending to 
mathematical objects in order to learn something about them. We must somehow be 
just attending to certain features and enjoying the way mathematics sounds or feels. 
91 My italics 
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But mathematics is characterised as an abstract discipline and, as such, it does not have 
'a look', 'a sound' or 'a feel'. Mathematical obj ects are not perceived through sense 
experience. So it is difficult to see how certain apparently necessary conditions for 
aesthetic experience could be fulfilled in quite the way that Stolnitz outlines, even if our 
attention were of a non-practical kind. But Stolnitz does entertain the idea that 
mathematics is an object towards which we may appropriately adopt an aesthetic 
attitude. As he explains: 
There is another kind of "awareness" that occurs, though relatively 
infrequently, in adult experience. This is "intellectual", nonsensuous 
knowledge of "concepts" and "meanings" and their interrelations: such 
knowing takes place in abstract thinking, such as logic and 
mathematics. Even if images or "pictures" accompany such thinking, 
they are only secondary. When the mathematician thinks of the 
properties of triangles, his thought is not restricted to any particular 
triangle he may "see in his head" or draw on paper. A man who 
develops a system of mathematical logic is occupied with logical 
relationships which are neither sensed nor perceived. Now this kind of 
apprehension can also be aesthetic. If one's purpose is not, for the 
moment, problem solving, if he pauses to contemplate disinterestedly 
the logical structure before him, then his experience is aesthetic ... to 
take account of such experience as well as sensation, I have used the 
broad term "awareness" rather than "perception". Anything at all, 
whether sensed or perceived, whether it is the product of imagination 
or conceptual thought, can become the object of aesthetic attention.92 
(pp.26-27) 
Often, as Stolnitz indicates, aesthetic experience is linked with a contemplative stance. 
This is true provided we do not suppose that this always implies a minimum amount of 
intensity. There are degrees of intensity in aesthetic attention. As Stolnitz points out: 'A 
color, briefly seen, or a little melody, may be apprehended on the "fringe" of 
consciousness, whereas a drama will absorb us wholly'. Aesthetic experience may not 
be immediate either; Stolnitz reminds us that we may have to walk round a sculpture or 
through a building like a cathedral to appreciate it. The same is true of aesthetic 
appreciation of certain mathematical objects like proofs, as we shall see. Finally 
Stolnitz reminds us that aesthetic awareness often involves taking notice of detail and 
we may need to have this detail pointed out, or even have a certain amount of technical 
92 My italics. Stolnitz seems to think like many others that this experience is an adult experience. 
Compare this with what Leibeck, 1984 has to say. 
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training. This will be particularly true of mathematics where, as I have already 
remarked, the aesthetic awareness is not of something sensual. 
We do have good reasons, then, from at least one aesthetician, to suppose that it is 
possible to have aesthetic experience in mathematics, even if such experience must 
involve a particular attitude. Moreover, this experience is markedly different from that 
which we are expected to have in realising the more familiar purposes of the subject. 
Furthermore, the experience might be difficult to achieve, indeed it may be scarcely 
accessible to children, and it mayor may not be as intense in mathematical contexts as 
it is elsewhere. So we shall need to examine carefully the objects within mathematics 
where opportunities for such experience are supposed to exist. One particular feature 
which mathematicians claim is to be found almost everywhere in mathematics is 
pattern. So it is to a consideration of this aspect that I now tum. 
Formalism and the ubiquitous pattern 
In one particularly influential theory of aesthetics it is formal properties that are 
regarded as the most important criteria of aesthetic evaluation and the source of 
aesthetic pleasure. Subject matter, and any expressive properties of an object are 
subordinated to the relationships between its parts whether these are colour, sound, 
textural structure of words or, in considering the parts together, what many formalists 
call unity. An aesthetician whose work is worth considering in more detail is that of 
Charlton, since he discusses in some detail the formal notion of a pattern. 
We should note from the start that Charlton's notion of a pattern is in one sense very 
general and in another sense very specific. It is general in the sense that it is defined as 
'a change through space in respect of visible qualities'. What kind of change in visible 
qualities is left open, at this stage. So that any configuration of visible qualities may be 
a pattern, though of course it might not be a particularly enjoyable one. On the other 
hand the fact that, for Charlton, the change must be one of visible qualities restricts the 
context in which patterns can exist. They cannot on this account exist in music, let 
alone mathematics, since music is essentially an aural experience. Indeed Charlton 
describes music and patterns separately and makes comparisons between them. 
Whereas a pattern is a 'a change through space in respect of visible qualities' music is 
'a change in sound which goes on through time'. 
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Having distinguished music from pattern Charlton goes on to enquire how each can be 
enjoyable since not any visible or aural change will be appealing. He therefore seeks to 
explain what a good pattern is, or as he prefers to say, a 'successful' pattern. There are 
parallels it seems between a successful pattern and a successful piece of music. Both 
involve following a change. As Charlton suggests: 
... listening to music is trying to follow the change in sound, and 
... music has merit by formalist criteria if it is a change which is easy 
for people who are in general able to follow music, or music of that 
type, to follow attentively. (pp.40-41) 
A little more of what is involved in following music is given when he says: 'It seems 
that anyone who is following any sort of process must know what is going on at any 
moment'. During the changes in sound, which as we have seen are criterial to music, 
Charlton insists that 'the listener should know where he is in the change at any 
moment. .. must be able to tell ... at what intervals the notes are ... ' This is necessary 
because it is important to see that these notes are related and also since success involves 
achieving unity, an important mark of aesthetic excellence. He also adds: 
When we enjoy an activity, not only is what we do determined by 
factors internal to the activity, but those factors seem by themselves a 
sufficient reason for doing it. If listening to a piece of music is to stand 
a good chance of satisfying this requirement, the piece must contain 
variety, surprises, even some difficulty. (p.4S) 
If we now try to explain successful pattern on similar lines we seem to have a difficulty 
at the outset. Whereas, music has quite definite pitches, timbres and rhythms, this is not 
true of colour, which provides part of the visual material of pattern on Charlton's 
account. However, size and shape are visible qualities about which we can be precise. 
So Charlton builds these features into his account of the enjoyment of pattern: 
If a pattern is to have unity, it must be clear that the elements in it are 
related ... there is only one way possible: quantitatively ... a pattern has 
unity insofar as the beholder can tell how great each distance, angle etc. 
is, not absolutely, but in relation to the others. That is once again, the 
pattern must be followable. (pp.49-50) 
But size and shape are mathematical properties and thus it is these which underlie 
Charlton's notion of pattern. We seem to be back with a view similar to Plato's and, in 
particular, to that of St. Augustine. That is to say, on Charlton's account, for a pattern to 
succeed in being enjoyable its mathematical properties must be followable. Moreover 
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this idea of a pattern's being followable means that for Charlton enjoyment is achieved 
rather more 'discursively' than 'synoptically'. He writes: 
Aestheticians who advocate formalist criteria often contrast 
'discursive' with 'synoptic' perception, going over and connecting up 
the parts oj an object of awareness with contemplating it as a whole; 
and they say that the former is characteristic of scientific observation 
and practical life, while the latter is typically aesthetic. Insofar as the 
distinction is valid .. .1 have urged just the opposite. Contemplating a 
pattern synoptically or all at once would be contemplating it as the end 
of a temporal process, and if we are to enjoy it we must rather 
contemplate it discursively as a spatial process ... On the other hand, 
even if the scientist or practical man is to observe some part of what is 
before him, he must be aware of it as some sort of unified whole or at 
least through awareness of such a whole.93 (pp.52-53) 
As we shall see there are patterns in mathematics, particularly but not exclusively 
number patterns, for which this discursive approach of following quantities seems 
possible, but which need not underlie any visible properties. Indeed it is tempting to 
suggest that mathematical patterns are rather like music in this respect since they exist 
as possibilities, as formulae which may be 'written out' in a similar way to the way in 
which a composer sets out instructions for the possibility of a performance. But there is 
at least one major difference between mathematics and music in this respect. Whereas 
the composer, like other fine artists, 'works out' , as Charlton puts it, his or her own 
patterns in composing music, it is not clear that mathematicians originate their own 
patterns in this way. 
Mathematicians not only assert that mathematics embodies or contains pattern. Some, 
like W.W. Sawyer (1955) for whom mathematics simply is 'the classification and study 
of all possible patterns' (p.12), even define the subject in terms of such entities. But 
does the mathematician, somehow 'work out' patterns just as Charlton says that some 
practitioners do? To answer this we need to distinguish between 'working out' in the 
sense of originating a pattern from scratch, as it were, and 'working out' in the sense of 
discovering a pattern amongst chaos, or perhaps identifying and describing an already 
existing pattern. The first of these is the stronger case and would be typical of an artist 
who, as I have discussed earlier, is often characterised as one who makes something. So 
it would be quite reasonable to suppose that a painter, architect or sculptor works out a 
pattern from scratch and that such a pattern might be just as Charlton describes it 'a 
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change through space in respect of visible qualities'. But whether a mathematician can 
originate patterns seems at first sight to be highly questionable. Yet this is not an 
opinion which is universally held. G. H. Hardy, one eminent mathematician who was in 
no doubt about the importance of mathematical pattern, wrote: 
A mathematician, like a painter or a poet, is a maker of patterns. If his 
patterns are more permanent than theirs, it is because they are made 
with ideas ... beauty is the first test: there is no permanent place in the 
world for ugly mathematics.94 (Hardy, 1967 pp.84-5) 
So whilst it may still be doubted whether a mathematician makes anything at all, except 
perhaps discoveries, for Hardy at least, a mathematician does make patterns, the chief 
criterion for the success of which is beauty. Whether mathematics is in fact created or 
discovered is a difficult question and is one that I touched on earlier in my discussion of 
creativity. In a sense it is true that mathematicians do construct axiomatic systems, but 
this does not seem to imply that they can claim to have thereby constructed the patterns 
which are contained within those systems. Popper (1972) very convincingly wrote: 'The 
series of natural numbers which we construct creates prime numbers - which we 
discover - and these in tum create problems of which we never dreamt'. (p 138). The 
same, it seems to me, can be said of pattern. Even if we admit that mathematics is 
created - or perhaps more neutrally that it is constructed - there is no need to suppose 
that the particular patterns which are later discovered are those which mathematicians 
had ever dreamt of. 
Aesthetic experience in discovering existing patterns 
What is clear, then, is that within the number system, at the very least, patterns exist in 
terms of quantities. Moreover it is possible to enjoy the discursive activity of following 
these patterns, many of which are fascinating, some of which are even surprising 
perhaps. It is thus appropriate to adopt the aesthetic attitude towards mathematics to the 
extent that the pattern may be contemplated, or followed discursively, independently of 
any practical value that they might have. So that certain sets of numbers, independently 
of any use which is made of them for practical purposes, may themselves be regarded as 
constituting pattern. For example: 2,4,6,8 ... and 1,2,4,8,16 ... 
93 My italics 
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For whatever reason the numbers 1,2,3,4 ... together with certain operations for 
combining them became known as the system of 'natural numbers' and this name is 
rather appropriate. Patterns are revealed or may be discovered within the system in a 
way analogous to the natural beauty of landscapes in nature. An example of such a 
pattern is to be found amongst those numbers that cannot be expressed as a consecutive 
sum of natural numbers. Most numbers can be expressed in at least one way as a 
consecutive sum: 
6=1+2 +3 
23 = 11 + 12 
94 = 22 + 23 + 24 + 25 
However, as it turns out none of the numbers in the sequence 1,2,4,8, 16 ... can be 
expressed in this way. This sequence of numbers forms a simple pattern. Although it 
may have no apparent practical application it is clearly followable and contains an 
element of surprise when it is first discovered. It is thus likely to be a source of pleasure 
or satisfaction as it is being followed, or perhaps when it is contemplated as a whole. 
Such enjoyment provides at least an explanation for engaging in mathematics of the 
kind raised earlier by Wells and Leibeck (see page 37). So we have the possibility of 
aesthetic satisfaction simply at the exploratory stage of mathematics. 
Mathematicians are seldom content with exploring patterns. They usually seek a 
generalisation, and also a proof that the observed pattern remains so indefinitely.95 If 
such a proofis forthcoming then a result within the system is discovered. If the result 
can be used for an extra-mathematical situation then we can say that the study of pattern 
has both an aesthetic and a practical outcome. One important way in which a 
mathematical result can be said to be practical, is when it can be used to correspond to 
certain significant features of an extra-mathematical situation. So that it provides a 
mathematical model of such a situation about which information can be established 
indirectly. 
9S I am thinking here of pattern found in infinite sequences. The number of terms in a cyclic pattern is 
fmite. Nevertheless, explanation of another kind may still be sought for these. For example, one might 
want to explain why some fractions are recurring decimals and others are not. 
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A simple example can be given of these stages, using once again the natural numbers 
and an anecdote based on an episode in the childhood of the brilliant mathematician 
Gauss. At school Gauss's teacher had asked the class to find the sum of the first 100 
natural numbers. Gauss answered almost at once '5050'. He had seen that: 
(1 + 100) = (2 + 99) = (3 + 98) = ... = (100 + 1) = 101 
So that: 
(1 + 100) + (2 + 99) + (3 + 98) + ... + (100 + 1) = 100 x 101 
= 10100 
But the sum above uses the first 100 natural numbers exactly twice and hence 10100/2 
= 5050 is the required sum. The use of pattern allowed Gauss to convert a lengthy sum 
into a simple product. 
The series of numbers used above, 1, 2, 3 ... 100, is called an arithmetic progression and 
it can be seen that Gauss's observation can be generalised in order to find the sum of 
any arithmetic progression. The defining feature of this progression is the 'constant 
difference' between its terms. Thus n terms of the progression can be expressed in 
algebraic shorthand as: 
a, a + d, a + 2d, a + 3d, ... a + (n - l)d 
By adding the first and last terms we get 2a + (n - 1 )d. But also by adding the second 
term to the penultimate term we get: (a + d) + (a + (n - 2)d) = 2a + (n - l)d which is the 
same as before. It is not difficult to see that if we add the third term to the term 
immediately before the penultimate one the same result is achieved. Moreover, we can 
continue in this way for as long as we wish and the result 2a + (n - l)d will remain the 
same for the simple reason that as we always gain one 'd' from the first term in the sum 
we lose a 'd' from the second term. Clearly, if we continue n times to add pairs of terms 
in this way, like Gauss, we will have added together the n terms of the sequence twice 
since each term has been used twice. If therefore we halve the result we will have an 
expression for the sum of n terms of an 'arithmetic progression'. Algebraically, this is 
written n(2a + (n - 1 )d) / 2. 
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Now, arithmetic progressions of this kind are of practical use precisely because an 
awkward sum is converted into a manageable product. For example, if! save £5.00 of 
my earnings one month, £5.50 the next month, £6.00 the next, and so on, how much 
will I have saved in, say,S years? This looks difficult but once it is noticed that the 
amounts saved follow an arithmetic progression then a correspondence can be set up 
with relevant features of the problem and the algebraic result determined above. 
Clearly, 'a' must correspond to 5, 'd' to 0.5 and 'n' to 60, so that we have: 
60(2(5)+(60-1)(0.5))/2=30(10+29.5)= 1185 and hence I save £1185 
pounds. 
Aesthetic experience in producing mathematical arguments. 
The proof that has been given here has been based on the ideas of Gauss, and when 
written more concisely it is usually regarded as being elegant. It is somehow pleasing in 
the way it reveals a truth. Moreover, although such proofs are in a sense discovered, 
they are also constructed, and aesthetic ideals are applied in their construction; elegant 
proofs are preferred to inelegant, rambling or obscure proofs. Notice therefore that 
aesthetic satisfaction can arise not only from discovering certain features, or perhaps 
uncovering such features, since this seems to include the discursive approach to pattem-
following which I am adopting, but also from creating or, again, more neutrally, from 
constructing proofs in certain ways. In general we can refer to this as producing 
mathematical arguments. 
If this distinction between different sources of aesthetic satisfaction is not convincing, 
then another explanation might help. Once a pattern has been found in mathematics no 
more 'finding' seems to be required, nor is the way in which it was found of much 
importance. The pattern has a completeness that cannot be improved upon. On the other 
hand, the number of proofs that may be constructed to establish a mathematical result is 
indefinite. (One only has to consider the number of proofs ofthe theorem of 
Pythagoras) Some of these theorems will be deemed more elegant and, therefore more 
aesthetically pleasing, than others. 
One writer of a mathematical textbook, which sets out to teach approaches to proving 
mathematical results, has urged the student to contemplate the finished item as an object 
of admiration. Velleman(1994), in likening the construction of a proof to the quite 
haphazard ways in which a jigsaw is completed, writes: 
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When you finish ajigsaw puzzle, you don't take it apart right away, do 
you? You probably leave it out for a day or two, so you can admire it. 
You should do the same with a proof. You figured out how to fit it 
together yourself, and once it's all done, isn't it pretty? 
(pp. 82-83) 
I shall give an example of certain proofs which I recently used with able primary school 
children. The proofs in question concerned the consecutive sums discussed above. A 
proof of the general result is quite difficult, but the proof that any odd number can be 
made in this way is quite easily constructed. One proof was given as follows: if you 
halve an odd number you get two identical numbers with halves. By taking the half off 
one and adding it to the other a consecutive pair is formed. Not all the children were 
happy with this explanation and I offered an alternative: subtract one from any odd 
number and you must get an even number. Halve the even number into two identical 
whole numbers, then add the subtracted one to one of these identical numbers and once 
again you have a consecutive pair. Whether or not the children did in fact prefer this is 
an empirical matter, but what is clear is that the second proof is still arguably the more 
elegant. It is more elegant because it only involves whole numbers. 
Aesthetic experience in constructing mathematical systems 
I have discussed the place of aesthetics at the levels of uncovering pattern and 
constructing proof. Now I want to discuss a construction task of a different, though 
related, kind. This takes us into a deeper context but one which, like proof, provides 
opportunities for invoking aesthetic ideals. Once again it involves creativity, not within 
a system, but rather the creating of a system. 
Beardsley (1958) in discussing unity, an aspect of form which was mentioned earlier by 
Charlton, suggests that it makes sense to speak not simply of an object's having form, 
but of its having more or less form. He analyses formal unity into the dual ideas of 
completeness and coherence. He describes completeness as a simple property, one that 
cannot be analysed out any further. But he does add that to attribute completeness to 
visual design, at least, 'is to say that it appears to require, or call upon, nothing outside 
itself, it has all that it needs; it is all there'. A coherent design, on the other hand, he 
informs us 'contains nothing that does not belong'. He gives examples of these qualities 
in paintings and music, and also questions whether such qualities can be spoken about 
in the same way in distinct art forms. Whether such qualities can, therefore, be 
discussed in a similar way in mathematics must at the outset seem even more dubious. 
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Nevertheless, what is striking is that 'completeness' is explicitly used in mathematics, 
and 'consistency' is used alongside it, having a meaning very close to that of 
'coherence'. Both terms are most readily applied to axiomatic systems. 
The axiomatic approach has already been introduced in the discussion of Kline's and 
Sullivan's view of mathematics. It involves constructing mathematical systems which 
often represent structures which are of practical concern. For example, the structure of 
switching circuits can be represented by Boolean Algebra. That is to say that an abstract 
set of symbols has been constructed which correspond to switches and their operations, 
so that by manipulating symbols we may make accurate predictions, indirectly, about 
the behaviour of switches. The choice of axioms in a given system is to some extent 
open, and mathematicians employ aesthetic ideals, like economy, when selecting such 
axioms. In this sense it would be unpleasant to have 'redundant' axioms, a situation 
which arises when the same theorems of the system could be deduced using fewer 
axioms than those chosen. Moreover, the system must at the same time be consistent. It 
must not allow a theorem and its negation both to be deduced from the axioms. 
At this point an important difficulty arises. It has been supposed that if we wish to adopt 
the aesthetic attitude then in a sense this involves suspending considerations of the 
usefulness of mathematics. The two are mutually exclusive. However, in the contexts 
considered so far no obvious tension has arisen between the aesthetic aspects and the 
utility of mathematics. They have simply been different sides of the same coin. But a 
slight tension arises in the present context when we confront pedagogical and aesthetic 
ideals. Using the axiomatic system of the mathematical group structure as an example, 
Griffiths and Howson (1974) point out that it is often necessary to suspend the aesthetic 
ideal of economy and present students with systems that do contain redundant axioms. 
They write: 
... when setting out the group axioms it is usual to demand the 
existence of both a right and a left neutral element, and a right and a 
left inverse, whereas the existence of a right neutral element and a right 
inverse element will suffice. In doing this we select axioms which 
emphasise symmetry, and simplify technical work, i.e. are 
pedagogically desirable; rather than those that are most economical and 
therefore logically desirable. (p.230) 
They add that' ... economy of axiomatic systems tends to be an aesthetic criterion of 
mathematics rather than a practical virtue of mathematical education'. What they have 
in mind here, as well, is that it is sometimes necessary to take a point further along the 
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deductive chain from the axioms and base a pupil's mathematics upon such a point as 
though this point were an axiom when it is more correctly a theorem. Such points 
Griffiths and Howson call 'pedagogical axioms'; to use these pedagogical axioms is: 
... sometimes a way of introducing pupils to work within a branch of 
mathematics, long before they are mature enough for a detailed proof 
that the axioms are satisfied. (p.230) 
This point is well taken. All the same, it is interesting to note that symmetry, 
itself an aesthetic notion, is the pedagogical consideration which replaces the 
ideal of economy in the example given here. 
Aesthetics and utility 
So far we have considered three aspects of aesthetic experience in mathematics. These 
involve uncovering pattern; constructing proof which meet the aesthetic standards such 
as simplicity and economy; and constructing axiomatic systems from which results and 
proofs arise. I have suggested that we can at least begin to explain these aspects as 
being a source of aesthetic experience by making reference to certain principles found 
in the works of aestheticians. In this way 'aesthetics' in mathematics is intelligible and 
does provide us with some reasons for studying it. 
But even if aesthetic experience is possible and may be sought after, it still remains to 
be seen how stable this is, as a reason for learning mathematics. We have seen that the 
notion of aesthetics implies a non-purposeful attitude towards mathematics, one in 
which enjoyment is forthcoming. Nevertheless, whilst mathematics may be a source of 
pure enjoyment for a pupil, such enjoyment may not be the ultimate purpose which an 
educator has in presenting mathematics in this light. It is easier to explain this point by 
analogy with the more neutral aspect ofjascination. It is clear that the entertainment 
value of mathematical puzzles and games mentioned in the Cockcroft Report (see above 
page 51) is sui generis and that thus some learning of mathematics enlarges one's 
options in life with respect to a special kind of entertainment. Similarly, some facility in 
language can provide opportunities for entertaining one's self with crossword puzzles 
and the like. But this consideration is distinguishable from the use of mathematical 
games which an educator might make in order to motivate a pupil to learn mathematics 
for its supposed utility. Thus a pupil might be given an investigation or game, which 
does indeed fascinate him or her, but which the educator has chosen primarily because 
it embodies mathematics of some utility. So fascination in mathematics may be one 
perfectly self-sufficient terminus for learning mathematics or it might be used as a 
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means for other purposes. It is in this sense that we can speak of the fascination of 
mathematics as not being an especially stable reason for learning it, since it may always 
rest upon a sensitive line between means and ends. The same is true of aesthetics in 
mathematics. 
Sawyer, as we have seen, was prepared to define mathematics in terms of pattern. But it 
is very important to note that to invoke the aesthetic aspects of mathematics in this way 
is, for Sawyer at least, to explain only the motivation for developing mathematics. That 
is to say, that although we may agree that the aesthetic aspects of mathematics attracts 
mathematicians and therefore gives them a reason for studying and researching the 
subject, the aesthetic dimension is not for Sawyer the end of the matter. The final test in 
justifying mathematical research, for him, is whether or not the mathematician does 
serve his or her community in some way. To be sure, Sawyer uses a state of emergency 
to make his point. He sets out to justify a mathematical department in the developing 
Gold Coast during the middle of this century. He writes 'to defend mathematics in such 
circumstances purely on the grounds of its beauty is the height of heartlessness' 
(Sawyer, 1955 p.16). Nevertheless, in order for a mathematician to develop useful 
mathematics Sawyer points out that he or she must at least be interested in the subject. 
'The fascination of pattern and the logical classification of pattern must have taken hold 
of you' . This is not unrelated to the situation in which pupils are introduced to games 
during mathematics lessons. From the inside the pupil is engaging in mathematics for 
its entertainment. But, as I have said, this is quite consistent with an educator's 
justification that the value of mathematics is its usefulness. Games for the pupil, like the 
aesthetic properties for the mathematician, are a source of motivation. 
Sawyer's position is not an isolated case. More recently, Dreyfus and Eisenberg (1986) 
have written that 'one of the major goals of mathematics teaching is to lead students to 
appreciate the power and beauty of mathematical thought' . Although they are less 
explicit than Sawyer it is clear that these authors, too, are in part aiming at aesthetic 
appreciation in order to facilitate mathematical thinking. Dreyfus and Eisenberg cite 
both Poincare and Papert who are impressed by the role which aesthetics plays in 
reaching solutions. Papert in asking for the nature of mathematical aesthetics asks how 
it can drive mathematical thinking. This clearly suggests that aesthetics, here, is not 
simply an end in itself, any more than appreciating the aesthetics of an intentionally 
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persuasive speech, or appreciating the aesthetics of a marketable motor car design, is 
similarly an end in itself for the speaker or the designer. Of course, there need be 
nothing disingenuous in finding effective ways of inducing mathematical thinking, so 
long as we do not think that we have thereby solved the general question of why we 
learn mathematics. 
The non-experienced aesthetic dimension of mathematics 
Poincare's and Papert's views, to which I alluded just now, need to be drawn out a little 
further since they both identify another aspect of aesthetics in mathematics. Moreover 
this is an aspect which is supposed to be a crucial, though perhaps under-valued, 
facilitator in the process of arriving at mathematical results. Earlier we saw that there is 
an established conceptual distinction between what is aesthetic and what is purposeful. I 
now want to consider an application of 'aesthetic' in mathematics in which the contrast 
in question is not so much between the purposeful and the non-purposeful, since this 
dichotomy is one connected with a conscious attitude. Aesthetic judgement now applies 
to unconscious thought processes and it provides a different contrast, one between the 
logical and the extra-logical. Such a view has its origins in the writings of the 
mathematician Poincare. In his Mathematical Creation he writes: 
A mathematical demonstration is not a simple juxtaposition of 
syllogisms, it is syllogisms placed in a certain order, and the order in 
which these elements are placed is much more important than the 
elements themselves. (See Newman, 1956 pp. 2042-3 ) 
What concerned Poincare was how the order in which the mathematical solution arises 
from the mathematician. He gives an autobiographical account of a problem which he 
solved in stages, not all of which he was conscious of: 
Among the great number of combinations blindly formed by the 
subliminal self, almost all are without interest and without utility; but 
just for that reason they are also without effect upon the esthetic 
sensibility. Consciousness will never know them; only certain ones are 
harmonious, and, consequently, at once useful and beautiful.96 (p.2048) 
Poincare believed that those particular ideas that come to mind are those that have been 
selected unconsciously by an aesthetic sense. He does, however, think that such a 
96 I am assuming that Poincare's mention of 'utility' and 'usefulness' here are to be taken as utility and 
usefulness within mathematics. 
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selection is a function only of distinguished mathematical minds. However, his ideas 
have been taken up and developed by Seymour Papert (1993). Papert claims that 
currently we view mathematics as a subject regulated by logic, and that the reason why 
Poincare can identify the special aesthetic sense with the exceptional mathematician is 
that this sense is simply not exercised in mathematical learning. This lack of training 
Papert seems to think undermines Poincare's view that the necessary aesthetic sense in 
mathematics is reserved for the few. He carried out some empirical work on various 
people that shows that the selections of manoeuvres which they make in proving a 
mathematical result, converge towards a particular manoeuvre which leads to a fruitful 
way of proving the result. His work is empirical, but it does give some reasons for 
evaluating the stage that his experimentees all seemed to reach, which give us some 
idea what might be meant by mathematical beauty. One difficult question which does 
remain is whether one's aesthetic sense can be educated by drawing out the aesthetic 
aspects of mathematics. But even if it can be educated the purpose of this, as I have 
already suggested, is not especially stable. 
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Summary and Conclusion of Part 2 
It is important to draw things together to see what the foregoing analysis in this part 
reveals. I have shown that art and mathematics have been connected by a number of 
writers in two broad ways. Although some writers have not, as it were, gone all the way, 
amongst those who do are those who assimilate art to mathematics, and those who 
assimilate mathematics to art. The views of those who assimilate art to mathematics 
may, arguably, be set aside for the present purposes. Such views may, at their weakest, 
suggest only that mathematics is useful in art, in which case mathematics is justified 
once again, as it was in Part 1. This assimilation need not take us beyond utility. On the 
other hand, if art simply is a particular manifestation of mathematics then the rationale 
for mathematics education rests, at this point, upon the nature and justification of art. 
But the notion 'art', itself, has at least two broad senses. It can mean an art or it can 
denote thefine arts. The disparate set of activities of teaching, lighting a pipe and 
picking pockets, for example, may all be described as arts. 'Art' here modifies a skill 
but does not imply that such a skill is universally valued. Thus to say that mathematics 
is an art can scarcely be controversial. It need only imply, as we saw in my discussion of 
Fitch, that mathematics is a set of potentially useful routines. To assimilate mathematics 
to the arts in this sense is thus a fairly weak claim and has little bearing upon the 
purposes of teaching the subject, over and above reasserting its utility. 'Fine art', on the 
other hand, does usually denote artefacts of universal value which it is one task of 
education to reveal. Thus any claim which assimilates mathematics to fine art is a very 
strong one to make. Nevertheless we have seen that such claims have been made. Kline 
and Sullivan have been my main spokesmen, but many others have, in varying degrees, 
suggested by their remarks that they, too, believe that mathematics is at least associated 
with fine art in some way. Now, since they all take it for granted that art is already of 
value, these claims all provide what I have called 'justification by association'. The 
claims have been made on the strength of certain persistent features, associated with the 
development or learning of mathematics, such as creativity; aesthetic properties (in 
particular, beauty); the expression of emotion; and self-knowledge. I have tried to show 
that none of these claims is satisfactory. Whilst it can be shown that mathematics does 
provide evidence of all of the foregoing aspects, to some degree, the fine arts are better 
placed to provide each of them. Moreover, since the fine arts are much more firmly 
rooted in human perception than mathematics, the latter, I have argued, could never be 
categorised in terms of the former. 
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The upshot so far is thus negative. But more positive results do arise. My discussion 
emphasises a point often made but which is important to stress. It is that aesthetics and 
fine art are not coexistent. Thus to refuse to categorise wholeheartedly mathematics as 
fine art, is not to deny that mathematics cannot be a source of aesthetic education in 
certain ways. Aestheticians do not readily cite mathematics as an object of their study, 
but those who regard aesthetics as a special kind of perception, or better still an attitude, 
have to admit that almost anything can be a subject for aesthetic experience. The formal 
properties of pattern in mathematics are thus a strong candidate for such experience. 
But there are other aspects of mathematics where aesthetic ideals such as elegance and 
economy are appropriately striven after. In addition it seems that an aesthetic sense 
regulates the production of mathematical results, not in intentional attentive activity but 
within the unconscious mind. This I have called aesthetic non-experience. 
As the aesthetic aspects of mathematics have some clear educational implications I shall 
spell these out a little more. I have endorsed the claim that there are aspects of 
mathematics that can provide a source of aesthetic experience of a certain kind. Since 
such experience is a form of enjoyment it follows that mathematics may be pursued, in 
part at least, for this reason. At one level such enjoyment arises simply from exploring 
the ubiquitous patterns in mathematics - both following them discursively and 
contemplating the unity expressed in their summary formulae perhaps. At another level 
one may not simply marvel at the aspects which are already within mathematics. One 
can playa part in producing mathematical arguments which establish results already 
perhaps revealed in patterns. At this level aesthetic experience is gained in meeting 
aesthetic ideals, such as conciseness. Mathematical arguments, some of which may be 
formally accepted as proofs, may be presented in ways which are pleasing to follow and 
contemplate. Of course one need not produce mathematical arguments. At the first level 
of engagement one can still appreciate the arguments that others have produced. At yet 
another level one may even construct, not simply mathematical arguments, but a whole 
mathematical system which provides the source of mathematical argument. Such a 
system is typically subject to meeting aesthetics ideals of economy and thus elegance, 
for example. Finally, it may be possible either through the level just outlined or by other 
means, to increase my aesthetic sense to the extent that more sustained mathematical 
'problem-solving' is facilitated unconsciously. There are, thus, levels of engagement in 
mathematics all of which, with the exception of the last, provide direct opportunities for 
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enjoyment. Since we may thus enrich our lives, nourish ourselves or find entertainment 
in mathematics, it has in this respect educational value beyond utility. 
However, what is not clear is how accessible this enjoyment is and thus whether it is 
more easily sought elsewhere on the curriculum. Even if it is fairly accessible, and 
writers, as we have seen, are less clear on this as the remarks from Leibeck, Poincare, 
Young and Papert, for example, have shown, more might be expected of an educator 
than is normally supposed in order to ensure that pupils come to avail themselves of 
such aesthetic experience. More empirical work is needed of the kind outlined by 
Papert (1993) and Dreyfus & Eisenberg (1986) in order to throw light upon this 
question. 
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Part 3 - Mathematics and Mental Training 
Chapter 8 - Mathematics as a form of mental training 
Mathematics as a vehicle 
In Part 1 I introduced the idea that mathematics provides a form of mental training. 
There, I was more concerned to see whether or not mental training was yet another 
example of the usefulness of mathematics alongside the other typical examples that 
have been continually set out in rationales for learning the subject. We saw briefly how 
Plato in antiquity and Fitch at the end of the nineteenth century had both distinguished 
mental training from the purely practical purposes of mathematics. We saw, too, that 
whether or not this distinction could be maintained depends upon how much the notion 
of 'usefulness' is extended. Whitehead, in suggesting that mathematics can provide a 
kind of mental training, was quite prepared to suggest that such training was part of the 
utility of mathematics. Perry, too, in his zeal, attributed almost all of the value of 
mathematics to its usefulness and Davis and Hersh, with a touch of irony, followed suit. 
I have suggested already that we do have certain grounds for marking off the purely 
practical purposes of mathematics from the mental training purpose. This is because 
when it is said that mathematics has practical value this usually means that it is of 
direct, if not immediate, fairly specific use to whoever has learnt it. As I remarked in 
Part 1, counting and elementary arithmetic are amongst the clearest examples of the 
practical aspects of mathematics which are useful for everyone. But the direct, practical 
use of certain aspects of mathematics, whether immediate or not, may be contrasted 
with a different use of mathematics, namely, that use which is made by an educator to 
achieve a less specifically mathematical long-term purpose. It is within this more 
general educational purpose that theorists often place the value of mathematics as a 
form of mental training. Moreover, even if an individual, whose mind is trained by 
mathematics, can now do something that he or she could not do before training, this 
need not involve the conscious or unconscious application of mathematics by that 
individual. But as I hope to show, certain theories of mental training do not simply 
involve an individual's being able to do something, and this strengthens my resolve to 
122 
maintain a distinction between the mental training purpose and the more 
straightforward practical usefulness of mathematics. 
If the practical utility of mathematics is best characterised by regarding it a something 
of a tool, then a helpful characterisation of the mental training purpose may be made by 
regarding mathematics more as a vehicle. But mathematics is not only a vehicle for this 
particular educational purpose, it has also been a vehicle for displaying the unusual gifts 
or special techniques of so-called 'calculating prodigies'. Ogilvy and Anderson (1966) 
give a vivid account of one or two of such prodigies. In the nineteenth century they cite 
Zerah Colburn who at the age of nine succeeded, amongst other things, in raising the 
number 8 to the sixteenth power, 281,474,976,710,656. Another example they give is of 
Zacharias Dase, a German born in 1847, who had reckoned out the natural logarithms 
(7 places) of the numbers from 1 to 1,005,000. In 1850 Dase went to England to earn 
money by exhibitions of his talents. Such prodigies, then, provide examples of 
mathematics being used not primarily as a convenient tool for solving everyday 
problems, but more for the entertainment of others, as mathematics is used as a vehicle 
for certain individuals to exhibit their mental prowess, even if such displays like these 
are perhaps rare nowadays.97 
The entertainment aspect is broad enough to include almost all of the material discussed 
in Part 2 under art and aesthetics.98 What I want to show now is how mathematics 
considered as a vehicle is supposed to have an additional purpose, other than mere 
entertainment, which makes it a fit subject for mental training.99 
97 Ogilvy and Anderson (1988) add: 'When a Colburn or a Dase multiplied two large numbers together in 
one twentieth of the time it would take to do the arithmetic by longhand, people were impressed partly 
because there was no other way to get the answer. But, now, when a machine can do the same "problem" 
in a twenty-thousandth of the time, with virtually no chance of error, the human performance, while just 
as noteworthy as it always was, fails to make the same impression. It happens that there have been no 
famous calculating boys in the twentieth century. When the next one turns up, it is a safe bet that his 
appearance will cause little stir' (pp. 106-107). Nevertheless, it does seem that at least one female, who, 
even if she is not regarded as a 'calculating prodigy' can still cause something ofa 'stir' Consider the 
attention which Carol Vorderman has attracted since her long-standing regular appearance on the 
television programme COUNTDOWN. 
98 I say 'almost all' of this material. If mathematics were a fme art in respect of its having the value which 
White attributes to it, namely, that it can give us a particular kind of self knowledge, then mathematics 
would hardly be entertainment, or at least it would not be solely this. 
99 But even if we leave aside the exceptional cases of mathematical virtuosity, it still seems to be the case 
that mathematics may be used as a vehicle for display in such contexts as public examinations. 
Mathematics is often regarded as a particularly suitable way of displaying intellect. Indeed at least one 
psychologist (Skemp, 1971) has claimed that mathematics is a form of intelligence. So that displays of 
mathematics are displays of intelligence. Of course when such tests are used with the sole purpose of 
assigning a measure of intelligence, then mathematics may be regarded as a tool. 
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The ambiguity of 'mental exercise' 
One question that I want to raise straightaway, however, concerns the extent to which 
display entails improvement or development of some kind. Suppose that I show my 
disapproval at something. Whilst this display might bring me some satisfaction, it 
would be odd to suggest that in displaying disapproval I thereby improve or extend my 
ability to disapprove or become more disposed to disapprove on future occasions. Thus 
a display of disapproval is in this sense mere display. Sometimes, 'exercise' is used in a 
similar way, so that when I exercise my authority in a given situation I exhibit it. But my 
authority is not increased by such exercise. On the other hand, in displaying physical 
skills I am sometimes also exercising the body and may even thereby improve or extend 
its capability. I display my skill at lifting a heavy object and thereby may reasonably 
suppose that, on some occasions at least, I improve my strength as a result of such 
exerCIse. 
The question now is to what extent mathematical 'exercise' is mere display, or whether 
such exercise typically improves or extends the mind in some way. I remarked above 
that a calculation prodigy uses mathematics as a vehicle to displays his or her 'mental 
prowess'. But the question is whether such display improves the mental prowess, of the 
kind that the prodigy is supposed to have, in a way analogous to lifting a heavy weight; 
or whether it is mere display. Ifit is mere display, then to invoke mathematics as a 
vehicle at this point may seem to have little bearing upon its justification for purposes 
other than recreation or entertainment. Of course there is a sense in which 
'mathematical exercises' are set up for the sole purpose of practising routines with the 
reasonable expectation that mathematical knowledge will thereby be extended. In this 
sense mental exercises are analogous to physical exercises. But this use of 'exercise' is 
not the one that writers always have in mind. For example, R.K. Elliot (1975) writes: 
It seems obvious that rigorous and systematic disciplines -
'Mathematics, Physics, History, and Philosophy, for example - provide 
great scope for the exercise of the powers of understanding, and are 
about things that matter; and it seems obvious, therefore, that at an 
appropriate age children should be introduced to disciplines of this 
kind ... 100 (p.59) 
Elliot appears to be invoking mathematics as a vehicle for challenging the powers of 
understanding. Moreover, his use of 'exercise' suggests that engagement in 
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mathematics does indeed have an effect analogous to physical exercise, rather than the 
mere exercise of authority. In other words, that mathematics not only provides 
opportunities for exhibiting mental behaviour of a certain kind, but also thereby 
improves, develops or extends such behaviour. As I have suggested, when we speak of 
'exercising our authority' we mean only that our authority is being used or appealed to. 
In physical contexts, unlike mental contexts, it seems to be harder to distinguish 
exhibition from development or improvement. When we take up a sport as exercise, this 
allows us to exhibit physical perfonnance and typically, if not necessarily, to increase 
our strength or agility. But the assumption that the same occurs in the mental context is 
questionable. Elliot wants to justify mathematics, and other subjects, partly as a form of 
mental exercise. But we need to be sure that the notion of exercise can be applied to 
mental and physical contexts in a similar way. Another example in which exercise may 
be mere display is in the context of a quiz. Here, the quiz is a vehicle which provides 
opportunity for exhibiting knowledge. But it is still an open question whether one's 
knowledge is extended through a quiz especially if those taking part are not given the 
answers but only an indication of whether or not their answers are correct or not. 
The foregoing discussion shows that it is important to clarify carefully the nature of any 
mental training justification for learning mathematics. If' exercise' is one of the 
preferred ways of drawing out this special role of mathematics, and if mathematics is 
thus being used as a vehicle, then we must be clear that it exercises and improves the 
mind, and be assured that it is not mere display. But the view that mathematics does 
provide certain special opportunities has had a long history, and as we shall see it takes 
on a variety of fonns. Although this particular rationale for mathematics education has 
not been emphasised in the last few decades as it was previously, it is still a view which 
is upheld in influential educational documents. I shall give three examples of these. 
Recent statements of mental training as a justification for learning 
mathematics 
(i) The 'Handbook o/Suggestions' 
The Handbook o/Suggestions from the HMI series 'Mathematics 5-11' (1979) 
acknowledges that one of the purposes of teaching mathematics is that mathematics 
100 M . I· Y Ita ICS 
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trains the mind. A little more is said about the mental training claim. It seems that it is 
'open to abuse': 
Mathematics can provide a valuable mental training, but many other 
things can do this just as well; and mathematics cannot be justified on 
this ground alone if it deteriorates into stereotyped working to rule, 
with the higher functions of the mind neglected. Mathematics can be 
justified as a training for the mind, but the training also needs to serve 
other purposes which can be understood by the pupil at the time. There 
is something wrong with the teaching ifthe reply to 'Wh~ are we 
learning this?' has to be 'You will understand later on!' 1 1 (pp.4-S) 
But suppose that such mental training does not 'deteriorate into stereotyped working to 
rule, with the higher functions of the mind neglected' , how and why can mathematics be 
then justified on the grounds that it provides mental training? The above passage from 
the booklet states that it can provide such training, but nowhere in this publication does 
it say how, and hence an answer to this question must be sought elsewhere. Moreover to 
satisfy the demands of this HMI document, at least, we would need to be clear about 
certain other notions. We would need to consider not only what is meant by 
'stereotyped working to rule' and the nature of the 'higher functions of the mind', but 
also certain other fundamental aspects of the nature of mental training arising from the 
above extract. These may be summarised as follows: 
(i) Training the mind is not exclusive to mathematics. 102 
(ii) The learning of mathematics per se is not sufficient for such training; certain 
pedagogical conditions are also necessary. 
(iii) The effects or value of the type of mental training achieved through the learning of 
mathematics in the required way may not be something that is immediately obvious to 
the pupil, and mathematics must also have some instantly recognisable worth of some 
kind. 
(iv) Implicit in this passage is a distinction between two senses of training which may 
take on the form of a dilemma: there is training as mere repetition or drill, which is 
thought to be somehow wrong, and training which requires (or promotes) intelligence. 
101 My italics 
102 This much we have seen is true of writers like R.K. Elliot who also includes physics, history, and 
philosophy, alongside mathematics, as suitable for exercising the mental powers. 
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'Mere repetition or drill' versus 'intelligence' 
The ambivalence concerning the nature of mental training in the document is not simply 
a muddle. We shall see that the whole ideal of mental training is characterised by 
different aspects of mathematics, which are supposed to be significant in such training. 
One way that I want to draw out these aspects will be in tenns of a duality between 
what I shall call the contemplative and the procedural aspects of the subject. The 
reference to 'mere repetition or drill' in the HMI document, I hope to show, can be 
aligned somewhat towards the procedural aspects of mathematics, whilst the reference 
to 'intelligence' might be considered, in part, to link more with the contemplative 
aspects. I say 'in part' because intelligence may be displayed in practice as well as in 
reflection. The correspondence is not by any means perfect but it will draw out what I 
think is one of the perennial dualities implicit in mental training aims in mathematical 
education, from ancient times to the present day. I shall be discussing this duality in 
detail using in particular Plato and Descartes as important theorists who draw out the 
reflective and procedural aspects of mathematics for mental training ends. 
'You will understand later on!' 
I remarked earlier that one of my reasons for supporting the view that mental training is 
not mere utility was that the mental training aim is sometimes a long-tenn aim. The 
HMI document, too, seems to assume that a long-tenn aim is at stake in mental training, 
and this is seen as presenting a particular kind of conflict for the pupil. I shall discuss 
another aspect of mathematics that is supposed to provide a relatively short-tenn aim of 
mental training since various theorists have pointed out that there is something rather 
simple, and immediate about mathematical evidence that makes it an ideal source of 
mental training. This view can be traced back at least as far as 8t. Augustine, and is 
drawn out particularly well in the nineteenth century by Thomas Tate whose account 
amongst other more recent related ones will be discussed below. 
(iiJ The Cockcroft Report 
The HMI booklet does not, however, present an isolated case for mental training in 
recent years. Mathematics counts (Cockroft et aI, 1982), also suggests that mathematics 
can be justified as a form of mental training and this is more explicitly given as 'powers 
oflogical thinking, accuracy and spatial awareness' (p.2). The report goes on to 
reiterate the cautionary remarks of the earlier document noting that it ' ... depends upon 
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the way in which mathematics is taught' and also that' ... the study of a number of other 
subjects can develop these powers as well'. Whether or not 'accuracy' in general, rather 
than simply mathematical accuracy, can be improved by learning mathematics is 
questionable. The same seems to be true of 'spatial awareness' though this is often an 
assumption that teachers make from time to time in teaching 'shape and space'. But the 
belief that 'logical thinking' is developed through mathematics has been an established 
view. Mathematics is, in a sense, a logical discipline, though sometimes there seems to 
be confusion regarding the question of whether a logical mind is presupposed for 
learning mathematics, or whether a logical mind is the result of learning it. This aspect 
of mental training will be addressed in my discussion of what I am calling the 
'procedural aspects' of mathematics. 
(iii) The National Curriculum in France 
It is interesting to note that the current National Curriculum in France also embodies the 
belief that one of the purposes of mathematics education is to provide something more 
than utility. Writing about the provision for the country's lower secondary aged pupils 
Howson (1991) writes: 
In a manner which hints at 'old-fashioned' faculty psychology but 
which, nevertheless, must still have some justification, it is pointed out 
that mathematics education should assist the intellectual development 
of the pupil through: 
developing reasoning powers: observation, analysis, deductive thought; 
stimulating the imagination; 
promoting the habit of clear expression, both written and oral; 
stressing the qualities of proceeding methodically and with care. (p.74) 
I will not say much about these supposed purposes of mathematics. Some of them, 
'developing reasoning powers', 'deductive thought' and 'stimulating the imagination', 
all arise in my discussion of contemplative and procedural aspects. What I have already 
said about the 'accuracy' purpose of the Cockcroft report, I think, can be said equally of 
certain aims of the French National Curriculum such as promotion of 'clear expression' 
and 'care'. The latter notion of 'care' however might very well be harnessed to the idea 
of reasoning and logic. As it stands it is too vague to elaborate upon. 
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The main point of outlining the latter two sources is to show that the belief in such 
extra-utility reasons for learning mathematics is still very much alive today. But since 
these beliefs are expressed in rather pithy expressions, the need to examine such claims 
that mathematics can train the mind is essential if it is to provide a rigorous means of 
justifying the learning of mathematics. So far, I have spoken of 'mental training' in this 
part of my account, as I did in the first part, as though it were a clear notion. This is not 
the case. Indeed, writers do not always use the expression 'mental training'. In some 
cases writers seem to be referring to something like 'character training' where certain 
dispositions are to be acquired. At other times it is more like an ability which is desired. 
Sometimes it is rather more like a special fonn of knowledge such as 'wisdom', 
'sagacity' or 'intelligence'. I shall continue to use the expression 'mental training', as a 
convenient way of referring to all of these, but the varieties of mental training will be 
drawn out in the following discussion. 
The concept of mental training 
If we consider firstly the general concept of training we see at once that it is a broad 
notion. We not only speak of 'toilet training' for infants, 'house training' for animals, 
but also of training plants to grow through a trellis for example, and of training the hair 
on our head to grow in a certain fashion. Sportsmen and musicians train, too, and so do 
teachers, scientists and scholars. The first question to answer is whether or not these 
examples of training all have something in common that can help us to detennine the 
precise nature of mental training. Certainly the outcome of the training in all of these 
cases is that some intentional change, on behalf of the trainer, has taken place in 
whoever or whatever it is that is being trained. But although this might be set out as a 
necessary condition of training it is not sufficient. Intentional changes might follow as a 
direct result of chemicals, or medication of some kind, so that the method used for 
making intentional changes plays a criterial role in all except perhaps certain borderline 
cases. What is usually required is intentional change as a direct result of the efforts of 
the trainer. 
More can be said about methods of training. Training involves some measure of 
repetition and in many cases application to different situations. We do not usually train 
something or somebody by a single action or even a few attempts. Training a plant 
seems to be a borderline case in this respect if all that is required of the trainer is his or 
her weaving it through a trellis. Nevertheless, even here, as elsewhere the trainer must 
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always be aware of the particular kind of change required and will be prepared to 
intervene if the training is not succeeding. So training seems to imply that during some 
period of time there is always the possibility that the required change will go off course 
and repeated intervention is expected. Not only is training usually restricted to a certain 
context, training to be an actor, for example, is linked to the context of entertainment, 
there is also a sense in which training has relatively specific ends. This is certainly true 
of simple cases of training, like drill. But we have to be careful here since teacher 
training, for example, is far from being a closed and precise activity. Nevertheless, to 
the extent that we can speak of teacher training rather than teacher education certain 
fairly clearly specified goals are implicit and also a measure of repetition is required. 
But as training is applied to more complex cases, like teaching, the importance of 
application to a variety of situations both familiar and novel becomes important, even if 
those situations are themselves set within fairly specified bounds. 
The intentional change that a trainer brings about, through a certain method, does have 
its limits. We can train many people in life saving, some people in heart surgery and no 
one in fortune telling. Something or somebody can only be trained in that for which 
they already have a capacity and maybe even a tendency or inclination of some kind. 
The hair and the plant that we train already grow, but it is the direction of the growth 
that is important to the trainer. To leave something untrained is to let it follow its own 
tendencies which may appear to be random or capricious, yet which often might be 
those which are linked to other important natural functions which have purposes 
intrinsic to them. Thus to train something or someone is often to set out to do 
something against an inclination to do otherwise, and a trainer will usually have a 
purpose for training, or is, in principle at least, always accountable in this respect. But 
often the training is voluntary and the trainee is aware that the trainer will be intending 
to make changes of some kind. A potential lifesaver already has a capacity to save lives. 
He or she can swim well, can keep a cool head, has a degree of courage and is prepared 
to take some risks. The trainer builds upon these prerequisites, extends them and 
introduces others necessary for the desired end. The trainee surgeon already has some 
knowledge that will need to be extended. More importantly, he or she will be trained to 
be able to apply that knowledge to a range of novel situations of which the trainer has 
usually had experience and is in a position to provide instruction, demonstration, 
exercise, praise, correction and warning. 
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We could, perhaps, generalise this idea of tendency to all cases of training. For example 
we might want to say that the untrained footballer who once had a natural tendency to 
kick a ball has, after training, a tendency to kick the ball more efficiently, accurately and 
purposefully. Similarly, we might say that the would-be scholar who had a natural 
tendency to research tends to be, after training, scrupulous and unprejudiced in his or 
her discussions and arguments, or much more so than hitherto. But we should not 
stretch this notion of tendency too far. Training involves learning103 and often 
knowledge and understanding. Yet to distinguish training from mere teaching it is 
helpful to consider it as also involving modified tendencies, or inclinations. In short, 
training sets out to form fairly settled dispositions in its trainees. 
By considering the degrees of knowledge and understanding involved in training of 
various kinds, and the extent to which application to novel situations is important, there 
appears to be a training continuum. At one end training constitutes a drill, where one is 
trained to carry out some relatively simple task as second nature. At the other end some 
settled disposition is expected as part of the training and a considerable degree of 
understanding is required too. A trained surgeon carries out skilled procedures, which 
might otherwise have been rules of thumb. He no longer has to rely on sheer luck. But 
the procedures of the trained surgeon whilst involving repetition and even some drill, 
are complex and cannot be solely a matter of drill; some understanding and deliberation 
is necessary in such cases. The same is true of teacher training. A teacher is not trained 
merely by drill. Knowledge and understanding are involved as well, though these are 
not sufficient. The training will involve, as it does for the surgeon, applying knowledge 
to situations under the guidance of one who is experienced in such situations. 
On this account of the concept of training, 'mental training' involves a desirable, 
intentional, mental change taking place in individuals who already have some capacity 
for such change, by the continual intervention of a trainer. Some kind of settled mental 
disposition would be required too. Such training might range from mere drill, on the 
one hand, to a training which involves knowledge and understanding, applied to a range 
of situations, on the other. This much can be inferred from the HMI document above. 
103 This cannot be true of plants and hair since they are not agents and do not learn to do anything. Indeed 
for more passive recipients of training the best we can say is that training implies that some change has 
taken place usually by some repetition such that a certain tendency has been overridden and replaced by 
another supposed better one. 
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But it still leaves unanswered the question of how mathematics can train the mind, and 
even if it can what kind of specific mental change is forthcoming from this process. 
In learning mathematics, as in any other subject, we may acquire a capacity which is 
either dangerous or useless. 104 So if mental training is worth having we shall still need 
to know why. The obvious answer seems to be that such training will be of use to us, 
but this means that the distinction which I have been trying to uphold, between learning 
mathematics for utility and non-utility reasons begins to collapse. On the other hand if 
mental training is some kind of modified tendency, settled disposition or valued 
character trait, such training might contribute to our personal well-being in a way that 
utility does not, of if it does, only indirectly. Whatever the outcome of such training, 
however, we must be sure that it is not simply the ability to do mathematics or even the 
tendency or disposition to do or want to do mathematics, otherwise this supposed 
justification for learning mathematics will be circular. 
104 For a discussion of this point see Passmore (1980) 
132 
Chapter 9 - Self mastery 
Meditation - Training the restless mind to become calm - a test case 
A clear example of mental training, which satisfies at least some of the criteria for 
mental training outlined in the previous section, is to be found in meditation. This is an 
activity undertaken not only in religious contexts, where it is a means of reaching a 
mental state of devotion, but also more recently in the secular context of therapy where 
it is advocated as a form of stress relief. The stress in question is mental stress, which, it 
is supposed, can be relieved by the particular process of mediation. The need for 
meditation arises for many of its advocates from the undesirable natural tendency of the 
untrained mind to flit from one object to another. Thus meditation is a form of training 
which is supposed to submit the mind to conscious control. It is believed that such 
control will promote mental health and well-being. 
This method of training is easy to describe in general terms. Unlike the training 
discussed above, in meditation one is usually one's own trainer. According to many 
accounts, this training simply involves trying to focus all of one's attention upon a fixed 
object of one's choice. Whenever the mind wanders off this object, which it frequently 
does in the early stages at least, the attention is to be brought back gently to the object 
of focus again. With practice the ability to focus is gradually prolonged and the benefits, 
some of which are supposed to be immediate, are increased. But it is not essential for 
this training to contemplate a fixed object. A more discursive procedure is also suitable 
using for example the first ten counting numbers. So that slowly counting from one to 
ten, repeatedly, attending to nothing else but each number in turn is one method of 
training the mind. In an extremely minimal sense, then, we can say that some 
mathematics may be used in meditation for mental training. We can agree, too, that 
other subjects will do just as well, simply because the nature of the subject matter is of 
little importance. But it is not even necessary to carry out a cyclic activity of this kind 
since, according to its practitioners, there are other suitable procedures. Meditation may 
be carried out simply by contemplating any object of one's choice. So that within 
meditation we find that the two aspects which I mentioned earlier, the contemplative 
and the procedural, can both be at work in this simple but clear test case. 
Meditation, then, provides us with one extremely simple model of mental training 
where mathematics can be used to train the mind to become 'still'. The end state is a 
state of mental change and it is a valuable one too, since it is one of personal well-
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being. But the particular use of mathematics which I have given is extremely minimal 
since the only aspect which is operative is sequential order. Two important aspects of 
mathematics are its concern with quantity, and deductive reasoning. In meditation no 
use is made of either of these aspects. In fact any ordered set of repeated words would 
be just as effective. Moreover the process is one of drill, to the extent that no additional 
knowledge or understanding, over and above the training method and its expected 
outcome, is essential. In particular one does not need to study mathematics for this kind 
of training. So the learning of mathematics could hardly be justified for this purpose. 
But the case of meditation is helpful. It shows that the outcome of mental training need 
not involve the mind's being able to do something. Certainly one has to practise the 
focusing technique, and this takes time and patience, but the outcome is not simply a 
skill in focusing. The fruits of meditation presuppose success in focusing the mind so 
that meditation trains the mind to be still or calm. It does not give the meditator some 
specific ability of any kind, though of course it may remove certain obstacles preventing 
other abilities from being formed. For example it may provide certain conditions for 
aesthetic experience, since as we have seen this involves a kind of detached 
contemplative attention. What I want to emphasise, is that since meditation clearly 
involves control, it forms part of what we may call 'self-mastery'. I have chosen this 
particular expression since it is the one adopted by at least one important theorist who 
did believe that mathematics played a central role in a particular kind of mental training. 
Thus we may broaden this simple test case of meditation into something more 
substantial. 
I should point out that I am not concerned with any function that meditation might have 
in special contexts like, for example, religious ritual. I have been considering the most 
simple of cases where an overactive mind needs to be calmed by some mechanistic 
drill. Nor do I want to suggest that meditation is a way of combating the dominance of 
certain desires. I want to remain neutral about the kind of thing that is causing unrest in 
the individual. Nothing in my account should suggest that the meditator wants to reach 
a calm state for any other reason than that the current state is uncomfortable and 
prevents him or her from flourishing in some way. My account, then, entails no further 
moral considerations of this discomfort. Indeed the mental turbulence or unrest may just 
as well be the result of considerable time spent in altruistic actions, abstract 
speculations or avaricious planning. 
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What we now must seek are fairly clearly-cut examples of mental training, like 
meditation, where the outcome of the training is characterised as some kind of extra-
mathematical human well-being, but where mathematics is supposed to play an 
essential role. These I believe can certainly be found in the works of Plato and to some 
extent in Descartes. Like most rationalist philosophers these men took mathematics as 
either the starting point, or the essence, of knowledge, and so it is the question of how 
the acquisition of knowledge may be regarded as training, in a non-trivial and non-
circular sense, which needs to be drawn out. Even if Plato and Descartes do not always 
explicitly refer to mathematics as a form of 'training' then certain of their commentators 
certainly do. In this respect these two philosophers in their different ways will form the 
backbone of my enquiry. 
Plato and self-mastery 
Education as a tranquilliser. 
In his examination of the nature of the just state, in The Republic, Plato draws his 
attention away from the state and directs it towards the soul of the individual. He makes 
an analysis of the soul expecting to find there, features analogous to those of the state. 
Improvement amongst these features he hopes will thus lead to the just state. The soul, 
he argues, has different elements. It has both an irrational appetitive part and also a 
reflective reasoning part, which are potentially in conflict and need to be kept in 
balance. In order to achieve order amongst them a measure of self-mastery is required. 
He explains what he means by the expression self-mastery in the following way: 
'What the expression is intended to mean, I think, is that there is a 
better and a worse element in the personality of each individual, and 
that when the naturally better element controls the worse then the man 
is said to be "master of himself', as a term of praise. But when (as a 
result of bad upbringing or bad company) the smaller forces of one's 
better element are overpowered by the numerical superiority of one's 
worse, the one is adversely criticized and said not to be master of 
oneself and to be in a state of indiscipline' (Plato, 1955 edn p.201). 
Self-mastery/os then, occurs when 'the better part' of the personality 'rules the worse'. 
So here Plato has described a situation similar to that which the stress therapists is 
lOS Elsewhere, too, Plato draws a similar picture of the soul: 
' ... within each of us there are two sorts of ruling or guiding principle that we follow. One is an innate 
desire for pleasure, the other an acquired judgement that aims at what is best. Sometimes these internal 
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confronted with before meditation. In both cases there is some kind of over-active state 
which has somehow to be stilled, or a tension which needs to be resolved. Of course 
there is a difference between the two. The stress from which an individual suffers need 
only be temporary and not a settled part of his or her nature. All the same, meditation is 
seen as providing some kind of control. Moreover, the therapist need not speak of 
wrong and right/orees, only, more neutrally, of comfortable and uncomfortable mental 
states. For Plato, however, the initial condition is more specifically a moral case of 
wrong and right forces. The wrong forces are the passions that need to be kept in check. 
He draws a picture in which the mind consists of two elements, reason and passion, 
which are in potential conflict. To these two elements he adds a further irreducible one 
of 'spirit', which is exemplified by the part of the individual that becomes angry, or 
indignant, when one has given way to irrational appetite. But whilst it is a third element, 
Plato points out that it fights' on the side of reason'. Goodness arises from the harmony 
among these three elements. 
We have seen that the therapist typically recommends a repetitive method of stilling the 
mind. For Plato, on the other hand, an education programme is required in which a 
harmony among the three elements of the mind is achieved by: 
, ... a combination of intellectual and physical training, which tunes up 
the reason by a training in rational argument and higher studies, and 
tones down and soothes the element of "spirit" by harmony and 
rhythm'. (plato, 1955 edn p. 219) 
So the initial conditions of the individual before training in 'rational argument', and the 
individual before meditation, are strikingly similar. There is also a similarity in outcome 
in both cases. The fruits of meditation such as tranquillity and peace of mind, are also 
gained by Plato's training in self-mastery, as Charles Taylor (1989) clearly points out in 
his discussion of Plato and self-mastery: 
guides are in accord, sometimes at variance; now one gains the mastery, now the other. And when 
judgement guides us rationally toward what is best, and has the mastery, that mastery is called 
temperance, but when desire drags us irrationally toward pleasure, and has come to rule within us, the 
name given to given to that rule is wantonness ... (See Phaedrus 237d - 238 in Hamilton and Huntingdon, 
1961 my italics) 
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Besides being at one with himself, the person ruled by reason also 
enjoys calm, while the desiring person is constantly agitated and 
unquiet, constantly pulled this way and that by his cravings ... The 
mastery of self through reason brings with it these three fruits: unity 
with oneself, calm and collected self-possession. (p.116) 
It is worth pointing out that Plato's account of self-mastery was set out in opposition to 
at least two rival dominant outlooks. One of these was a warrior morality where as , , 
Taylor describes it: 
... what is valued is strength, courage, and the ability to conceive and 
execute great deeds, and where life is aimed at fame and glory, and the 
immortality one enjoys when one's name lives for ever on men's lips. 
The higher moral condition here is where one is filled with a surge of 
energy, an access of strength and courage - e.g., on the battlefield - and 
is able to sweep all before one. It is not only different from but quite 
incompatible with the reflective and self-collected stance of rational 
contemplation (p.117). 
The other, related, rival view to Plato's was one which I touched on earlier. It is, as 
Taylor puts it, a view which 'exalts a state of manic inspiration in which poets create'. 
So there are clear similarities between the initial states of the individual who is in need 
of meditation (see above pp 82-83) and the individual who Plato believes is in need of 
education. There are also similarities in the training outcomes. The particular difference 
between them is the kind of training involved. We have seen what kind of training the 
therapist recommends; Plato's goal is secured by different means. It is secured by 
ensuring that the individual is ruled by reason, and since mathematics plays a 
substantial role in this, we have one of the first accounts of how mathematics may train 
the mind. 
Education as a stimulant - a subtle shift. 
What I want to be able to show is how Plato's higher educational programme, with 
mathematics at its core, is supposed to provide a certain kind of peace of mind. Yet it 
must be pointed out that the nature of the struggle between the passions, spirit and 
reason, seems to be transformed by Plato during The Republic, in a rather special way 
before higher education enters the picture. We expect education to be introduced as a 
remedy for reconciling internal conflict, given the picture of the individual's initial 
plight and the rival moral outlooks which Plato set out to replace. What does finally 
emerge, however, is a programme which addresses a particular appetite, namely the 
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passion for knowledge. Indeed those who are unfit to train as philosophers are precisely 
those who lack a thirst for truth. Far from remedying the dominance of passion, 
education seems to presuppose it. 106 This transfonnation allows the struggle between 
appetite and reason to be displaced by something milder, namely, a contrast between 
perception and knowledge, since to have a passion for knowledge is to transcend mere 
sense perception. The emphasis is now placed on the propensity for most individuals to 
use their senses, rather than pure intellect, not only as a first resort but also typically as 
the sole means in seeking 'knowledge' .107 There are of course connections between the 
senses and irrational appetite, but the upshot of this shift of emphasis is that education 
is not now so plausibly characterised as a calming agent, but as the means of stirring the 
individual into action. The passion for knowledge it seems needs to be aroused and 
maintained. The picture of the initial condition that we now have, is of an individual 
who is not necessarily struggling with his passions, but who may be complacent, 
believing that what is to be perceived is all there is. So, paradoxically and more 
importantly, unlike meditation,108 education will be something of a stimulant rather than 
a tranquilliser. 
The shift is effected smoothly by the particular example of beauty that Plato uses in 
drawing out the qualities of the philosopher. Plato has used a cunning example here, 
since the quest for beauty appeals both to the appetite, on the one hand, and to reflective 
reason on the other. Plato begins by allowing Socrates to show that his interlocutor's 
all-consuming passion for beauty is all of a piece with the thoroughgoing quest of the 
philosopher. Socrates remarks to Glaucon: 
' ... anyone as susceptible as you should surely remember that those of 
your amorous temperament are always getting bitten with a passion for 
boys in the bloom of youth, and think they all deserve attention and 
affection' (plato, 1955 edn p.267). 
Far from suggesting that this passionate response needs to be kept in check as it may 
conflict with other internal forces, Plato contrasts it with the more dilettante 
106 A analogous position can be drawn in religion. We might say that religion is a remedy for those whose 
outlook is materialistic and at the mercy of the appetite. Yet evangelists are often construed as the 
~assionate ones who are preaching to those who are complacent. 
07 I have put 'knowledge' here in inverted commas because knowledge for Plato could not be achieved 
from the senses. 
108 It is perhaps not wholly correct to construe meditation merely as a calming activity. Experienced 
meditators would surely suggest that the fruits of meditation, including as they do such goods as self 
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characteristics of ordinary people. He wants to bring out the point that one who really 
loves something loves all of it. In this case he is suggesting that Glaucon loves all 
examples of beautiful youths. The philosopher, too, must love everything; he must not 
be fussy. Indeed far from keeping the passions in check, the passion for loving 
knowledge must have no bounds. It is not, of course, the case that Glaucon has the 
wherewithal of a philosopher simply because he has such a passion for all beautiful 
objects of a certain kind. But it is the intensity of this passion which, when extended 
further, distinguishes philosophers from non-philosophers. As Socrates explains: 
'Those who love looking and listening are delighted by beautiful 
sounds and colours and shapes, and the works of art which make use of 
them, but their minds are incapable of seeing and delighting in the 
essential nature of beauty itself.' (Plato, 1955 edn p.269) 
What is important here is that the incapability which most people have for loving all 
beauty, which includes the pursuit of the essential nature of beauty, is not rectified by 
calming the passions. It involves an aWakening. This is clear from the way Plato allows 
Socrates to characterise those who fall short in their all-consuming desire for beauty: 
'Then what about the man who recognizes the existence of beautiful 
things, but does not believe in beauty itself, and is incapable in 
following anyone who wants to lead him to a knowledge of it? Is he 
awake, or merely dreaming? Look; isn't dreaming simply the confusion 
between a resemblance and the reality which it resembles, whether the 
dreamer be asleep or awake? (Plato, 1955 edn p.270) 
From here onwards it seems Plato is not concerned with an excess of passions but rather 
with a lack of the passion to know the true nature of things. 
For Plato no knowledge could be apprehended through the senses. The most that one 
was able to achieve in this way was mere belief or opinion. Knowledge, for Plato, was 
apprehension of reality; it was knowledge of what is rather than what is becoming. The 
'world' which sense experience reveals is impermanent, one which is in a state of flux. 
Plato believed that there was another 'world'- the world of Forms - which was not 
subject to change, and hence it was only this that could be known. But sense experience 
could not reveal such a world; it was apprehended through the intellect. But since most 
people tended to rely on their senses, to apprehend knowledge of reality required an 
possession, do allow a more contemplative state to take place in the individual, allowing a more 
philosophic nature to come through. Indeed meditation is often viewed as a means to self-knowledge. 
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enormous shift of some kind. It was Plato's belief that mathematics was the kind of 
discipline that could effect this shift. He shows by his famous analogies of the Sun and 
The Cave that the acquisition of knowledge did not involve simply putting knowledge 
into the individual's mind. It required the individual to make some kind of change: 
, ... the organ by which he learns is like an eye which cannot be turned 
from darkness to light unless the whole body is turned; in the same way 
the mind as a whole must be turned away from the world of change 
until its eye can bear to look straight at reality, and at the brightest of 
all realities which is what we call the good' (p322). 
Self-mastery, then, is achieved through education, for Plato, if the individual 
apprehends the Forms, in particular the Form of the Good. Moreover, the ultimate state 
is characterised by a degree of peace of mind. However, this does not show that 
education is simply a kind of tranquilliser. Indeed, for Plato it was more like a 
stimulant. The individual needed, to use his metaphor, to 'turn' him or herself in the 
right direction. Plato believed this 'movement' could be achieved, in some individuals 
at least, cognitively through reason, and more especially, that mathematics had a central 
role in this task. In The Republic this is made explicit. Mathematics was supposed to be 
a fit subject for training the mind to apprehend the Forms in two ways. 109 Firstly, 
because the study of mathematics allows the mind to enter a state between belief and 
knowledge, and is thus a vital stepping stone in the ascent to knowledge, and secondly 
because, what we would call today, 'mathematical propositions' seemed to Plato to be 
puzzling, or more strictly paradoxical. How these two features provide mental training 
needs careful examination. 
Mathematics provides paradoxes which 'forces the mind into a quandary in 
which it must stir itself to think' 
For Plato, anything, which was only relative to some person or some thing, was not 
knowledge. In this respect knowledge of quantity, raised severe difficulties for Plato as 
the following extract illustrates: 
109 Plato does not appear to use the either the expression 'mental training' or 'training of the mind' 
though at least one of his commentators does. In the Penguin translation for example Desmond Lee writes 
of Plato's Education of the Philosopher' ... the main stress throughout is on the training o/the 
mind .. . and mathematics is to be studied without any immediate practical or scientific aim in view'. 
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'And what about the many things which are double something else? If 
they are double one thing can't they be equally well regarded as half 
something else?' 'Yes.' 'And things which we say are large or small, 
light or heavy, may equally well be given the opposite epithet.' 'Yes, 
they may all be given both.' 'Then can we say that any of these many 
things is, any more than it is not, what anybody says it is?' (pp. 274-5) 
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Plato thought that there were various states of mind, determined by corresponding 
specific objects, and that these states of mind and their objects formed a hierarchy. An 
important role of higher education was to enable one to ascend this hierarchy. Since the 
highest state of mind was that which apprehended the objects of reality, complacency is 
the result of either taking the wrong objects as those that constitute reality, or merely 
inferring reality from a state of non-reality. The goal of education was an apprehension 
of, and love of, the Form of the Good, that which reveals the reason why things are how 
they are, and that which motivates our moral actions. More specifically, the complacent 
state of mind is one that does not distinguish between appearance and reality. Plato 
would say that such a mind either takes what is only becoming for what is, or it takes 
what both is and is not for what is. The reason for this is that the untrained mind is 
confined to relying at best on sense experience. This state of mind is for Plato at worst 
either illusion or ignorance and at best only belief. Neither are states of knowing. 
Knowledge is the state of mind that he seeks. So Plato's theory of mental training 
involves changing one's state of mind from a state of unknowing complacency to a state 
of knowing. Moreover, since knowing was, for Plato, intimately connected with 
goodness, his theory was of special importance. 
As I have suggested earlier, Plato had a much more tightened up notion of knowledge 
than we have today. The contemporary notion of knowledge is either propositional or 
procedural, knowing that X is the case or knowing how to do Y. For Plato it was what is 
sometimes called knowledge by direct acquaintance. It was rather like the knowledge 
one has when one knows a friend or a place. That is to say, it involved more than simply 
knowing facts about a friend or a place. It involved a/acuity rather like an internal form 
of sight, and just as sight can see objects, the faculty of knowing knew objects of some 
kind. Moreover, this internal vision was gained not from being given a special kind of 
sight, but by being turned in the right direction. Plato thought that mathematics 
provided special kinds of situations which were especially thought-provoking. He was 
impressed by such facts that, since six, say, is simultaneously twice three and also half 
of twelve, it is both a double and a half and as such cannot be a source of knowledge. 
Plato's point here is that knowledge can only be something which is, and since six is 
and is not a double it cannot be a source of knowledge. States of affairs in mathematics 
such as this reveal to us that our understanding of what it is to be six, a half or a double 
are incomplete, and hence that we must continue our quest to find the nature of all 
things and not be satisfied with the testimony of the senses. 
Plato believed that reflection upon paradoxes of this kind were of considerable value 
since they shook us out of our complacency. However, much of what we perceive is, it 
seemed to Plato, paradox-free in this respect, and so it does not provoke thought of this 
kind. We are, therefore, kept in a state of acceptance; we take it for granted that what 
we perceive is how things really are, and we do not seek knowledge in Plato's terms. 
Thus he writes: 
'By perceptions that don't call for thought I mean those that don't 
simultaneously issue in a contrary perception; those that do call for 
thought are those that do so issue in the sense that in them sensation is 
ambiguous between two contraries, irrespective of distance. But you 
will understand more clearly if! put it as follows. Here, we say, are 
three fingers, the middle, third, and the little one' 'Yes'. 'And you can 
assume you've got what I call a close view of them. But there's a further 
point I'd like you to consider.' 'What is it?' 'Each of them looks as 
much a finger as any other, and it makes no difference whether it's 
white or black, fat or thin, and so on. There is nothing here to force the 
mind of the ordinary man to ask further questions or to think what a 
finger is; for at no stage has sight presented the finger to it as being also 
the opposite ofa finger.' 'No it hasn't.' 'So there's nothing in this sort of 
perception likely to call for or stimulate thought.' (Plato, 1955 edn 
p.329) 
However, since Plato thought that there is a reality which can be known beyond the 
objects of perception, an awareness of this reality is made possible by being confronted 
with these paradoxes and by reflecting upon them. Since also, mathematics provides a 
wealth of such paradoxes of quantity, these are instrumental in our quest for knowledge. 
Plato believed that mathematics in this respect was an important form of mental 
training. He acknowledged the utility of mathematics for some stages of education, but 
stressed its role as a form of mental training. He refers to another paradox concerning 
unity in the following passage: 
142 
'If our perception of the unit, by sight or any other sense, is quite 
unambiguous, then it does not draw the mind towards reality any more 
than did our perception of a finger. But if it is always combined with 
the perception of its opposite, and seems to involve plurality as much 
as unity, then it calls for the exercise of judgement and forces the mind 
into a quandary in which it must stir itself to think, and ask what unity 
in itself is; and if that is so, the study of the unit is among those that 
lead the mind on and turn it to the vision of reality'. 'Well, the 
perception of unity by sight most certainly has this characteristic; for 
we see the same thing both as a unit and as a plurality'. (p.331) 
The point here is that since every single object can be divided, it seems that everything 
is simultaneously both one and many and once again reflection on quantity shakes our 
complacency, so that he concludes that the study of arithmetic, 
... draws the mind upwards and forces it to argue about the numbers in 
themselves, and will not be put off by attempts to confine the argument 
to collections of visible or tangible objects.(p.332) 
Mathematics lies between belief and knowledge 
As I pointed out in the Interlude, Plato inherited from Pythagoras the view that the 
rationale of the universe was not some kind of material substance. But whereas 
Pythagoras treated numbers as the non-material ultimate explanation, Plato went further 
than this and introduced the Forms. This meant that numbers had a slightly lower status. 
Nevertheless, mathematics was still important as a way of reaching the Forms since it 
held a unique place in his order of things, between belief and knowing. The best one 
can learn about the sensible world, as I have remarked, is opinion or belief. The state of 
knowledge, on the other hand, is only achieved by apprehending the Forms. However, 
mathematics occupies an intermediate position between these two poles since it is 
concerned with reasoning. It lacks the intelligible status of the Forms because the 
mathematician still makes some appeal to the sensible world in deducing results. In 
doing this he is, Plato argues, in an analogous position to someone who deduces that 
there is, say, a physical object on the strength of a shadow or reflection of it. What 
distinguishes the mathematician and the higher status of the philosopher is the status of 
the former's starting points. The mathematician, it seems, takes the truth of his sensible 
geometric figure, or set of physical objects in the case of assertions about number, as 
given. He then proceeds to deduce results on this assumption. All that is possible on this 
approach is consistency. But the philosopher establishes the truth of his starting points 
before deducing results from them. In this way mathematics lies on the continuum 
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between belief and knowledge. It provides more than belief but less than knowledge and 
thus acts as a halfway house on the way to apprehending truth. 
The influence of Plato's paradox theory 
It might be supposed that the paradoxes which Plato thought lay beneath relative terms, 
and in particular quantity, were of little significance to subsequent thinkers. But this 
does not seem to be true. Even if different thinkers came to different conclusions from 
Plato, they begin from the same point, and this shows at least that reflecting upon 
puzzling aspects of quantity still provides a source of philosophical enquiry. In the 
medieval world, for example, 8t. Augustine (see Howie 1969a), in a strikingly similar 
way to Plato, dwells upon the fact that since unity cannot be identified with anything in 
the sensible world, the idea of it must have its sources elsewhere: 
When I seek unity in my physical environment and am sure that I am 
not finding it, then surely I know what I am looking for and not finding. 
I must know that I cannot find it there or rather that it does not exist 
there at all. Thus, since I know that no physical object is a unity, I 
know what unity is; if I did not, I CQuid not add up the many different 
parts of an object. Wherever I have learned about unity, it is not 
through the senses that I have found it. Through the senses I have 
known only physical objects, which, as we have demonstrated, are not 
truly and simply one. (pp. 247-8) 
On the other hand, in the eighteenth century Berkeley (1962 edn) remained unconvinced 
by the argument that since everything is made of many parts, unity cannot be perceived. 
For him, the fact that an object may be seen to embody a variety of different numbers, 
including unity, is sufficient to show that 'number is entirely the creature of the mind': 
... the same extension is one, or three, or thirty-six, according as the 
mind considers it with reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch. Number is 
so visibly relative, and dependent on men's understanding, that it is 
strange to think how anyone should give it an absolute existence 
without the mind. We say one book, one page, one line, &c.; all these 
are equally units, though some contain several of the others. And in 
each instance, it is plain, the unit relates to some particular combination 
of ideas arbitrarily put together by the mind. (p.70) 
During the nineteenth century Frege (1980 edn), taking a similar starting point to 
Berkeley by agreeing that we can attribute many different numbers to the same object, 
including unity, wrote: 
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While looking at one and the same external phenomenon, I can say 
with equal truth both "It is a copse" and "It is five trees", or both "Here 
are four companies" and "Here are 500 men" (p.59). 
But he uses this fact not only to argue against the Platonic/Augustinian view that 
numbers must be 'external things'. He disagrees with Berkeley's view, too, that 
numbers are 'something subjective'. He argues that numbers are a property of (non-
subjective) concepts. 
More recently the apparent paradox is raised again by Geach (1957) to reach extra-
mathematical conclusions, namely, the refutation of 'abstractionism' as a theory of 
concept acquisition. Speaking specifically of arithmetical concepts he writes: 
What number I find may vary, without my observations' varying, 
because I am considering a different kind of things; the same auditory 
experience may give me the number 2 if what I have in mind is heroic 
couplets, 4 ifit is lines o/verse, 40 ifit is syllables, 25 ifit is words; if 
I have no special kind of thing in mind, no number will suggest itself to 
me at all. (p.28) 
This raises the question: what number could possibly be abstracted from a poem, since 
the number concerned depends upon the aspect of the poem that is being attended to. 
As a matter of fact, then, Plato seems to be right in the sense that reflecting on this 
puzzle has stimulated thought in several ways, even if it does not show that the mind 
has necessarily turned towards the Platonic Forms. What it does show is that reflection 
upon some fairly simple examples of what is said in mathematics, stimulates 
philosophical activity. This is an important point. Plato does not stress the importance 
of the procedures and routines of mathematics though clearly they must play some part. 
It is reflection upon the nature of mathematical thinking which is his major 
contribution. In short mathematics is a vehicle for provoking philosophical thought and 
it is the philosophical mind which exemplifies self-mastery. 
Nevertheless it must be said that a rationale for the systematic study of mathematics, 
based upon the value of reflecting upon some of the kinds of mathematical paradoxes, 
remains unconvincing. It is only if we introduce the metaphysics of the Forms that the 
systematic study of mathematics can be characterised as a point on a mental journey of 
some kind. But this metaphysical picture is certainly not central to the modem mind and 
was subjected to critical scrutiny by Plato, himself, and rejected by Aristotle after him. 
But before concluding the discussion of Plato, it is worth considering one contemporary 
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example that has arisen from a school mathematics lesson which if not directly 
influenced by Plato certainly bears some of his thumbprints. 
Mathematics as a 'rich ground/or exploring what tends to be taken/or granted'-
Echoes 0/ Plato in recent mathematical education? 
Despite the influences which Plato has had on the other philosophers, whom I have 
mentioned in the last section, it might still be questioned whether his theory has any 
value at all in justifying the study of mathematics today. It does not seem perplexing to 
the modern mind that a number can be a half and a double simultaneously. Even if the 
observation, that every sensible object is both a whole object yet has many parts, has 
allowed theorists to derive theories outside education, it might still be doubted whether 
observations of this kind provide the basis of a justification for the learning of 
mathematics. But if the modern adult mind does not seem to be perplexed that a number 
can be a half and a double simultaneously, a child might be. He or she might take 
paradoxes of this kind seriously and be in some way affected by them, so that 
mathematics might still provide some kind of vehicle for a special kind of thought. 
Only a few years ago a writer discussed a pupil's remark, in his rationale for learning 
mathematics, which casts some doubt on whether Plato's theory is completely bankrupt. 
In a stimulating article, Davis (1995) firstly shows that the need for mathematics he is 
seeking' ... should not be understood in the utilitarian terms of equipping children with 
the skills necessary for adult life, nor in the political terms of providing the 
understandings needed for democratic citizenship ... ' (p.6). His view is that 
mathematics can 'offer a rich ground for exploring what tends to be taken-for-granted' 
adding that 'we need to study mathematics to begin to understand our prejudices ... '. 
Reference here to what is taken for granted and our 'prejudices' certainly seem to echo 
what Plato thought about the role of mathematics in what I have characterised as 
shaking oneself out of complacency. Moreover the similarity between Plato and Davis 
seems stronger when we consider the mathematical example which he uses to make his 
point. 
Like Plato, Davis makes use of a simple point. It arises from a classroom episode in 
which children have been exploring the fraction 2/6 with practical equipment. Whilst 
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some fractions, including 1/3, were deemed to be clearly equivalent to 2/6, when 
confronted with 3/9 one pupil, Jiema, charmingly remarked that 'it's not as equal as the 
others'. Davis reflects upon this child's remark and it certainly stirs his mind into 
action. He sees it as a confirmation that no matter how much one supposes that 
'Western systems of logic are founded on a belief in the possibility of clean definitions, 
crisp edges, and unambiguous categories'. Things are much more fuzzy than we think. 
Unlike Plato, our prejudices are not ones which must be transcended in favour of the 
quest for an unchanging reality. Our prejudices are necessary because they are what 
make perceptions and actions possible. As he says: 'We need our prejudices - without 
them we would be unable to draw meaningful images out of the noise of sensorial 
possibilities that surround us' (p.S). 
Mathematics comes into the picture, at this point, since it is responsible, it seems, for 
creating many of our prejudices. 'Rhythms and patterns that would otherwise go 
unnoticed are revealed through mathematics to be repeated in all forms of life at all 
levels of observation'. However, it seems that some modifications to mathematics are 
always possible and hence our prejudices are subject to revision. In this respect Davis 
gives the example that so many writers seize upon - the discovery of consistent 
alternative geometries. What conclusions he draws from the classroom episode are not 
altogether clear. It is as though in trying to suggest that fractions can have degrees of 
equivalence, the pupil is somehow revealing the essential contrast between fuzzy logic 
and mathematical logic. All he says about this episode with respect to the foregoing 
discussion on prejudices is: 
One way of interpreting this classroom event is to suggest that the 
participants were engaged in contrasting the crisp conclusions of one 
mathematical system with the fuzzy way we sometimes think. While 
not formulated in the established language of fuzzy logic, Jiema and 
the teacher had touched on a topic of current widespread discussion 
within the mathematics community. (p.6) 
The fraction concept offers what Davis calls a 'site' for such an exploration. Such sites 
are' ... possible locations for interrogating our mathematics - or, more accurately, for 
studying ourselves and the prejudices that shape our world. ' 
Despite the metaphysical differences, between Plato's theory and that which Davis has 
presented there are still significant similarities. The latter's theory begins with the same 
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kind of elementary statements about mathematics which Plato believed could stimulate 
thought of a general sort. Moreover, both have used mathematics as a vehicle to 
challenge our conservative perceptions of everyday experience. Despite the fact that 
Davis would probably not look at matters in this way since he regards his approach to 
mathematics as 'enactive', the contemplative aspects of the subject still seem to be 
revealed to Jiema. The naivety with which one can say that '3/9 is not as equivalent to 
2/6 as 1/3', seems to be very much of the same kind as saying that everything is one 
whole and yet not one whole, or that everything is a double and yet not a double. 
The contemplative aspects of mathematics seem to be at work again in the theory which 
Davis sets out. The strangeness which sometimes arises in mathematics stimulates 
reflective thinking. Although he does not make it explicit, there is also the suggestion 
that what we might be achieving from this is a kind of self-knowledge. Recall that 
Sullivan (see page 92) believed, too, that 'mathematics is of profound significance 
... because it exhibits principles that we impose. It shows us the laws of our own being 
and the necessary conditions of experience'. Davis does not make the further move of 
saying that mathematics is thus a fine art, but one of his points remains that certain 
insights into extra-mathematical issues are revealed through reflection upon 
mathematical activity. 
Descartes and self mastery 
Training the diverse mind by procedures of unification 
If we return to Charles Taylor's illuminating account of the nature of reason, we find 
him arguing that Descartes had a radically different account of reason from Plato; one 
which, as we shall see, is characterised by procedures. He writes, ' ... in relation to 
Plato, Descartes offers a new understanding of reason, and hence of its hegemony over 
the passions, which both see as the essence of morality' (Taylor, 1989 p.144). Recall 
that for Plato being ruled by reason involved contemplating the order inherent in the 
Forms. But this view of reason was not possible for Descartes for whom, as Taylor 
reminds us, 'the universe was to be understood mechanistically' , and this meant that 
what is out there to know is not directly attainable by a kind of acquaintance. In 
particular, as Taylor points out, this meant that: 
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The account of scientific knowledge which ultimately emerges '" is a 
representational one. To know reality is to have a correct representation 
of things - a correct picture within of outer reality, as it came to be 
conceived. (Taylor, 1989 p.144) 
This correct representation of things cannot however be found, it must be built, and 
Taylor adds that 'the order of representations has to be developed in such a way as to 
generate certainty, through a chain of clear distinct perceptions'. So that: 
The Cartesian option is to see rationality, or the power of thought, as a 
capacity to construct orders which meet the standards demanded by 
knowledge, or understanding, or certainty ... Ifwe follow this line ... 
then the self-mastery of reason now must consist in this capacity being 
the controlling element in our lives, and not the senses; self-mastery 
consists in our lives being shaped by the orders that our reasoning 
capacity constructs according to the appropriate standards. (p.147) 
On Plato's account mathematics allows us to tum towards the order of the universe. On 
Descartes' account self-mastery is supposed to be achieved by our 'capacity to construct 
orders' which becomes 'the controlling element in our lives' since it 'instrumentalises 
the desires'. To quote Taylor again: 'Reason rules the passions when it can hold them to 
their normal instrumental function. The hegemony of reason for Descartes is a matter of 
instrumental control' (p.1S0). For Descartes, the role of mathematics now is not as a 
source of paradoxes which stimulate the mind into reasoning and hence shake it out of 
complacency, nor is it a stepping stone which attempts to connect the objects of sense to 
those of knowledge. The role of mathematics is to act as the model for constructing the 
orders which 'meet the standards demanded by knowledge, or understanding, or 
certainty' (p.l47). The shaping of our lives by such orders constitutes self-mastery. It is 
in this way that mathematics is supposed to provide mental training. To elaborate on 
this we need to take a closer look at Descartes' work. Just as we noted that Plato did not 
make much, if any, explicit use of the term 'mental training' so we must note that 
Descartes, too, does not speak of such training. However, we can see that at least one of 
his commentators does. It seems that Descartes wrote only twenty-one 'Rules for the 
Direction of the Mind' out of the thirty-six that he had intended. But of the first twelve 
Margaret Wilson (see Descartes, 1969 edn) explains that these were supposed to 
provide 'a general account of scientific procedure and how to train the mind ... ' 110 
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Descartes begins his Rules for the Direction of the Mind with an interesting 
distinction between the arts and sciences which we have already noted in the last 
section (see page 58). Recall that for Descartes sciences' ... entirely consist in the 
cognitive exercise of the mind' whilst the arts ' ... depend upon an exercise and 
disposition of the body' (p. 36). Descartes distinguishes the sciences and arts in 
order to persuade us that they should not be approached in the same way. Whilst 
he agrees that a single individual could not practise all of the existing the arts, so 
that within our lives some kind of specialisation is inevitable, Descartes 
complains that we wrongly suppose that the sciences should be viewed in the 
same way, and studied separately. But for him all of the sciences taken together 
contribute to a particular goal, and so the first rule is that we should direct our 
attention not to the individual sciences but towards the special goal to which they 
are directed, namely 'good understanding' or 'universal wisdom'. 
It is worth emphasising two points here. Firstly, in my discussion of Plato I 
compared what I called the 'initial conditions' that were supposed to hold before 
training with those of meditation, my simple example of mental training. In this 
respect, the initial conditions of Descartes' theory are different. Nevertheless, 
they do embody a 'tendency' of some kind, namely the tendency to treat the 
sciences as though they were like arts and to suppose that division of labour was 
essential in them. Secondly, the goal to which Descartes supposed all the 
different sciences of his day were directed, although different from the arts, was 
nevertheless a broad one, since for each individual it was concerned: 
... not for the purpose of resolving this or that difficulty of 
scholastic type, but in order that his understanding may light his 
will to its proper choice in all the contingencies of life. I I I (p.37) 
As it stands, then, Descartes appears to be providing us with an interesting 
rationale for a curriculum which promotes specialisation in certain particular 
'arts', but which seeks some holistic approach to the 'sciences' based on a belief 
that some overall goal exists amongst them. The 'rules' that he set out, were 
supposed to guide, or more precisely 'direct', the mind to this overall goal and 
hence they provide a much more detailed mental training plan than that found in 
Plato's work. In what follows I shall draw out some of what I think are the 
salient rules. 
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Firstly Descartes tells us that we must 'make it a rule to trust only what is completely 
known and incapable of being doubted' and since he thought that' ... Arithmetic and 
Geometry alone are free from any taint of falsity or uncertainty ... ' (p.39), these must 
become the centre of attention. But Descartes makes it clear that we should not study 
mathematics to the exclusion of other 'sciences', but that 
... in our search for the direct road towards truth we should busy 
ourselves with no object about which we cannot attain a certitude equal 
to that of the demonstrations of Arithmetic and Geometry'. (p.4D) 
There are two 'mental operations' in mathematics which Descartes thinks are 
responsible for guaranteeing certainty, namely, 'intuition' and 'deduction'. 112 He gives 
an account of what he thinks is a special meaning for the first of these two operations. It 
is, he says, 'the undoubting conception of an unclouded and attentive mind, and springs 
from the light of reason alone' One example he gives is that 'a triangle is bound by 
three lines only'. By deduction on the other hand he means' ... all necessary inferences 
from other facts that are known with certainty' (p.43). 
It is tempting to think that intuition concerns only the truth of the premises of a 
deductive argument and that the step by step procedure is the more important one. But 
Descartes points out clearly not only that: 
... none of the mistakes that men can make ... are due to faulty 
inference; they are caused merely by the fact that we found upon a 
basis of poorly comprehended experiences, or that propositions are 
posited which are hasty or groundless. (p.39) 
So that intuition is required throughout' ... discursive reasoning of whatever sort'. The 
example he gives is helpful in reminding us of the importance of not just using, what 
we now call 'transitivity', in deductions, but that we must see, by intuition, that this 
relationship must hold in certain cases, especially that of equality. He remarks that if we 
want to show that '2 and 2 amount to the same as 3 and I' , it is not sufficient simply to 
see that '2 and 2 make 4' and '3 and 1 make 4'. We must also see, intuitively, that the 
required conclusion follows from them. 
112 I had reason to introduce the notion of 'intuition', in one of its senses during my discussion on the 
central role of perception in art. There, intuition was used in a sense which made it susceptible to being 
overturned by mathematical thinking. For Descartes intuition means the grounds of certainty. 
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The importance of intuition and deduction as the means of establishing truth needs 
further elaboration. It is certainly true that some 'facts' seem to be intuitively true. It is 
also true that inferences can be made from known facts to derive new facts. However, if 
this is an account of the correct order of deriving facts then in general it is false. In 
mathematics it is indeed possible and common to begin with a fact, often in the form of 
a definition and to infer an indefinite number of other facts. However, it is also the case 
that many facts which can be validated by such deductions from intuition are not 
necessarily originated in this way. If this were the case then proving established results 
in mathematics would not be as difficult as it often is. Often the result is already 
believed to be true and the difficulty is in convincing oneself and others that it really is 
true. This may involve working backwards from the result to the known facts, or 
working forwards from the fact and backwards from the result at the same time, 
gradually closing the gap between these chains. More often the deductive steps required 
to show that something is true are not themselves established deductively. Imagination, 
experience and insight all play their part. So, Descartes' remarks seem to be more 
concerned with the logical status of our reasoning than with the psychological. 
Descartes tries to get closer to the core of mathematics, to what he calls 'universal 
mathematics', by reducing it to just two elements with which it is concerned, namely, 
'order' and 'measurement'. He then proceeds to discuss the method for arriving at his 
goals which are, in accordance with what I remarked earlier in my account of training 
(see page 129), namely, trying to get thinking to go along certain lines different from 
usual tendencies. In tackling any enquiry it seems we should bring to bear a certain 
order on its elements. This involves taking simple matters first and familiarising 
ourselves with these before using them to move on to the more profound. Descartes 
gives us ways of ordering the task in respect of what he calls 'relative' and 'absolute' 
aspects and it is necessary that we can follow through any of our claims in a continuous 
'movement of thought' . So sufficient reference is made to order to prevent Descartes 
supposing that the truth unfolds to the thinker in the same way in which it is later 
written up. 
Descartes makes frequent reference to mathematics but the learning of mathematics is 
not explicitly connected with mental training until we reach Rule X where he does 
make an explicit educational point. The foregoing rules show how impressed he is by 
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the way knowledge is validated but not precisely how it is arrived at. He summarises 
Rule X in the following way: 
In order that it may acquire sagacity the mind should be exercised in 
pursuing just those inquiries of which the solution has already been 
found by others; and it ought to traverse in a systematic way even the 
most trifling of men's inventions, though those ought to be preferred in 
which order is explained or implied. (Descartes, 1969 edn p.67) 
Descartes proudly claims that whenever he read a book which 'promised some new 
discovery' he would try and anticipate this discovery before reading the published 
account. Unlike many others it seems he was successful and he concludes that this was 
a particularly worthwhile approach and one for which he developed certain strategies. 
Whilst he does not outline these personal strategies of his, he does suggest that others 
develop in a similar way. He does realise that not everyone will succeed since the books 
he tackled would not be appropriate for everyone to tackle. However, he suggests a 
range of activities which one should engage in. Once again the notion of order appears 
in his choice of exemplary activities. The activities should not necessarily be difficult 
ones, but those, which oUght to be undertaken, should display order. He suggests 
weaving and embroidery alongside 'all play with numbers and everything that belongs 
to Arithmetic, and the like'. About such activities he says: 
It is wonderful how all these studies discipline our mental powers, 
provided that we do not know the solutions from others, but invent 
them ourselves. For since nothing in these arts remains hidden, and 
they are wholly adjusted to the capacity of human cognition, they 
reveal to us with the greatest distinctness innumerable orderly systems, 
all different from each other, but nonetheless conforming to rule, in the 
proper observance of which systems of order consists the whole of 
human sagacity. I 13 (p.68) 
It is not quite clear what kind of arithmetical activity would be appropriate here. In his 
reference to rule-following Descartes could be recommending the following of a routine 
algorithm such as, for example, long division. This would reveal an orderly system of a 
kind, and there are those today who believe that such practice is a form of mental 
discipline. This would be in keeping with the other activities in his list. Weaving and 
113 Even though Descartes, earlier, speaks about traversing in a 'systematic way', thus drawing out the 
procedural aspects of mathematics and other activities, there are still some traces ofa contemplative 
attitude to these rule-following systems since they are revealed to us in certain activities which constitute 
human wisdom. 
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embroidery are routines only a little different, in this respect, to arithmetical routines. 1 14 
Moreover, much of arithmetic appears to have been taught by rote in and around 
Descartes' time, so the idea of working out a solution by oneself rather than being able 
to reproduce a teacher's example would be some innovation. On the other hand, what 
Descartes has to say, in the same work, about how the use of syllogisms can result in 
lazy thinkers suggests that the position on this is not clear. We shall see later on, that 
even though the belief that mathematics can train the mind is still upheld in very recent 
times, the kind of mental activity necessary for such training is still somewhat in doubt, 
even though the belief that mental training is a fit purpose for mathematics still exists in 
recent documents. Nevertheless, if this is all Descartes has in mind, then his notion of 
mental training does seem to conflict with the point at which we started, namely, to 
explore contemporary remarks from such sources as the HMI booklet (see above page 
127). There, recall, mental training seemed to involve the 'higher functions of the mind' 
rather than 'stereotyped working to rule'. 
In summary, Descartes offers us two aspects of mental training. The first is based on the 
way mathematics is validated. All our wisdom, it seems, ought to be validated in this 
way. However, what he calls the 'mental operations' of 'intuition' and 'deduction' 
cannot simply be adopted as ways of thinking, without considering that the order in 
which the string of reasoning is carried out in mathematics, depends upon imagination 
and experience. Descartes does discuss ordering and analysis, but it is not really of the 
kind that relates directly to mathematics, even if it does support the view of training as 
trying to correct a general tendency amongst people to think in less fruitful ways. The 
second aspect is much more explicitly linked to carrying out mathematics, though it 
seems that other activities will also suffice, but nothing he says prevents us from 
concluding that what he is suggesting is the practice of routines. 
Plato and Descartes compared 
For both Plato and Descartes the nature of mathematics permits mental training. For 
Plato, to achieve wisdom it is necessary to reflect upon the nature of mathematics - its 
114 A slightly different reason for providing opportunities for following simple procedures, beginning at 
an early age, has been set out by Anita Straker (1986). She argues that the dominant role that 
programmable machines are having in our lives demands a general facility with procedures. 
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apparent paradoxes of quantity, for example, and its paradoxical relationship with the 
sensible world - in order to enable the mind to apprehend the Forms, and in particular 
the Form of The Good which constitutes the Order upon which our moral life is based. 
What is for Plato fundamentally a contemplative business is for Descartes more 
discursive. To achieve wisdom, the later thinker speaks in terms of a procedural kind of 
order. One constructs order by following a process similar in kind to the way 
mathematics is validated, or more mundanely we apprehend the notion of order by 
undertaking exercise or tasks of a variety of kinds which are rule-following. These 
include arithmetic but other activities are included too. Plato urges us, or at least urges 
those who will educate his philosophers, to seek activities in which our 'minds are 
drawn from the world of change to reality' as opposed to 'a training in habituation'. 
Descartes seems in some respects to favour habituation. 
We have seen that the procedures involved in mathematics are for Descartes at the heart 
of the mental training process, both in the more general sense of constructing order, and 
in the specific cases of undertaking activities which reveal 'innumerable orderly 
systems'. The idea that reason is somehow embodied in mathematics persists in more 
recent times. But we need to question whether this notion of reason has been subjected 
to further changes in more recent accounts. Taylor, it will be recalled, distinguished 
between the substantive and procedural accounts of reason in Plato and Descartes, and 
made a distinction between reasonfound and reason built. In more recent accounts, 
reason is sometimes directly linked to logic. So that mathematics is either explicitly 
linked to training the mind in logic; or training in logic and training in reason are treated 
as though they were synonymous. 
The influence of Descartes' procedural view 
Fitch - Mathematics as training in logic 
The value of what I am calling procedural reason, after Charles Taylor, was clear in the 
work of Sir Joshua Fitch. In his Lectures on Teaching given at Cambridge during the 
latter part of the nineteenth century he argues without any caution that' ... the 
fundamental reason for teaching mathematics at all either to boys or men' is because 
... a certain kind of mental exercise, of unquestioned service in 
connexion with all conceivable subjects of thought, is best to be had in 
the domain of mathematics. (Fitch, 1902 p.342) 
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The boldness of his view, which is worked out in some detail, makes Fitch an 
exemplary proponent, in the last hundred years or so, of the view that a rationale for 
learning mathematics may be based on its fitness for providing mental training. I have 
mentioned his work earlier when it was noted that he believed that mathematics, or 
arithmetic at least, could be viewed as either an art or a science. The former view, as we 
saw, focused on the utility of the routines of the subject, and Fitch was, perhaps 
unusually for his time, hardly impressed with this view. But it is within his view of 
mathematics as a science that he believes mental training is possible. 
For Fitch, arithmetic is a science when it 'investigates principles' and because, 
... he who unearths the truths which underlie the rules of Arithmetic, is 
being exercised, not merely in the attainment of a particular kind of 
truth about numbers, but in the processes by which truth of many other 
kinds is to be investigated and attained. (p.287) 
His belief in the value of the procedures of mathematics is clearly signalled by his use 
of 'processes' of finding truth. The importance of this aspect of arithmetic follows from 
Fitch's premise that the 'main purpose of our intellectual life is the acquirement of 
truth', by which he does not mean the collection of isolated facts. Indeed Fitch is 
concerned with what we might call his scientific approach to knowledge and truth, 
which requires: 
the recognition of every separate phenomenon in the shifting panorama 
of life as an illustration of some principle or law, broader, higher, and 
more enduring than itself .... every particular fact worth knowing is 
connected with some general truth, and it is in the tracing of the 
connexion and collocation of particular and separate truths with general 
and abiding truths that science mainly consists. (pp.315-6) 
This is perhaps a reasonable position to take on the facts of science, but Fitch extends 
this idea to historical facts and grammatical rules. Whilst we might be prepared to 
agree that any particular rule of grammar has' scant meaning or use for us until it is seen 
as part of the science of language, it is highly questionable whether historical facts are 
similarly bound to a kind of science of history. Yet Fitch's scientific approach clearly 
does embrace other areas of knowledge, so that each historical fact is, ' ... to little 
purpose unless it is seen in its bearing on some political, economic, or moral law'. With 
this overarching view, the correct educational approach is clear. Pupils must' ... leam to 
see special facts and bits of experience in the light of the larger generalisations by 
which the world is governed and held together'. (p.316) 
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His use of 'in the light of the larger generalisations' is deliberately indeterminate. It 
might mean that pupils must see how isolated facts somehow establish, inductively, 
certain general principles, or it might mean that pupils must learn to see how isolated 
facts are derived from the principles. Fitch is aware of the value of both induction and 
deduction. Indeed at first his plea is that pupils should be competent in both kinds of 
reasoning: 
... it is a great part of the business of education so to train the faculties 
that whichever process we adopt we should use it rightly, that our 
generalisations shall be valid and sound generalisations, and that our 
inferences shall be true, not hasty and illegitimate inferences, from the 
facts which may come before us. (p.31 7) 
Moreover he points out that although inductive reasoning is most typical of the physical 
sciences, arithmetic and geometry use both kinds of reasoning. But to secure his strong 
claim for mathematics, he has to restate his commitment to the method of deduction, 
which he insists is 'the characteristic mode of procedure in arithmetical as well as in all 
other departments of mathematical science'. Fitch adds some other remarks about the 
nature of mathematical 'truths', which he says: 
have the great advantage of being very simple and very evident. They 
lie quite outside the region of contingency or controversy, and they 
therefore furnish a better basis for purely deductive or synthetic logic 
than any other class of subjects in which the very data from which we 
proceed are often disputed, or at least disputable. (p.318) 
So, in true Cartesian spirit mathematics is a science because it is deductive, and has 
truths that are at once simple and evident and certain. But, recall, Descartes sought a 
procedure which would be of use for 'all the contingencies of life'. All that remains for 
Fitch to do, is to make good his claim that mathematics embodies the dominant model 
of reasoning for 'all conceivable subjects of thought' ,for his view to be barely 
distinguishable from what Descartes had believed earlier. But to approach this position, 
he must restate the important point, now somewhat eroded by his admission of the 
different kinds of reasoning, that mathematical reasoning is of general application. This 
he does in the following way: 
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Suppose then I want to give myself a little training in the art of 
reasoning; suppose I wish to get out of the region of conjecture or 
probability, free myself from the difficult task of weighing evidence, 
and putting instances together to arrive at general propositions, and 
simply desire to know how to deal with my general propositions when I 
get them, and how to deduce right inferences from them; it is clear that 
I shall obtain this sort of discipline best, in those departments of 
thought in which the first principles are unquestionably true. (p.319) 
From here he feels that he is justified in asserting that' .. . the proper office of arithmetic 
is to serve as elementary training in logic' .llS (p.321) 
Although I have argued that Fitch has more in common with Descartes than Plato, that 
is not the way that Fitch would necessarily have seen himself. He aligns himself with 
the earlier man when he remarks how Plato and his followers valued rigorous mental 
training through Geometry in their quest for the solutions to a range of moral questions. 
As he put it, these thinkers thought 
... that a man whose mind had not undergone a rigorous training in 
systematic thinking, and in the art of drawing legitimate inferences 
from premises, was unfitted to enter on the discussion of these high 
topics; and the sort of logical discipline which he needed was most 
likely to be obtained from geometry - the only mathematical science 
which in Plato's time had been formulated and reduced to a system. 116 
(p.320) 
If this were true then there would seem to be little of difference between Plato and 
Descartes in respect of the educational value of mathematics, or at least there would be 
little between them if logical rigour were the only reason Plato valued mathematics. 
What I have been trying to draw out, is that as far as The Republic is concerned, which 
contains some of the most detailed accounts of Plato's view of education, Plato has 
emphasised the more reflective value of mathematics in education; the logical rigour of 
mathematics is not of primary educational importance to him. What is of more 
importance, are the paradoxes and puzzles of mathematics, and the ontological status of 
the premises upon which mathematical reasoning is based. 
liS My italics 
116 My italics 
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The value oj logical training through the learning oj mathematics - a criticism 
There are two main criticisms of Fitch's view. Firstly, recall that Fitch's view is 
premised on his main purpose of intellectual life as the acquisition of truth, and that all 
valuable facts are connected with general truths. So that the main value of learning 
mathematics lies in the assistance it can give us in drawing out facts from general 
principles, or what Fitch calls 'deducing right inferences'. If examples could be found 
of several kinds of worthwhile facts, which are not necessarily connected with general 
true principles, or at least not deductively connected with any such principles, then this 
would severely weaken the case that Fitch makes. With such examples we would have 
shown that all Fitch could have rightly claimed, would have been the value of 
mathematics in certain kinds of scientific knowledge, since some of this knowledge is 
surely based on inferences made from law-like principles of a general nature. This 
would greatly reduce the scope of Fitch's claim that mathematics trains the mind. Any 
thoroughgoing rationale for the subject would then have to point out that mathematics 
provides a training which will be of service to certain areas of life, and not to 'all 
conceivable subjects of thought' (p.342) as Fitch believed. lI7 
It is easy to sympathise with Fitch, in his insistence that facts must be connected to 
principles, especially if we consider that many of the teachers of his day might have 
resembled Charles Dickens' Gradgrind in 'Hard Times' for whom facts were given an 
exaggerated status. It is to the credit of educators like Fitch that issues surrounding the 
learning of mere facts are just as alive today as they were in his own time. Nevertheless, 
a thoroughgoing case, such as Fitch tries to make, is not in the end sustainable. John 
Passmore, in defending the value of imparting information in teaching, finds himself 
confronted with views, some of which are not unlike Fitch's, which stress the primacy 
of principles over facts. But Passmore's reply to this is very instructive. In many 
contexts, he remarks, principles are non-existent: 
... there is no principle from which it can be deduced that Henry VIII 
broke with the Church of Rome, or how rapidly the population of India 
is increasing, or how many ribs a human being has, or when President 
Kennedy was assassinated, or how distant the moon is from the earth, 
or, even, that chloroform is an anaesthetic or that platypuses suckle 
their young. (Passmore, 1980 p.97) 
117 Aristotle believed in the value of principles but he also pointed out the value of experience see The 
Metaphysics 
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But it would be absurd to deny the value of this information simply by showing that it is 
not the result of some inference from principles. Indeed matters are worse than this. 
Passmore points out that in some contexts there are real dangers in assuming the 
existence of principles: 
... the mistakes in American foreign policy since the Second World 
War largely derive from a too powerful tendency to think conceptually 
and a weak appreciation of historical factors. Similar considerations 
apply, scarcely less obviously, to the practice of medicine or 
engineering; to think entirely in terms of general principles, without 
respect for the peculiarities of individual cases, is the path to disaster. 
(p.l02) 
Hamlyn (1967) says essentially the same thing: 
Explanatory theories, e.g. scientific theories, have a logical structure in 
the sense that the propositions of which the theory is constituted can be 
arranged in a certain order, so that certain propositions can be derived 
from others. It is indeed the fact that from general laws and statements 
of initial conditions it is possible to derive conclusions - the facts to be 
explained - that provide the basis of scientific, and no doubt other 
kinds, of explanation. (p.28) 
But Hamlyn is more careful than Fitch to point out that: 
This ... only applies where the discipline in question constitutes a theory 
- to parts of science, the foundation of mathematics and so on. Where 
questions of explanation do not arise and do not have a place, then this 
sort of consideration has no place either. It is difficult to see how large 
parts of history or literature could be said to have a structure in this 
sense. (p.29) 
Indeed Hamlyn argues that in learning there must always be a 'delicate balance between 
principles and cases'. Both Hamlyn and Passmore have distinguished between different 
kinds of knowledge. Where Hamlyn is careful to distinguish subjects which are 
theoretical from those which are not, Passmore prefers to distinguish between open / 
closed, broad / narrow capacities. For him scientific knowledge is open and broad, and 
in this way is distinct from historical knowledge which is narrow yet still valuable. 
We should note with Fitch, just as we did with Descartes, that any valid proof for a 
theorem must follow deductively, but that this does not mean that anyone who was able 
to carry out such deductions would have been able to have formulated the proof. It is 
one thing to follow a proof, quite another to originate one. Originating proof involves 
deductive thought but also a good deal of imagination, insight, experience, trial and 
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error, and awareness and expertise in useful strategies. A machine can in principle carry 
out deductions but not all proofs. 
So whilst Fitch is right that deductive method is typical of mathematics, he does seem 
to underplay other ways in which mathematics proceeds, even though he does suggest 
that inductive reasoning plays some part. However, having conceded this much, Fitch 
does rather overstate the notion of truth in mathematics. There certainly was a time 
when it was thought not only that Euclid's geometry was consistent, but that also that it 
described the space in which we live. The discovery of alternative geometric systems 
have shown not only that this cannot be true, but that other systems describe space more 
appropriately. Such observations as this have led to the view that mathematics does not 
describe the world, rather it consists of models which are constructed securely and 
consistently, but their truth arises from inner coherence rather that correspondence with 
some extra-mathematical reality. There is a price to pay for attempting to match up a 
theory with the world - an axiomatic system free from doubt, but free from substantial 
content. 
Charles Taylor helped us to see that Plato's and Descartes' views were linked with the 
outcome of self-mastery. Fitch gives us no indication that he has moral ends of this 
kind. The most that logic can provide, it seems, is a certain kind of freedom. But this is 
not freedom from the passions, but simply freedom from 'the difficult task of weighing 
evidence, and putting instances together to arrive at general propositions'. So the notion 
of reason has changed its meaning from Plato, through Descartes, to modem times. 
Nevertheless, it is still supposed by many, Fitch in particular, that the logical reasoning 
of the kind found in mathematics remains of universal value. 
Toulmin's critique of 'idealised logic' 
A more sustained and penetrating criticism of valuing what he calls 'idealised logic' can 
be found in the work of Stephen Toulmin. One of Toulmin's aims in his book The Uses 
of Argument is to reveal two models of reasoning: one based on the procedures of 
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JurlSPru ence and the other based on formal logic that has mathematics as its model. 
He writes: 
From the time of Aristotle logicians have found the mathematical 
model enticing, and a logic which modelled itself on jurisprudence 
rather than geometry could not hope to maintain all the mathematical 
elegance of their ideal. Unfortunately an idealised logic, such as the 
mathematical model leads us to, cannot keep in serious contact with its 
practical application. (Toulmin, 1958 p.147) 
One of the main points of Toulmin's argument is the nowadays fairly established view 
that discourse takes place in a variety of non-reducible contexts. Often influenced by 
Wittgenstein, a range of theorists have insisted that there are different kinds of 
discourse and hence knowledge and facts. In education, for example, Hirst (1965) has 
famously attempted to delimit kinds of knowledge on the basis of their distinctive 
concepts and methods of validation. More recently, some of the theorists of the 'critical 
thinking' movement have also been quick to deny the existence of general powers of 
thought. But I have chosen to outline some of the main points of Toulmin's argument, 
particularly since it directs its attack at the primacy of the kind of logic which has been 
explicitly linked to mathematics by Fitch. 
Toulmin's argument, as the title of his book suggests, involves a consideration of the 
nature of argument itself. Arguments, for Toulmin, are at root, ways of supporting 
claims and assertions when such support is required, as it always is in principle. Every 
day of our lives we make claims and assertions. But these are not arguments. 
Arguments give what Toulmin calls 'backing' to such claims and assertions when 
required. The wide variety of contexts in which arguments take place are what he calls 
'fields of argument'. In assessing arguments Toulmin asks 'what things about the form 
and merits of our arguments are field-invariant and what things about them are field 
dependent?' 
One kind of claim, which arises in a variety of different contexts, is the claim that 
something can or cannot be done. For example one cannot lift a ton, one cannot call a 
king 'she', one cannot ride a bike on the pavement etc. The arguments that are provided 
118 See the last chapter of Kline (1972) for an account which, against the spirit ofToulmin's position, 
does attempt to show that law may be regarded as following similar lines to the axiomatic approach of 
mathematics. 
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in support of these claims vary with respect to what Toulmin calls the criteria for the 
term 'can', and in this respect such arguments will be field dependent. What can be 
done in algebra will be different from what can be done within the law. But what he 
calls the force of 'cannot' as an injunction, a means of ruling out something, is field-
invariant, the disregarding of which involves a consequence of some kind -
incoherence, penalty, contradiction. What is ruled out will vary from field to field but 
the fact that something is always ruled out is field invariant. The fact that some 
consequence follows from ignoring this injunction is also field invariant, though the 
kind of consequence will be field dependent. Later on he generalises this point in saying 
that 'all the canons for the criticism and assessment of arguments ... are in practice 
field-dependent, while all our terms of assessment are field-invariant in their force' . 
So far then, if mathematics is to provide any general training in reasoning, in arguments 
at least, it must be in terms of training inforce rather than criteria. One must learn, that 
is, that terms like 'can' or 'possible' have the same force in contexts outside 
mathematics as they do in mathematics itself. But the field invariance of 'modal' terms 
can equally be gained from other fields and therefore mathematics has no special claim 
to develop the mind. 
Toulmin investigates next, the layout of arguments. When an argument is a means of 
justifying an assertion or claim, such claims form the conclusion of an argument. But if 
the conclusion is to be more than simply an assertion, it will rely upon some backing in 
the form of data. Not any data will do, of course, it must be data which is appropriate to 
the conclusion in question. Furthermore a warrant is required, which allows the 
conclusion to follow from the data. In some cases there will be exceptions to a warrant 
and the qualifier indicates what Toulmin calls 'the strength conferred by the warrant on 
this step'. Finally, the warrant, itself may be called into question. It is always a warrant 
on account its own backing, and there are in principle always cases where the warrant 
may be overridden and this is marked out by a rebuttal R. So that we have the following 
layout with Data D, Conclusion C, Qualifier Q, Condition of rebuttal R, warrant W and 
the backing of a warrant B: 
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D • SO, Q, C 
.I 1 Smce Unless 
W R 
1 
account 
ofB 
What Toulmin claims is field dependent here is the backing needed to establish our 
warrants. We can give a mathematics example here: 
All (whole) numbers are of one • All prime numbers are of 
of the following fonns:-----.-------+ the fonn 6k ± 1 
6k, 6k+l, 6k+2, 
6k+3, 6k+4, 6k+5 
But 6k is divisible by 6. 
Also, 6k +2 = 2(3k+l), 
and 6k + 4 = 2(3k+2), 
so both of these are divisible 
by 2. 
Finally,6k+3 = 3(2k+l) 
and so this is divisible by 3 
1 
Unless, the 
number is 
A prime p is only divisible less than 6 
by P and 1. 
1 
By definition 
So in learning mathematics one might use a common layout especially where proof is 
required. 
The standard syllogism has much in common with this layout. 
AisaB 
All Bs are C 
A isaC 
The first line is a data line, the second apparently a warrant and the last line a 
conclusion. But Toulmin believes such paradigms of logical form mask a more complex 
situation in everyday reasoning. He suggests that the second line can be taken as either a 
warrant or the backing for a warrant, especially if second lines are of the form, 
'Scarcely any As are B', or 'Nearly all As are B', in which case the second line is 
backing and therefore it is field dependent. 
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One of the most important distinctions for Toulmin is that between a warrant and its 
backing. He wants to show how the idea of logical form is unhelpful. Any statement can 
lead to any conclusion provided a suitable warrant is inserted. But not all warrants are 
accepted and the backing that is needed is field dependent. In the above mathematical 
example the argument is valid because the warrant guarantees it. If a number has a 
divisor of2, 3, or 6 it cannot be prime. So primes must be of the only remaining forms. 
But the warrant here is backed by definition, that is to say agreement, within the 
mathematical community. So it seems that mathematics provides no special training 
beyond the use of form in this minimal sense, and if Toulmin is right every other 
subject can train the mind in this sense. To be able to argue we must get down, at some 
point, to the level of types of backing, and mathematics can only provide a limited 
source of these, particularly definitions. 
Toulmin thus provides us with a powerful objection to any rationale for learning 
mathematics, along the lines which Fitch's runs, which claims that the kind of 
reasoning acquired through the study of mathematics is of widespread or even universal 
application. However, not all mental training theorists who have stressed the 
importance of the procedures of mathematics have believed that these procedures are of 
universal importance. Indeed some have emphasised the dangers of supposing that such 
procedures can be transferred to other contexts. These theorists, then, seem to provide a 
more modest view, and we shall now consider what they have to say on the matter. 
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Chapter 10 - A more modest account of mental training 
Initiating the reasoning powers through mathematics - Tate and his 
legacy. 
It is been interesting to note how mathematics is seen to be valued, by some writers, on 
account of its ease of accessibility, whilst for others the sheer inaccessibility of the 
subject is what is at issue. For example, we saw in my discussion of the connection 
between aesthetics, art and mathematics how the aesthetic properties of mathematics 
were regarded by some (see Leibeck, 1984) as the main reason why even young 
children pursued mathematics. Others like Poincare were in some way sceptical about 
the universality of aesthetic capacities, at least as far as mathematical discovery is 
concerned. This in tum was denied by Papert who was convinced that aesthetic 
processes could regulate the mathematical thinking of those who were given certain 
opportunities. Huntley's remarks seem to lie somewhere between these extremes, 
though the particular examples which he gives are all set in quite advanced 
mathematics. 
A similar ambivalence surrounds the basis that mathematics can train the mind. Locke, 
as we saw in Part 1, believed that Arithmetic 'is the easiest and consequently the first 
sort of abstract Reasoning, which the Mind commonly bears, or accustoms itself to' . 
Fitch, too, as we have just seen, thought that since mathematics is simple and 'very 
evident' it could 'furnish a better basis for purely deductive or synthetic logic than any 
other class of subjects'. Isaac Watt, on the other hand, who was not an unequivocal 
defender of mathematics, believed that the sheer difficulty of mathematics provided a 
good reason for at least being exposed to it. In a similar manner to Descartes, he sets out 
rules for improving the mind, but in one respect at least his approach is radically 
different. One rule involves teaching oneself humility. Watt (1809) writes: 
You should ... contrive and practise some proper methods to acquaint 
yourself with your own ignorance, and to impress your mind with a 
deep and painful sense of the low and imperfect degrees of your present 
knowledge, that you may be incited with labour and activity to pursue 
after greater measures. 
Whilst, he does not suggest that all mathematics is suitable for this purpose, since 
compared with the sciences much of mathematics leaves 'scarce any doubt', he urges 
his reader to: 
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Spend a few thoughts sometimes on the ... doctrine of infinites, 
indivisibles, and incommensurables in geometry, wherein there appear 
some insolvable difficulties: do this on purpose to give you a more 
sensible impression of the poverty of your understanding, and the 
imperfection of your knowledge. This will teach you what a vain thing 
it is to fancy that you know all things, and will instruct you to think 
modestly of your present attainments, when every dust of the earth, and 
every inch of empty space, sunnounts your understanding, and 
triumphs over your presumption. 
This exposure to tortuously difficult aspects of mathematics, however, needs to be 
mentioned only so that it may be set aside for the moment. It is to those who are 
convinced of the simplicity of essential aspects of mathematics that I now want to tum. 
There is, as I have begun to show, a stream of thought that has elevated mathematics 
over other subjects because it provides a certain kind of training in reason by dint of its 
simplicity, or what I shall call later its 'transparency'. A third, modest, theory of mental 
training emerges out of a consideration of the supposed simplicity of mathematics. 
Procedures are still important in this theory. But what distinguishes this modest fonn of 
training from those such as Descartes and Fitch is that the particular mathematical 
procedures that are learnt are not supposed to be generalised across other subject areas 
as a kind of master key. What is important is simply the disposition of the trainee to 
raises questions, give reasons and use appropriate evidence. Mathematics, therefore, is 
supposed to provide the simplest initiation into rational procedures. The same view, as 
we shall see, is sometimes carried over into more explicit social settings and in extreme 
cases to a moral or at least a quasi-moral context. What is transferable to other areas of 
life is not so much a particular generalised skill, but more an awareness or 
understanding of what characterises rational discourse. It is seeing that there is a kind of 
rational etiquette. Although this view can be traced back to St. Augustine, again, I shall 
begin with the nineteenth century educationist Thomas Tate, who has discussed the 
view in some detail. 
Half a century before Fitch, who in 1880 gave his 'Lectures on Teaching', claiming as 
we have seen that the main value of mathematics was as a fonn of logical training, an 
influential work The Philosophy of Education was published by Thomas Tate. In this 
book, Tate devotes a section to the 'cultivation of reason and judgement' , both of which 
he begins by running together, describing them as 'a mental faculty whereby we 
distinguish truth from falsehood'. From then onwards he focuses on the notion of 
167 
reason. The educational ideal of self-mastery which is made explicit in Plato, but which 
is not mentioned in Fitch, emerges again in Tate. He writes: 
Reason in a well regulated mind, holds the mastery of all the other 
faculties: it gives strength and precision to every one of them, and 
harmonizes and regulates their operations as a whole ... 119 
(Tate 1854, p.88) 
There are, here, echoes of Plato's view of the mind as involving parts or faculties, 
which have a tendency to conflict and are in need of harmonisation. Yet for Tate, whilst 
some mention is made of the passions, he prefers to contrast reason with imagination. 
Clearly, this cannot be the same imagination which we saw in Part 2 was invoked in 
support of the claim that mathematics was a fine art. It is rather more like what some 
writers have called merejancy.120 Thus Tate writes: 
When we neglect the cultivation of the reason of young persons, their 
minds become engrossed by trifles, or carried away by the wild freaks 
of imagination; and the most sacred and momentous opinions are either 
treated with unbecoming levity and indifference, or accepted without 
thought or reflection. Such persons readily become the victims of 
sophistry, or the willing slaves of superstition and bigotry. ( p.88) 
The similarity between Plato and Tate aside, there is at least one notable difference 
between them. Whereas for Plato the apprehension of reason was characterised as a 
long and difficult task, and was thus reserved for the few, Tate insists that the 
development of reason is more universally attainable. He writes: 
No faculty in our nature is more susceptible of cultivation than reason; 
and the neglect of its cultivation is attended with the greatest possible 
evils, as well to the individual, as to society at large. No doubt, there 
are original differences in the power of reason or judgement, but we 
have no hesitation in stating, that the chief source of the differences in 
this power, found amongst men, is to be traced to culture and 
regulation. (p.88) 
Given, then, that reason does provide some self-mastery - that it prevents the individual 
from being at the mercy of his or her imagination and the domination of others - given 
too that in varying degrees it is universally attainable, what contribution can 
119 My italics. It is perhaps worth pointing out, that although Tate is emphatic about. th~ imp?s~ibility of 
using mathematical procedures across other subject areas, he still sees reason as unIfymg wlthm the 
individual. 
120 See Passmore (1980) Ch.8. 
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mathematics make to its acquisition? Tate asserts that: 'the reasoning powers of a child 
are exercised whenever we put the question why, or because'. Whereas for Plato the 
'why' and 'because' ultimately depended upon an acquaintance with the Fonns, Tate's 
demand here is more modest. He seems less concerned than Plato and Descartes with 
finding or constructing the source of reason, but more with its practice. For Tate the 
reasoning faculty develops, in the first instance, as pupils begin to understand the 
necessity of giving grounds for truths, where appropriate, and responding to 'why' 
questions with appropriate 'because' answers. Like Fitch he does acknowledge the 
existence of principles, but these do not have a central role in his theory. As he remarks 
, ... the higher principles of a science should never be taught before the pupil has been 
made acquainted with the relations and analogies of the most familiar facts' (p.90). 
Thus it is with more basic elements of training in reason that he is concerned. But it is 
important to note that even at a later stage these 'higher principles' do not become the 
source of general logical principles that they were for Fitch. 
For Tate, just as it was for Descartes and Fitch, it is the simplicity and certainty of 
mathematics which make it such an ideal vehicle for developing the reasoning powers. 
Thus, in outlining these essential properties of mathematics, Tate writes: 
1. Nothing is taken for granted or on mere authority; for its principles 
of reasoning are axioms or self-evident truths. 
2. Its proper objects are the relations of numbers, lines and spaces, 
things which are cognisable by our senses, and which can be 
defined and measured, with a precision of which the obj ects of no 
other kinds of reasoning are susceptible (p.80). 
Since Tate's conception of mathematics is so close to that of Descartes' and Fitch's, it 
is worth emphasising the distinction between Tate's modest role for mathematics in the 
development of reason, and the stronger claim that mathematical training is of universal 
application. Recall that Descartes supposed that the principles of mathematics were the 
best model of reasoning for 'all the contingencies of life' .121 Similarly, Fitch argued that 
mathematical reasoning unquestionably serves' all conceivable subjects of thought' .122 
Tate, however, is sceptical about the direct transfer of mathematical reasoning to all 
other areas. This is a very important point to stress and it is upon this very point that 
Tate's view is a modest one. He remarks: 
169 
Although the mathematical sciences may form one of the best initiatory 
trainings of the reasoning powers ... it only exercises the mind in 
appreciating one kind of evidence, - namely, mathematical evidence. 
Some other subject, therefore, should be adopted for the purpose of 
developing the reasoning powers of children in relation to moral 
evidence. (p.90) 
In saying this, he is anticipating views in recent years, such as Toulmin's critique of the 
value of 'idealised logic' which I have already outlined, and those such as Hirst's theory 
which argue that knowledge is of different kinds, each one embodying its own methods 
of validation. Such views are often supposed to be conclusive in showing that some 
kind of general reasoning power cannot be achieved outside a particular enterprise. So 
that Descartes' project of employing the 'universal mathematics', and Fitch's general 
logical training for use across the areas of thought, are in the end futile. 
But Tate does not seem to be open to this kind of criticism. His important point seems 
to be that mathematics is valuable in exemplifying certain aspects of a rational 
enterprise, that of giving reasons, or more precisely of providing evidence to support a 
claim. But his insistence upon the limitation of the kind of evidence involved-
mathematical evidence - anticipates, as I have already suggested, Toulmin's critique. In 
particular Tate would agree with Toulmin that arguments are 'field dependent' with 
respect to the evidence that is appropriate in such aspects of an argument as Toulmin 
refers to as 'backing' and 'warrants'. But Toulmin did admit that some aspects of 
arguments are 'field invariant', and for Tate to preserve some kind of theory of training 
he needs to show how mathematics has some field invariants. What are they? 
The answer to this question seems trivial. It is simply that what is common to all 
arguments is the necessity for warrants and backing of some kind. But Tate's point 
seems to be that the backing used in arguments outside mathematics is not only often 
less accessible, but also that it relies upon authority. It is thus not as simple, self-
evident, and thus certain, as the backing in mathematics. It is in this way that it provides 
an example of a rational enterprise. It has what I am calling its own 'rational etiquette'. 
But in being a particularly helpful exemplification of how reason-giving is essential in a 
range of areas of life, it has nothing to show about the particular kinds of reasons that 
are appropriate in other enterprises, only that reasons, of some kind, will be appropriate 
121 My italics 
122 My italics 
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there. In learning the subject it seems we can come to learn the appropriateness of 
reason-giving, and thus become disposed to seek and supply reasons. Much, of course, 
will depend upon the kind ofteaching involved, but in principle Tate's position seems 
both distinct from the procedural accounts examined already and also somewhat 
plausible. 
He elaborates further on the limitations of the kind of reasoning embodied in the 
'mathematical sciences', and also the danger of supposing that such reasoning can be of 
general use across a range of human discourse: 
These branches of knowledge may give a false direction to the mind, if 
they are not taught with caution, and in connection with moral science. 
The certainty, and peculiar nature, of mathematical science, often 
inspire the disposition to demand the same kind of demonstration in 
other points. (p.90) 
In order to make his point even stronger, Tate quotes another theorist - one 
Abercrombie - who 'observes' that: 
'The mathematician argues certain conclusions from certain relations 
of quantity and space, which are ascertained with absolute precision~ 
and these premises are so clear, and so free from extraneous matter, 
that their truth is obvious, or is ascertained without difficulty. By being 
conversant with truths of this nature, he does not learn that kind of 
caution and severe examination, which are required in other sciences, 
for enabling us to judge whether the statements on which we proceed 
are true, and whether they include the whole truth which ought to enter 
into the investigation. He thus acquires a habit of too great facility in 
the admission of data or premises, which is the part of every 
investigation which the physical or mental enquirer scrutinizes with the 
most anxious care, - and too great confidence in the mere force of 
reasoning, without adequate attention to the previous process of 
investigation on which all reasoning must be founded. It has been, 
accordingly, remarked by Mr. Stewart, and other accurate observers of 
intellectual character, that mathematicians are apt to be credulous, in 
regard both to opinions and to matters of testimony; while on the other 
hand, persons, who are chiefly conversant with uncertain sciences, 
acquire a kind of scepticism in regard to statements, which is apt to 
lead them into the opposite error.' (p.91) 
Clearly, some generalisation of reasoning must follow from Tate's account, but this 
seems to be, as I have already suggested, simply that one is disposed to seek and supply 
reasons in other contexts as a result of experience of doing so in the simple context of 
mathematics. Unfortunately, whilst Tate gives a wealth of examples of reasoning in 
several different categories, he makes hardly any reference at all to mathematics. The 
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examples he does give are examples of inferences which can be made on the strength of 
general statements. Some of these do clearly show that, for the inference in question, 
backing and warrant for the conclusion are based upon authority. For example the truth 
of the premise of the following is not self-evident: 
Misery, disease, and death always follow drunkenness, dissipation, and 
all such crimes: then vice and misery are inseparably connected. (p.96) 
With this kind of example in mind we can construct our own mathematical one which 
does appear to rely upon more accessible evidence as its backing: 
Any number whose last digit is a zero will be divisible by 5: 166340 is 
divisible by 5. 
But when we compare other examples of Tate's, with a mathematical one of our own 
making, then things are not quite so convincing. Compare Tate's: 
with: 
All animals with four feet are called quadrupeds: then, a cow must be a 
quadruped. A fowl is not a quadruped - why? (p.93) 
All quadrilaterals which have four right angles are called rectangles: 
then a square must be a rectangle. 
Clearly, the backing for the conclusion 'a cow must be a quadruped' is based on the 
authoritative statement about what is meant by 'quadruped'. But the mathematical 
argument is also based on the 'authority' of the use of words such as 'quadrilateral' in 
precisely the same way. 
As I have said Tate gives many examples of inferences some of which are clearly based 
on authority or experience beyond the scope of the early experiences of a pupil. 
Nevertheless, some authority of naming exists in mathematics. So the strength of Tate's 
view still rests upon the extent to which the authority is less marked in mathematical 
evidence than it is elsewhere. This is something which I shall address in the following 
sections, as I bring other writers from the past and present into the discussion to show 
how they, too, have been impressed by the minimal extent to which authority operates 
in mathematical contexts. 
However, before moving on to a closer look at how other writers have taken up the 
issue of authority in learning, and related issues, it is worth asking whether other 
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activities could not provide the same purpose that Tate believed was best provided by 
mathematics. In particular, certain games like chess may similarly exemplify the same 
principles, except perhaps that one is not normally called upon to give reasons for chess 
moves. It is this in respect, where discourse is essential to the activity, that mathematics 
does seem to have a special place which is fairly resistant to objections and alternatives. 
Everyday life however can provide opportunities for asking 'why' and eliciting 
'because .. .'. Moreover, whilst much of the evidence appealed to in everyday life is 
arguably based on authority, some reasoning is surely based upon backing which 
depends upon fairly straightforward perceptual evidence. For example such reasoning 
as: 'why' did you take off your jumper?' 'Because I'm hot' seems to be based on 
evidence which is perfectly clear. Thus to encourage reasoning of this kind would issue 
in a training which would meet some of the demands of Tate's theory. But it seems to 
me that he could still argue that mathematics provides a simple system of results which 
are missing in everyday perception and in which more sustained explanation may be 
sought on behalf of the pupil. But the plausibility of Tate's account still depends upon a 
sensitive trade-off between those aspects ofhis theory which distinguish it from the 
ambitious claims of earlier procedural accounts, and those which distinguish it from the 
value of reason in famiJiar contexts like games and everyday life. 
If the modest theory of mental training based on Tate's view can be upheld, then it does 
seem to fulfil the demands of the HMI booklet mentioned above (see page 131), from 
which some important points were raised. In particular not only does such mental 
training not imply drill, but some intelligence is necessarily involved. The training on 
this theory bas, arguably, fairly immediate effect too. Also whilst I have agreed that this 
training might not be exclusive to mathematics (since reasoning in more familiar 
contexts bas an important part to play, the drawing of inferences, for example) 
mathematics does appear to be a particularly suitable candidate. 
Mathematics and morality 
Tate is surely right to restrict the scope of mathematical reasoning, and not to suppose 
that it might be applied to other areas of life in quite the way that some might suppose. 
There is, however, another reason why the subject might be associated with areas 
outside its own particular domain. Mathematics has traditionally enjoyed a certainty not 
possible in other subjects, even though many now believe that this is because 
mathematics ii a formal subject devoid of meaning. Thus, when 
we say of some mathematics that it is right (or wrong), we are often only suggesting that 
a method has been used correctly (or incorrectly). In other words 'that is right (wrong)' 
means not so much that you have revealed a truth (or falsity) but rather that the 
conclusion follows correctly (incorrectly) from what is given. Whatever the source of 
the use of terms like 'right' and 'wrong', as ways of speaking about mathematics, the 
fact that they are used in this way has led people to suppose that there is a connection 
between mathematics and morality. Once a mathematical system is constructed, what 
follows from the system is inescapable. To face up to this kind of inevitability, has 
sometimes been likened to possessing a kind of courage. It is as though one must accept 
the consequences of a mathematical deduction, in the same way as one must accept the 
consequences of one's actions. Mathematics has thus been associated with character 
building or even a form of moral training. Myers (in Moritz, 1914 pp 69-70) for 
example writes: 
I do not maintain that the chief value of the study of arithmetic consists 
in the lessons of morality that arise from this study. I claim only that, to 
be impressed from day to day, that there is something that is right as 
an answer to the questions with which one is able to grapple, and that 
there is the wrong answer - that there are ways in which the right 
answer can be established as right, that these ways automatically reject 
error and slovenliness, and that the learner is able himself to manipulate 
these ways and to arrive at the establishment of the true as opposed to 
the untrue, this relentless hewing to the line and stopping at the line, 
must colour distinctly the thought life of the pupil with more than a 
tinge of morality ... To be neighbourly with truth, to feel one's self 
somewhat facile in ways of recognising and establishing what is right, 
what is correct, to find the wrong persistently and unfailingly rejected 
as of no value, to feel that one can apply these ways for himself: that 
one can think and work independently, have a rea~ a positive, and a 
purifying effect upon moral character. They are the quiet, steady 
undertones of the work that appeal to the learner for the sanction of his 
best judgement, and these are the really significant matters in schoo I 
work. It is not the noise and bluster, not even the dramatics or the 
polemics from the teacher's desk' that abide longest and leave the 
deepest and stablest imprint upon character. It is these still, small 
voices that speak unmistakably for the right and against the wrong and 
the erroneous that really form human character. When the school 
subjects are arranged on the basis of the degree to which they 
contribute to the moral upbuilding of human character good arithmetic 
will be well up the list. (See Moritz, 1914 p.70) 
Myer's extract seems to be related to Tate's view that mathematics is a form of 
exemplification. But he goes further than Tate and seems to me to be overstating the 
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case. There are clearly two senses of 'right' and 'wrong'. Both might be regarded as 
normative but not both moral. To have the 'right idea' is not to suggest that one is any 
more moral than one was before one had such an idea. It simply means that one is 
following good practice. But 'good' here, need not necessarily be the moral sense of 
'good'. Indeed, mathematics is arguably one of the most morally neutral disciplines, so 
the use of right and wrong in mathematics does not entail that one becomes any more 
moral by getting things right. 
Mathematics and social value 
However, an important point does arise here. Ifwrong or right mathematics were 
dependent upon good or bad practice, where does this practice originate? Is it the case 
that authority of some kind must enter the picture and if so where does this originate? 
We may acknowledge that 'right' and 'wrong' are neutral terms yet still want to insist 
that there is important social value in learning mathematics. There is a sense in which 
Tate has already anticipated this point of view in his suggestion that mathematics 
provides a forum for asking and giving reasons, and moreover that it is accessible in a 
way that other subjects are not. Several writers more recently have made essentially the 
same point though often they have invoked the social notion of 'authority' to make their 
point. In mathematics, they argue that what is right or wrong, true or false, can in a 
sense be determined by anyone. Sometimes this point has even been used to link 
mathematics and 'democracy'. 
If such views can be sustained then we might have found a justification for learning 
mathematics that avoids the dilemma that concerned John White which I outlined 
earlier. Recall (see page 7) that White argued that a National Curriculum must neither 
advocate a particular lifestyle, nor remain neutral since in being neutral it was tacitly 
committed to the ideal of autonomy. Nevertheless, White points out that the 'general 
argument for a National Curriculum rests on the notion of democracy', which as he 
points out 'has to be taken as a system of government in which every citizen has an 
equal right to participate in the exercise and control of political power'. Aims for a 
National Curriculum must therefore embody this assumption. If it could be shown that 
mathematics provides an individual with certain dispositions required for taking his or 
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her place in a democratic society, then this would provide some justification for 
including it within a National Curriculum. 123 
We can contrast a democratic society with one in which control is by the few and the 
individual's opinion counts for little or nothing. Decisions are based on the few people 
who carry authority. In the field of education it appears that some subjects embody 
authority in a similar way and are thus less democratic than others. Sawyer remarks: 
If ... a French teacher tells me that the French always use one phrase to 
convey a particular idea, and never use the phrase that I have put in my 
homework, I can only bow to superior knowledge. If I produce a 
dictionary in support of my version, I will be told the dictionary is out 
of date; people do not speak like that today. (Sawyer, 1964 pp.81-2) 
Often, in response to the question why the French express themselves in a certain way, 
the best that can be said in reply is 'because they do'. Mathematics, it seems, is different 
in this respect. As Skemp (1971, plIO) points out: 'In mathematics perhaps more than 
any other subject the learning process depends on agreement, and this agreement rests 
upon pure reason'. Skemp argues that in mathematics the teacher must submit to 
exactly the same rules as the pupils so that within the sphere of mathematics 
authoritarian pronouncements are out of place. In particular he writes: 
If a teacher makes a mistake when working on the blackboard and a 
member of the class points it out, the teacher has no alternative but to 
correct it. Teachers are subject to the same rules as pupils, and these 
are not the rules of an authoritarian hierarchy but of a shared 
structure of concepts .124 (p.ll 0) 
Fitch makes the same point when he remarks that mathematics: 
... is the one department of school-study in which the sceptical and 
inquisitive spirit has the most legitimate scope; in which authority goes 
for nothing. In other departments of instruction you have a right to ask 
for the scholar's confidence, and to expect many things to be received 
on your testimony with the understanding that they will be verified 
afterwards. 125 (Fitch, 1902 p.320 
Since it is true that authority in some sense is out of place in mathematics, it seems to be 
one small step forward for Sawyer to conclude that: 
123 Clearly, the practical utility of mathematics already provides some knowledge which is indispensable 
for the individual to take up his or her place in a democratic state. But this bears little upon character. 
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Mathematics is, or should be, the most democratic subject in the world; 
in mathematics there is no evidence available to the teacher that is not 
available to the student. 126 (Sawyer, 1964 p.82) 
But even if the gradual move from certain observations of the procedures of 
mathematics leads us to the view that mathematics is 'the most democratic subject in 
the world', that does not make the subject self-justifying in a National Curriculum. The 
use of democratic is not a political notion in mathematics. It does not connect with the 
idea of political control, though it does suggest that the manner in which mathematics 
proceeds has something in common with the manner in which social or political 
decisions are reached in a democracy. But is this true? Surely, the truths of mathematics 
are not straightforwardly reached by an individual's decision, even if it is true that a 
choice of method might be available. Surely, once a mathematical system is 
constructed, what follows from the system is inescapable. In this sense at least facing 
the inescapable in mathematics is character building. 
The Transparency of Mathematics 
What we must be careful about here is linking those authors, who want to rule out the 
authority of the teacher in settling mathematical decisions, with a questionable view of 
mathematics. To see what I mean by this cautious remark, consider firstly how the 
following extract from Augustine can be linked with the comments of the modem 
writers whom we have just discussed. In St. Augustine's Free-Will ii 20-24 Augustine 
asks his interlocutor Evodius whether he can 'find something which all reasoning 
beings see in common, each with his own reason and his mind' The latter replies: 
I see that there are many such things, but it will be enough to mention 
one of them. The principle and truth of number is open to all 
reasonable beings, in such a way that every calculator may try to grasp 
it with his own reason and intelligence. One man can do it easily, 
another only with difficulty, while another cannot do it at all. But the 
truth of number is the same for all who have the power to grasp it; it is 
not changed and transmuted, so to speak, into nourishment for the 
person who takes it. Therefore it is not truth which fails when someone 
makes a mistake in calculation; truth remains true and complete, and 
the less of it a man sees, the more he is in error. (See Howie, 1969a pp. 
245-6) 
124 My italics 
125 My italics 
126 My italics 
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Augustine is one of the earliest writers who not only believes that mathematics is 
grasped with one's own reason rather than by the authority of others, but who also goes 
a little further and suggests that it is a moral shortcoming if one refuses to see the 
h 127 Th d" fi S . trut . e tra Ihon rom t. Augustme, Tate, Skemp and Sawyer, all of whom are 
trying to suggest that mathematics in one way or other is either simple, free of authority, 
open to reason etc, is nevertheless open to one objection which needs to be considered. 
There is a risk that our faith in the transparency of mathematics contains some aspect of 
what Popper (1963) calls the 'truth is manifest' doctrine. This doctrine, which 
according to Popper is especially associated with Bacon and Descartes, embodies the 
belief that 'truth may perhaps be veiled. But it may reveal itself. It represented what 
Popper calls an 'optimistic epistemology'. Its exponents, he writes: 
... taught that there was no need for any man to appeal to authority in 
matters of truth because each man carried the sources of knowledge in 
himself; either in his power of sense-perception which he may use for 
careful observation of nature, or in his power of intellectual intuition 
which he may use to distinguish truth from falsehood by refusing any 
idea which is not clearly and distinctly perceived by the intellect. 128 
(Popper, 1963 p.5) 
An 'optimistic epistemology' is welcomed as a contrast to epistemological pessimism 
which Popper says is: 
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.. .linked, historically, with a doctrine of human depravity, and it tends 
to lead to the demand for the establishment of powerful traditions and 
the entrenchment of a powerful authority which would save man from 
his folly and his wickedness. (p.6) 
But then he asks 'how can we ever fall into error if truth is manifest?' His reply is: 
.. through our sinful refusal to see the manifest truth; or because out 
minds harbour prejudices inculcated by education and tradition, or 
other evil influences which have perverted our originally pure and 
innocent minds. (p.7) 
Indeed in St. Augustine we an excellent example of this move: 
127 Consider the old story about the mathematics teacher who when presenting some proof to his pupils. 
announced that'it was surely "obvious". However, he paused, left the room and returned after some whIle 
and repeated "Yes, it is obvious"! ",' . 
128 In recent education, too, especially amongst teachers of young children, the expressIOn mathematICs IS 
all around us' has traces of the 'truth is manifest' view. After all it was supposed to show that 
mathematics is not so elusive after all. Yet the mathematics is only around us after we know what it is. A 
better expression is that opportunities for learning mathematics are all around us. Pi is not really in the 
sky! 
... everyone who discusses the question, whom God has endowed with 
good ability and who is not clouded by obstinacy, is compelled to 
admit that the law and truth of numbers do not depend on physical 
sensation, but stand inviolate and pure, and are open to the common 
inspection of all rational beings. (See Howie, 1969a p.249) 
Despite its obvious attraction, then, Popper rejects the truth is manifest view because he 
believed that it did ultimately appeal to an authority, namely, 'the authority of the 
senses' and the' authority of the intellect'. In so doing it dogmatically refused to 
acknowledge human fallibility which is central to Popper's own theory. He believed that 
we do err, but that we get closer to the truth by acknowledging this fact and by 
, ... persistently searching for our errors: by indefatigable rational criticism, and self-
criticism' .129 (p.l6) Popper's views are important in showing that we ought not to press 
too far the view upon which the modest view of mental training rests. 
It is perfectly reasonable to draw out those features of mathematics which show that it 
has some autonomy and does not seem to depend upon custom and tradition to the 
extent that other disciplines do. But to over-emphasise these features is counter-
productive. Recall that the modest theory was supposed to provide an initiation into the 
rational enterprises. But if the very feature of this mental training - the ease by which 
mathematics can exemplify the giving of reasons - arises from a wholehearted belief in 
the transparency of the discipline, this undermines the very critical spirit which it is 
supposed to engender, and then of course it is self-defeating. 
129 In mathematics Popper's approach was developed by Lakatos (1976). 
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Summary and Conclusion of Part 3 
A distinction between the so-called practical utility of mathematics and its purpose of 
mental training may I think be drawn out by distinguishing between those by whom 
mathematics is used and the kind of ends which result. When mathematics is 
consciously used by an individual as a tool to get something done, which is fairly 
clearly defined and perhaps relatively immediate, then mathematics may be said to have 
practical utility. But mathematics may also be regarded - 'used' if you will- as what I 
have called a 'vehicle'. In this respect an individual might simply display his or her 
virtuosity but, additionally, an educator might use mathematics as a vehicle not simply 
to display mental acumen in his pupils, but more importantly to improve the mind in 
some extra-mathematical way. 
It might be supposed that all mental training is simply a particular capacity to carry out 
an operation of some kind. But I have shown that in the area of health, or more 
specifically stress therapy, we do have a form of mental training, namely, meditation, 
which is not strictly undertaken in order to facilitate some determinate activity. It is 
supposed to promote a more indeterminate outcome of personal well-being. This 
provides us with one clear model of the outcome of mental training. But what needs to 
be shown is how the learning of mathematics could hope to produce personal well-
being of a kind like this. I have tried to show that certain theories of mental training do 
suppose that this end may be achieved, through the study of mathematics, especially if 
we regard this end as self-mastery. 
I have outlined three different models of mental training by tracing back those whom I 
see as their earliest exponents and also by following through their legacies. The three 
accounts derive from Plato, Descartes and Tate. Since each ofthem is connected in 
some way to the acquisition or the development of reason and that this has been 
regarded as essential to pr~moting self mastery, I have connected these theories, to a 
lesser or greater extent, to this educational ideal. The nature of reason, which each of 
these main theorists believe mathematics has a part in achieving, has changed 
throughout history. With Plato it seems to be an object of contemplation, with Descartes 
and Fitch certain kinds of procedure. Indeed, with Fitch it has become identical with 
logic. Tate however is concerned less with the source of reason per se and more with 
the practice of reason based on 'mathematical evidence'. 
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We have seen that Plato was curiously preoccupied with the special nature of 
mathematics to produce 'paradoxes', in contemplation of which we find ourselves 
engaged in philosophy and drawn closer towards reified Reason. Reason thus conceived 
as the Form of the Good, becomes the ultimate object of contemplation which reveals 
what it true, good and beautiful, and why it is so. The change in metaphysical 
background makes Plato's theory difficult to accept in toto. Nevertheless, I have argued 
that his paradoxes have remained alive throughout the centuries. For this reason they 
ought not to be ignored. But more that this, I have shown that at least one recent 
theorist, Brent Davis, has developed a theory which whilst not owing anything 
consciously to Plato is still partly based on the revelation which the 'unsayable' in 
mathematics is supposed to provide. 
The most familiar theory of mathematics as a form of mental training is probably that 
which derives from Descartes. This theory identifies reason not with something existing 
independently and 'outside' the individual, as it was for Plato, but with certain 
procedures. The rigorous deductive method based on intuitively known premises and 
rules of passage, by which mathematical results are validated, if not originated, are 
supposed on this theory to have application in extra-mathematical contexts. Indeed they 
are supposed to be the universal canons of truth acquisition. It is no surprise that 
mathematics is thus seen as the subject par excellence for training the mind. With 
Descartes such training still leads to self-mastery in the sense that awareness of the 
centrality of procedures allows an instrumentalisation of the passions, which have now 
become separated from the mind, to take place. 
The attraction of what is essentially Descartes's view still persists at the end of the 
nineteenth century when it is restated by Fitch. By then mental training has become 
training in logic, again of universal application. In a sense, then, we may say that one of 
the predominant overarching views of mental training through mathematics arises 
through the connection of the discipline with reason. But reason has in a sense become 
transformed, perhaps even emasculated, as it has changed from being part of the 
furniture of the universe, to the procedures carried out by rational individuals to the 
application of logic. To this extent alone the justification of mathematics for this 
purpose has also lost some of its conviction. But there are other reasons why the 
DescarteslFitch procedural view of the matter cannot in the end carry much, if any, 
weight in educational justification. This is because by no means all of the areas of 
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knowledge may be seen to be so tightly articulated by principles which the procedures 
of mathematics may serve. This is clearly shown by Passmore and Hamlyn. Moreover, 
as Toulmin has demonstrated, in general, the principles of argumentation have fewer 
invariants to share with mathematical arguments than we might suppose. 
It remains for Tate and his legacy to provide us with a similar but more modest theory 
of mental training yet still identified as training in reason. What he believed was the 
simplicity of mathematical evidence makes it a suitable backing and warrant (in 
Toulmin's sense) for inference making and thus an ideal subject for initiating pupils 
into rational discourse where the business of giving evidence is necessary. But the scope 
of mathematical evidence is not extended into all areas of life. In this respect it is 
distinguishable from the other two broad mental training views. It is thus at its best in 
the early stages of education and is only generalisable with the respect that pupils are 
disposed to seek and supply reasons of some kind in mathematics and elsewhere. 
Tate was particularly impressed by the fact that mathematics is less dependent upon 
authority than other areas of life. Thus when a pupil is invited to give reasons, those 
which he or she gives are somehow more authentic. If Tate is correct in this respect 
then the mathematical forum is distinguishable on the one hand from the rule following 
activities like chess, where reasons for moves are available but not normally articulated, 
and from ordinary discourse where reasons are sought but which still might need to 
depend upon authority. 
Others, too, have continued in Tate's tradition. The inappropriateness of authority, even 
the democratic nature of mathematics has for some writers seemed to give the subject 
an attractive social dimension. At its most extreme we can characterise the Tate legacy 
as adopting something like the 'truth is manifest' view which ~opper has famously 
identified and duly criticised. For all that, it seems to me that Tate's view provides us 
with the best model for a mental training which meets the suggestion of the kind 
referred to in the HMI booklet. Clearly, some reasons in everyday experience are based 
on direct perception and thus, like mathematics, do have simplicity and certainty. Such 
reasoning opportunities mathematics cannot hope to displace. Nevertheless, 
mathematical evidence is, additionally, of a somewhat broader kind and this provides 
formal and rich opportunities, especially for young pupils, to make inferences. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
Now that the discussion is finished it is time to draw the parts together and see what the 
overall conclusions are, what shortcomings it may have and how further work might 
contribute to the lines of enquiry which I have begun. The value of the task, as I 
suggested in the introduction, lies in showing how mathematics contributes not only to 
the general question of the aims of education but also, to some extent, to the question of 
cognition. Moreover, whilst several writers have already approached the topic of why 
we learn mathematics and what its aims should be, it has been my contention that these 
are not especially illuminating. One reason for this is that they have relied rather too 
much on one or other of two approaches; I will elaborate on these a little further and say 
how my enquiry stands in relation to them. 
In seeking a rationale for learning mathematics one approach is to examine the nature 
of mathematics, to consider certain of its properties, and thus to draw out aspects of 
mathematics which either seem to be obviously educationally worthwhile, or which 
may be shown to have some significant educational worth by further argument. For 
example, we may be struck by the fact that mathematics is a kind of tool for practical 
purposes, a system of logical relations, a powerful language, a source of fascination etc. 
Then, if we believe that education should be concerned with empowering pupils by 
providing them with tools, developing logical thinking, acquiring language, stimulating 
the imagination etc, then the value of mathematics is confirmed and we have some 
reasons for teaching it. 
But the nature of mathematics is not as straightforward as it may seem to be. There is 
room for disagreement upon precisely what it is. I have taken a fairly orthodox view of 
mathematics, in accordance with most of the theorists whose work I have explored. I 
have not, for example, explored the so-called 'enactivist theory' which Brent Davis 
partly bases his conclusions upon. This is because I was more concerned to draw out the 
similarities between his and Plato's theory. Moreover, although my discussion finishes 
with some of Popper's views I have not explored the 'fallibilist' 130 theory of 
mathematics, which grows out of his philosophy. On this theory the nature of 
mathematics is not simply the systematic body of knowledge derived from axioms and 
characterised by certainty, which I have supposed it to be. However, whilst alternative 
130 See for example Ernest (1994) and Lakatos (1976) 
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views on the nature of mathematics may open up other avenues, they are just as likely to 
confirm some of my conclusions. I have found powerful arguments to show that 
mathematics is not a fine art, but if mathematics is regarded more as a critical process 
than a product this would appear to provide additional support for my arguments. It is 
less clear whether my critique of mental training would be undermined by fallibism. 
Whilst the supposed certainty of mathematics impressed each of the theorists I have 
discussed, the importance of processes was just as important to Descartes, Fitch and 
Tate. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that the fitness of purposes which I have 
been seeking must be seen in terms of a particular conception of mathematics. 
Another way of approaching the question, of seeking a rationale for mathematics 
education, is to look at things the other way round. Then what is first attempted is a 
deliberate spelling out of those aspects of education which are of special value: 
creativity, autonomy, aesthetic experience, self-sufficiency, collaboration, the awareness 
of other cultures etc. It is then argued that mathematics is at least one way in which 
some of these ideals may be achieved, and once again the value of mathematics is 
supposed to be confirmed. I have approached my enquiry from some educational ideals. 
In particular, I have approached the question from an aspect of personal autonomy -
self-mastery - and also from the goal of self-knowledge. But other goals remain which 
may be linked to mathematics, particularly though not exclusively, that of citizenship 
which I have not mentioned explicitly, though I have given some consideration to 
democracy. The question of the extent to which mathematics can contribute to 
citizenship is one for which further detailed work would be fruitful. 
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But to say that mathematics is one way in which certain educational goals are attained is 
not necessarily to show that it is the best way. My research has shown that across the 
various aspects that I have explored, there is disagreement amongst the remarks of 
Plato, Locke, Leibeck, Whitehead, Stolnitz, Huntley, Poincare, Papert, Fitch, Watson, 
Tate and St. Augustine about the accessibility of some of the valued aspects of 
mathematics. These writers may of course have different levels of mathematics in mind. 
Nevertheless, the fact that they take issue at all means that we cannot simply take it for 
granted that if certain properties exist in mathematics then they exist for all as a 
rationale for learning the subject. We must take this point seriously. In particular, the 
amount of time taken to be in a position to appreciate the aesthetic properties of 
mathematics might not make mathematics the best way of achieving such goals. Further 
empirical work of the kind carried out by Papert (1993) and of that discussed by 
Dreyfus & Eisenberg (1986) is necessary to confirm that what exists is sufficiently 
accessible. 
In practice, these two approaches to the question of seeking a rationale for mathematics 
are not so clear-cut. They are no more clearly cut than the way in which a mathematical 
proof is obtained by starting from premises and working one's way to the conclusion. 
The psychological processes may have indeed involved working forwards from the 
premises to the conclusion, or backwards from the conclusion to the premises, but it is 
just as likely that a combination of both are at work. Similarly, we may begin with some 
educational ideals and work towards the nature and properties of mathematics and hope 
that any gaps that appear on the way can be filled. But there is always the risk that in 
determining what we believe to be the nature and properties of mathematics we are 
covertly looking for something which we already value. In examining education, too, 
we may already be selecting those goals which we believe align themselves to particular 
aspects of mathematics. There is a narrow line between setting forth a rationale and 
making a rationalisation. 
My research has revealed how important it is to follow through carefully both the 
connections from mathematics to educational goals and those from educational goals to 
mathematics. This is especially true of the section on mathematics and art in Part 2. 
Little or no attempt is made by certain prominent theorists, most of whom are 
mathematicians, to trace back the educational implications of asserting that 
mathematics ought to be regarded as a fine art. Of course, as mathematicians, those 
writers were not intending to make explicit educational connections between 
mathematics and its resemblance to the fine arts. But it is important to note that a 
rationale for mathematics cannot be derived simply from connecting mathematics and 
fine art. To adopt this approach leaves the crucial connection between fine art and 
education not spelt out. In such cases what we have is simply what I have called 
'justification by association'. The consequence of this is clear: the value of mathematics 
still depends upon an adequate rationale for that with which it is supposed to be 
associated, in this case the fine arts. So rather than providing an answer it simply 
relocates the question. 
Most of those who have only provided justification by associating mathematics with the 
fine arts have constantly made reference to the same two broad aspects of mathematics: 
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the creativity involved in its origination and certain aesthetic features, typically beauty, 
which it is supposed to have. Additional attempts to deal with the absence of intrinsic 
emotion in mathematics, by trying to show that the presence of emotion in the fine arts 
is less characteristic than we might ordinarily suppose, I have argued, is not convincing 
either. Of course, anything may be indexed as fine art by the 'artworld'. But this only 
shows that it is time to look at the matter the other way round and take the alternative 
approach; we need to consider what educational ideals would be addressed by indexing 
mathematics in this way. 
In considering the special way in which the fine arts can contribute towards the 
particular educational goal of self-knowledge, outlined by White, I have argued that 
mathematics could never equal them in this respect. The particular kind of self-
knowledge which the fine arts can provide depends upon treating human perception as 
an end, and not simply as a starting point. Mathematics, like Science, must at some 
point leave the human point of view behind and in this important respect can not be 
considered to be a fine art. But it has to be emphasised that the examination of 
mathematics alone does not lead to this conclusion. Careful consideration must be made 
of the fine arts and their role in education. Yet this referral back to art and education 
does not produce an altogether negative conclusion. In considering mathematics, once 
again, one writer was found who believed that self-knowledge, of a kind, is realisable 
through mathematics and thus that mathematics is a fine art. As it turns out, the kind of 
self-knowledge obtained from mathematics is of a narrower, less pressing kind. 
Furthermore since such self-knowledge arises largely from a consideration of how 
mathematical systems are created rather than discovered, this view has the same defects 
as others which invoke creativity. More importantly its goal is of dubious accessibility 
in general education. 
Taking our attention away from mathematics and towards art facilitates further fruitful 
analysis. The attempts to assimilate mathematics to the fine arts are extravagant but they 
are not wholly in vain. By disentangling the usual connections between fine art and 
aesthetics - by showing that art and aesthetics are not coexistent - a more defensible 
claim can be upheld, namely, that aesthetic properties in mathematics exist. Such 
properties can be linked straightforwardly to the educational ideal of personal 
enrichment through the enjoyment achieved by either contemplating or discursively 
attending to objects in a non-purposeful way. Although I have taken one aesthetician's 
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notion of pattern as my main point of entry into mathematics, I have shown that 
aesthetic experience is available, to some extent, at different levels. At one level such 
experience is possible by contemplating or following mathematical pattern or argument 
and appreciating it simply for its formal properties. At another level what is involved is 
producing mathematical argument which meets certain formal ideals. At a higher level, 
though scarcely accessible in school, similar aesthetic ideals may be met in the studying 
or constructing of mathematical systems. In addition, I have also pointed out that not all 
reference to aesthetics in mathematics links directly to the non-purposeful. Aesthetics in 
mathematics is not always a matter of experience. It has been suggested that the 
unconscious working of the mind is regulated by an aesthetic sense, more developed in 
some individuals than others, which is functional in selecting appropriate mathematical 
solutions to problems. In a similar way, the pursuit of mathematical games and puzzles, 
purely for the fascination which engagement in them brings, constitutes an important 
purpose of mathematics. But the use of games as a motivational factor is quite 
compatible with a thoroughgoing justification of mathematics on the strength of its 
practical utility. It is on this very point that the distinction between aims and purposes 
becomes important. Aesthetic appreciation can be something we aim at without 
necessarily being what mathematics is partly for. 
If several of the arguments I have discussed surrounding art and aesthetics, began from 
a consideration of the nature of mathematics, the case for mental training began from 
the other end. In using meditation as a very simple model of achieving a kind of mental 
composure in stress relief, I sought in mathematics the wherewithal to bring a 
comparable kind of well-being. This led me to one of the earliest coherent theories of 
education and one which did begin by outlining personal and societal well-being before 
going on to attempt to show how mathematics might provide some of this. Thus Plato 
seeking the Just State realised that this is a function of ajust individual who is so, only 
when his potentially competing passions are in harmony. He therefore sought a means 
of providing self-mastery. Since such harmony is ultimately achieved by contemplating 
the Form of the Good, or in other words by being ruled by reason, then anything which 
sets one on this road is going to be potentially educationally worthwhile. A 
consideration of mathematics shows that it sits midway on the road and hence acts as a 
stepping stone on the ascent to the Good. Its puzzling properties, too, stimulate the 
mind and are supposed to shake the individual out of his complacency. I have also 
shown that the cognitive use of mathematics if it ultimately calms the mind, is unlike 
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the fairly mechanical process of meditation. It is first necessary to rouse the mind into a 
fairly long and arduous task of finding reason. For all this, Plato still does not prove a 
particularly convincing case. His consideration of the nature of mathematics as 
something which provides paradoxes, whilst being of some philosophical interest, is 
scarcely sufficient to do the job he thinks it can, especially if we strip off the 
metaphysical background which is implied in his theory. 
Descartes, too, begins away from mathematics, as it were, but barely in the area of 
education, and seeks a united approach to the pursuit of the sciences. In so doing he 
shows how mathematical procedures should be the model upon which to construct any 
enterprise in which truth is sought. Such general procedures which mathematics is 
supposed to provide persist in later writers like Fitch. I have argued that the 
generalisability of such processes is not tenable. The most plausible theory of mental 
training I have argued is one in which mathematics provides clear and simple evidence 
for initiation into inference making, not as a set of principles of reasoning which may be 
applied across other areas of discourse. 
My enquiry has been centred round an exploration of the question of the purposes of 
mathematics education. The two questions 'why do X?' and 'what's the use of X?' 
though not identical in meaning, are nonetheless somewhat interchangeable in uncritical 
discourse. We are so prone to equating the reasons for doing something with the use 
that it has, that the questions 'why do mathematics?' and 'what's the use of 
mathematics?' have in education, as elsewhere, a close similarity in meaning. I hope 
that it is clear that my enquiry has shown that they not equivalent. 
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In a trivial sense 'why do X?' and 'what's the use of X?' are not equivalent simply 
because, as I have shown, theorists since ancient times have set out reasons for doing 
mathematics which are contrasted with at least one particular idea of usefulness. That is 
to say, such reasons are supposed to be distinct from those which concern the 
application of mathematics to achieve fairly immediate and accessible extra-
mathematical ends in everyday life on behalf of the possessor of mathematical 
knowledge. But to set out supposedly non-utility reasons does not imply that these are 
good reasons. Indeed, other theorists, perhaps by equating the very questions 'why do 
mathematics?' and 'what's the use of mathematics?' or perhaps working with a more 
generous interpretation of the notion of 'useful' , characterise all reasons for learning the 
subject in terms of use. I have shown that beyond even a fairly broad notion of utility 
there are non-trivial reasons for learning mathematics. Doing mathematics for its own 
sake, though a more complex notion than it appears, is a possibility. In one of its 
interpretations, which involves engaging in mathematics for enjoyment, mathematics is 
not reducible to any helpful notion of usefulness. I have argued that an educator's use, if 
it must even be called that, of mathematics as a vehicle for training the mind, is also 
separable from the utility of mathematics conceived as something which can be applied 
by the possessor. 
I have been at pains, then, to identify, describe, analyse and criticise non-utility reasons 
for engaging in mathematics and I want to defend them against being swallowed up 
under the name of utility. Nevertheless I defend them guardedly. This is because whilst 
admitting that non-trivial non-utility reasons for learning mathematics do exist, they are 
nevertheless open to question in a way in which the utility ones are not. This is an 
important part of my conclusion and I will enlarge upon it presently. 
Whether or not we do equate the question of the value of mathematics with its use, 
much, if not all, of mathematics is developed for fairly transparent practical application. 
Even mathematics that is not developed with a clear practical end, is nevertheless 
valued highly if it is useful within the discipline itself. History, too, shows us that it has 
been central to the growth and development of civilisation, that civilisation would have 
been impoverished without the development and application of mathematics. It is 
evident, too, that mathematics is still being used and it takes little to convince anyone 
that it will always be used in the future. 
Nevertheless, there still, of course, remains a gap between remarking that something has 
uses and thereby asserting that it has educational value. One difficulty is the extent to 
which mathematics is supposed to be universally useful. What is implicit in many 
rationales for learning mathematics is not only how some individuals, but rather how all 
individuals, will make use of the mathematics prescribed for them. My section on 
counting quite clearly shows that this particular aspect was developed for its utility and 
remains of paramount importance to all. It is impossible to gainsay this, though it is of 
importance to ensure that pupils are aware of it. But it is often not this aspect of 
mathematics, nor even those other areas of rudimentary mathematics, some of which I 
have also reviewed, that are in question when the reasons for learning mathematics are 
raised. It is the justification of the sustained study of the more complex areas which is 
often sought. I have in mind those areas of mathematics which many find very difficult 
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to master and for which considerable time and energy is required, time and energy 
which could be used for other things thought to be more worthwhile. So, although the 
utility of mathematics is at once self-evident, its force as a justification for all pupils in 
school may nevertheless be inversely proportional to the depth and breadth of the 
content under consideration. 
Of course doubts about the extent to which utility is self-sufficient as a justification, 
beyond the rudimentary stages, may be unfounded. Further work on the universal value 
of mathematics for such areas as citizenship, for example, might throw light on this 
problem. Nevertheless, it is when a particular level of mathematics seems to be hard to 
justify, for all individuals at least, that non-utility reasons are sometimes introduced to 
supplement, or even more ambitiously, to replace the utility reasons. 13 I When doubts 
are raised about the amount of time and effort involved in learning the subject, these 
other non-utility reasons are sometimes set out to augment the rationale. It is has 
therefore been of crucial importance to examine carefully the non-utility reasons to see 
how fit they are for mathematics education. If the non-utility reasons are of only 
marginal importance, then the utility arguments are left to stand up almost unaided. 
I come now to my guarded comments about non-utility reasons for learning 
mathematics. If at least one of the aims of exploring non-utility reasons is to see 
whether the self-evident utility reasons, which are convincing in the rudimentary 
aspects of mathematics, may be supplemented by other reasons, then my work has 
shown that difficulties emerge. Firstly, the most plausible view of mental training 
stresses how it is particularly the procedures within the elementary stages of 
mathematics that are appropriate for such training. Indeed ifthis 'modest' view of 
mental training is to have value it is valued precisely because it provides an early 
initiation into rational enterprises. Ifwe delay this process then the other disciplines can 
take care of themselves. If this is so then a justification does arise, but at a place in 
mathematics where a supplementation of reasons is scarcely necessary, where the utility 
rationale is arguably at its strongest. The same point seems to be true even in a less 
plausible view of mental training where mathematics is supposed to provide stimulation 
for reflective thinking. For Plato such reflection depended upon a mature approach to 
the subject, yet it is in the elementary areas of mathematics that this typically takes 
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place. So that to benefit from the paradoxes or the 'unsayable' in mathematics few 
convincing reasons are given by Plato, or recently by Davis, for sustained learning in 
complex areas of mathematics for this purpose, even if such areas are not ruled out as 
appropriate 'sites' for contemplation and self-knowledge. 
But if the case for mental training does not provide convincing support for utility 
reasons as the subject matter goes beyond the rudimentary, it may be supposed that the 
case for aesthetics does. But my earlier remarks do show that if accessibility to 
aesthetics is a difficulty then this might be just the property which comes into play in 
further study of mathematics, if not earlier. So this is a possible candidate for 
supplementing the utility reasons where, as I am suggesting, they are needed most. 
Nevertheless, the point which I made earlier now comes in to undermine the situation: 
several writers invoke aesthetics as a means to learning mathematics for its utility. 
Aesthetics becomes a means of ensuring that the learning is successful. This is what I 
meant by saying that the aesthetic reason is 'unstable'. Either way my work shows that 
the non-utility views are not of much help iil supplementing the utility views where the 
latter might seem least convincing. 
But as I have already remarked, further work on the extent to which the utility of 
mathematics beyond a rudimentary stage is sufficient for a rationale still needs to be 
undertaken. Without this, however, we still have the entertainment value of 
mathematics as a possible justification for mathematics at all stages and the pursuit of 
aesthetics in at least the later stages. 
Even if my work has not revealed reasons which can replace or supplement the usual 
utility reasons to any considerable extent, it has been important in another way. It has 
shown by a careful, if selective, examination that mathematics does have some 
additional value even if this is not always appropriate for all pupils at all levels. 
Nevertheless, a sensitive teacher who is aware of this value will still in many cases be 
able to communicate it to his or her pupils at least some of the time. 
131 See in particular Whitcombe (1988) and Andrews (1998) who are both explicitly sceptical about the 
utility justification. 
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